Presentism, Truthmakers, and God
I've just finished revising my paper "Presentism, Truthmakers, and God" and have sent it off to a journal. I made quite a few changes from the earlier version. For those who might be interested, here's the abstract:
Abstract: The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that what exists simpliciter is coextensive with what exists now) is that it does not have sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response ought to meet. In the light of these constraints, I examine and reject several recent proposals by John Bigelow, Simon Keller, and Thomas Crisp. Consideration of how these proposals fail, however, points toward another proposal, that truthmakers for truths about the past are to be identified with God’s memories, which seems to work. I conclude that presentists have, in the truthmaker objection, considerable incentive to endorse theism.And here's a link (.pdf)
posted by Alan Rhoda @ 7:39 PM
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5 Comments:
I had a look at the paper. Obviously it's the first few steps I have an issue with. I haven't persuaded you that Truthmakers are creatures of darkness, so I won't try now.
But what say you to the idea that 'Socrates once existed' is now a fact, and so there is a truthmaker? This implies, as I point out below, that a world where things used to exist is different from a world where nothing existed, and which has just been created, but where all present tense facts in the two worlds are identical.
All the present tense facts in these two worlds would not be the same. That's the point. It's fallacious to suppose that a total reality created by God five minutes ago and given the appearance of our world's particular history (including our memories) would have "all the same present tense facts." They wouldn't, for GOD would in the last analysis figure into that totality differently. HIS memories would be different in the two worlds. And since Alan is arguing that divine memories are the only proper grounds for past-tense truths, it wouldn't be the case in a world created five minutes ago that "Socrates once existed." Though WE could not distinguish this truth, God could. Our memories and history books and other historical records would tell US one thing about the past (viz., false things; things that do not correspond to God's memories of our world [which would in truth be only five minutes old]), but God would know the truth. Hence, God's memories would not be the same in both worlds, hence World A and World B would not be identical. They wouldn't have the same presnt-tense facts. WE would experience the present in the same way, but God wouldn't.
Tom
Ocham,
I accept the implication that "a world where things used to exist is different from a world where nothing existed, and which has just been created" but I deny the compossibility of this with "all present-tense facts in the two [being] identical". Every past-tense fact (true proposition) implies a present-tense fact. Thus, if Q="It was the case that P" is a past-tense fact, then "It is the case that Q" is a present-tense fact. A world in which things used to exist is one in which some past-tense facts (and their present-tense consequences) are true. But the present-tense consequences of these past-tense facts will not be true in a world just created with no prior history. Thus, it is false that all present-tense facts in the two worlds can be identical.
Tom,
Amen.
I'm away on business for the next month. So enough of that. Good luck with the paper Alan. Have a good summer both of you. Tom, do you have a web address or blog? Why not get one, it's free.
William
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