Actuality is the Ontological Delimiter of Possibility
I'd like to take this idea out for a test drive. If actuality is the ontological delimiter of possibility (ODOP), what follows?
Offhand, it conflicts with the idea that possibility is ontologically prior to actuality, an idea that might seem attractive given that the actual world is generally thought to be one of a vast number of metaphysically possible worlds. On this picture, we start with a vast ensemble of possible worlds and either (a) one of these possible worlds is somehow "anointed" as the actual world, or (b) actuality is a reflexive relation between each possible world and itself.
The problem with (a) is that this "anointing" would have to come from outside the set of possible worlds, but that makes no more sense than something's coming from nothing (Some may beg to differ, but ex nihilo nihil fit seems to me nearly as secure as the cogito.). By definition nothing can be outside the set of possible worlds.
The problem with (b), as I see it, is its deflationary treatment of actuality. Actuality, according to (b), is nothing special, since every world has it in exactly the same sense. (As the character Dash from The Incredibles reminded us--yes, I liked the movie--"If everyone's 'special' then no one is.") But what's wrong with a deflationary treatment of actuality? If a philosophical all-star like David Lewis endorses it (see his "Anselm and Actuality" in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1), it's got to have something going for it, right? What, he asks, could possibly make the actual world so special? That's a good question and I'll answer it with a question.
What makes possible worlds possible? Why, for instance, is our world possible whereas a world containing square-circles is not? The laws of logic, you say. Fine, I agree. But how could the laws of logic do that if they weren't actual in the first place? How could non-actual laws of any sort constrain anything at all? I don't see how. My argument contra Lewis is therefore also an argument that actuality is the ODOP. If a deflationary account of actuality is accepted, then there is no way to account for the possibility of what is possible, including the alleged real possibility of actuality's being as the deflationist thinks. Hence, we must reject the deflationary account of actuality and recognize that actuality is ontologically prior to possibility. What makes the actual world so special? The very fact that it is the ontological delimiter of possibility.
I'll close with one more observation. If my thesis is correct, then a null world--one of absolute nothingness--is not an intelligible possibility. Its possibility would nullify its possibility. Consequently, there can be no null world. It is necessary that something exists.
It occurs to me just now that I've got to refine my view of the "actual world" to account for the difference between logical and physical possibility. I'll do that tomorrow.
posted by Alan Rhoda @ 11:19 PM
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8 Comments:
Alan,
Always enjoy your thoughts. I'm still relatively new at the technical terminology of philosophy, but in my reading and discussions with others I've never really liked the term "possible worlds." It seems to give ontological priority to the possible over the actual.
My philosophy prof here at seminary is a Molinist. In his description of the Molinist account of God's creation, he talks about God looking at all the possible worlds, picking out the best one, and actualizing it. Now I know that he's simplifying for the sake of those who are totally unfamilar with the concept of PW, but from what I've read of Flint and Craig it's not too far off from what they believe.
But this seems to give more concreteness (I can't think of a better term) to the realm of the possible than I think is necessary. So I say all that to say that I'm with you on actuality being the ODOP. And this works well with Theism, which says that the actual (God) is prior in his essence to the possible (His free actions and their repercussions).
Hey Ross,
Nice to have you chime in. Yes, I share your misgivings about the "grab bag of possibilities" view (that's one of Peirce's expressions). Of course, the typical Molinist would say that these possibilities are "in God's mind" rather than "out there" like Platonic Forms. Perhaps that helps ease some of the issues.
At any rate, I still have to iron out some issues before the actuality as ODOP idea is philosophically "in the clear". Thanks again for your input.
Alan-
I love this issue. It’s really fun to discuss. But as an amateur, I’m just going on intuition and common sense. Anyhow…
Alan: “Offhand, it conflicts with the idea that possibility is ontologically prior to actuality…”
Tom: I never thought this was right either. But when I hear “possibility is ontologically prior to actuality” I usually thought of specific objects or events. In other words, take actual S. Sticking with contingent actualities for the moment, it’s seems to me to be true that before any object or event S can become actual, it must first be possible for S to become actual. Simply put, before something can occur, it must be possible that it occur. We argue this elsewhere, right? So there is a sense in which “possibility before actuality” is true, namely, for any specific actual entity S, possibly S is logically prior. Not only must it be true prior to S’s becoming actual that possibly S, but possibly S remains logically prior to actually S.
BUT…since we ground possibility in what is actually the case, “possibility before actuality” is false. And this is really the more fundamental issue indeterminist need to articulate better. The point is, possibility ,just is an attribute of actuality, by which I mean a disposition of some actual state of affairs. So yes, possibly S is logically prior to actually S. But possibly S is in fact nothing less than some actual state of affairs T with a particular disposition that grounds the proposition possibly S.
Alan: “Why, for instance, is our world possible whereas a world containing square-circles is not? The laws of logic, you say. Fine, I agree. But how could the laws of logic do that if they weren't actual in the first place? How could non-actual laws of any sort constrain anything at all? I don't see how.”
Tom: They can’t. So it must be the case that the laws of logic are necessary truth (so that they delimit possibilities in all possible worlds), which of course begs the question of how that might be the case…viz., God?). Is the law of non-contradiction a necessary truth? Most think so. It is self-existent? If not, then it's grounded in something that is.
Alan: “My argument contra Lewis is therefore also an argument that actuality is the ODOP.
Tom: Right. Possibility just is a dispositional reality. So in fact, “actuality before possibility” is more fundamental and absolute in an unqualified sense; while "possibility before actuality" is true where specific objects or events are under consideration. So there must be some necessary actuality that grounds all possibilities. And it just follows from this that before any particular possibility transitions into actuality, it was possible to so transition.
Alan: “If my thesis is correct, then a null world--one of absolute nothingness--is not an intelligible possibility. Its very possibility would nullify its possibility.”
Tom: I wanna agree, but here's my problem. Consider possible world W in which no sentient being exists. States of affairs would obtain, yes. But there would exist no propositional truth in such a world, since propositions are units of ‘meaning’ and meaning entails language and langauge implies sentience. So to have ANY ‘truth’ you have to have sentience. But isn’t a world with no sentient beings conceivable?
Maybe I just argued myself into your view. Not sure. If we can strengthen the case for theism, great. If anyone can do it, you can!
Tom
Hello? Tap, tap, tap. Anybody there?
;o)
"The point is, possibility just is an attribute of actuality, by which I mean a disposition of some actual state of affairs. So yes, possibly S is logically prior to actually S. But possibly S is in fact nothing less than some actual state of affairs T with a particular disposition that grounds the proposition possibly S."
This seems to be on the right track to me, Tom, though I'm not sure that 'disposition' works well outside the context of physical possibility.
Consider possible world W in which no sentient being exists. States of affairs would obtain, yes. But there would exist no propositional truth in such a world, since propositions are units of ‘meaning’ and meaning entails language and language implies sentience. So to have ANY ‘truth’ you have to have sentience. But isn’t a world with no sentient beings conceivable?
You might be right, but there controversial assumptions here that need to be argued for. Why does meaning entail language? Why does language imply sentience? Does conceivability imply possibility? (Consider "There are no square-circles." You understand that enough to see that it's true, but then doesn't that mean that you can conceive of something that's not possible?)
“This seems to be on the right track to me, Tom, though I'm not sure that 'disposition' works well outside the context of physical possibility.
Hmm. It seems to work fine when we introduce it, for example, into our language about God (as you know Greg does in his diss.). In fact, it would just be a particular divine disposition that grounds the law of non-contradiction. Doesn’t this work?
Does conceivability imply possibility? (Consider "There are no square-circles." You understand that enough to see that it's true, but then doesn't that mean that you can conceive of something that's not possible?)
I don’t think so. Sure, we can SAY the words “square circle.” But that doesn’t amount to conceiving them (if conception is meaningful). I take “conceiving of square circles” to be equivalent to “finding ‘square circles’ meaningful,” and I’m unable to find them meaningful. So when I object to square circles, my objection is meaningful not because I conceive of square circles, but because I’m unable to conceive of them. I can conceive of squares, and I can conceive of circles. But the meanings these concepts have aren’t conjointly meaningful (i.e., no longer meaningful when conjoined and attributed to one and the same object—because they’re meanings are contrary, no one object can be both). So rather than “conceiving of the impossible” by objecting to square circles, I’m really only expressing “the impossibility of conceiving” of square circles.
What fun!
Tom
Hi Tom,
I guess the problem I have with the term 'disposition' is that is seems too weak for things like the laws of logic. Ordinarily, when we say that there is a disposition for X we mean to leave open the possibility of not-X. I'd prefer something with stronger connotations, like 'essential property'.
I'll grant that you may be right about the impossibility of "conceiving" square circles, especially if that is taken to mean having a "clear and distinct" idea.
Alan
Ah, I see. Well, I'm not an expert on Grg's diss. But if you check him out, I think you'll see that 'dispositions' can be determining. They can be 'disposable' (such that they ground possibly S and possibly not-S) or 'indisposable' (such that they ground only possibly S). God's disposition for holiness, for example, is not disposable. You and I would want to say it God cant be unholy. And so his disposition for goodness. But his disposition to create, for example, is disposable. That is, God is free to create or not.
Not sure if this helps. I think we're saying the same thing. If 'essential property' works fine, that's good too I suppose.
Take care,
Tom
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