From the Mailbag: On Mind and Intention

Reader C Grace (Celinda) asked me to comment on the following argument:

p1 Intrinsically, the mind has no form or existence only intention
p2 Intention is a potential relation
p3 Representation occurs when the mind takes on the form of the object presented
p4 Willing is the act of actuating an intention thus creating an actual relation
therefore
c1 the mind gains form and existence from willing a representation of an actually existing object
c2 any misrepresentation that we will has no existence
c3 any actually existing thing that we do not will, that we disbelieve, reject etc, is not represented in the mind.

For background on (p2) see comments on this blog post, and for more details on the overall argument see Celinda's blog here. She's coming from a broadly Thomistic angle.

OK, now for comments. I hope, Celinda, that these will help you refine your thoughts on these issues.

First, I'm skeptical of (p1). It seems to say that that the mind is, in itself, just a tabula rasa, a blank slate waiting for some experience of being to etch something on it and thereby in-form it. The reason I'm skeptical is that I think the mind as blank slate idea has been conclusively refuted from a variety of different angles. I don't have time to go into details, but there are powerful arguments from thinkers like Plato, Reid, Peirce, Chomsky, et al. to the effect that we come into the world partially "hard-wired" with certain a priori conceptions. So I wouldn't say that the mind has absolutely no form. Some Thomists may object and say that allowing any a priori form into the mind will give rise to a Kantian-style skepticism of things-in-themselves. But that doesn't follow if the a priori structure of the mind is isomorphic with the intelligible structure of reality, as thinkers like Reid, Peirce, and Lonergan would argue.

That said, I would agree with Aquinas that our minds start out as largely indeterminate, having a primordial orientation toward being and a receptivity for the forms (or intelligible characters) of experienced objects.

In (p2) I wouldn't talk of a 'potential relation' as opposed to an 'actual relation'. There is either a relation or there isn't. If there is a relation then it is ipso facto actual. What I gather is meant by (p2) is that an intention in itself, considered in abstraction from the existence or nonexistence of its object, does not actually constitute a relation to its object, but if its object does exist and that intention is "fulfilled", then the intention serves to bring the mind into relation with that object.

Regarding (p3), it's not clear what it is for the mind to "take on the form" of the object presented. Is this form a type of qualia, concept, perceptual judgment, or something else? Qualia and/or concepts in themselves will not suffice to bring the mind into relation to any particular object, so I'm guessing that a perceptual judgment (e.g., "That's a red chair") is what's needed here.

Talk of willing "actuating an intention" (p4) sounds odd to me. And why would it create an actual relation? Better, I think, is to say that to will is to form an intention (or simply intend) to do X for the sake of Y. But that by itself won't suffice to bring about a relation between oneself and the ultimate object of one's willing. Perhaps the intention has a built-in time delay (I intend to get up in ten minutes). Or perhaps, unknown to me, I've become paralyzed, such that when I try to carry out my intention I find that I can't.

As for the conclusions (c1)-(c3), I find these rather implausible as they stand. Nor it is terribly clear how they are supposed to follow from the premises. I'll mention just a few issues I have concerning each.

Regarding (c1), I don't think it's right to say that the "mind" wills - persons will, minds don't. Nor does the mind "gain existence" in this way. You need to have an idea of X and thus a mind before you can will X.

Regarding (c2), what is the sense of "misrepresentation" - a false judgment? If so, how does one will a false judgment? Finally, if someone's wills a misrepresentation then doesn't the misrepresentation have to exist in the willing of it?

Regarding (c3), if I reject or disbelieve something then it has to be represented in my mind. I can't have a propositional attitude (like disbelief) without having the corresponding proposition in my mind.

Again, Celinda, I hope these comments help. As it stands, I don't think your argument is very effective. Perhaps you can fix it up for us, or clue me in if I've misunderstood you.