Comments on a Recent Paper
Ian Spencer, a philosophy Ph.D. grad student at UC Davis, has commented on my paper (coauthored with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt) "Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future", which recently came out in Faith and Philosophy (Fall 2006 issue). In this post I'd like to address some of his concerns. I'll take short quotes from him and comment on them in turn.
One of things they do is to argue that the future's causal openness ... is incompatible with the denial of semantic openness for associated future-tensed sentences (a sentence is semantically open if it is neither determinately true nor determinately false).This is inaccurate in two respects. First, our concern is not with future-tensed sentences but with propositions about the future. Sentences and propositions are not the same things. Sentences are physical things (typically strings of words or sounds) that can express a proposition. Propositions are semantically complete units of meaning that can have a truth value. Second, we say that a proposition about the future is 'semantically open' [I now prefer to say 'alethically open'] iff neither the 'will' nor the 'will not' variants of it are true and the corresponding 'might and might not' proposition is true. Thus, a proposition about a state of affairs X obtaining at future time t is semantically open iff neither
They argue for this incompatibilism by arguing that 'will' in normal cases has 'causative force' - when we utter such future-tensed sentences we are indicating that there is some (high, perhaps) causal probability that what we are saying is going to occur. And supposedly that shows that if the future is causally open then such sentences cannot be semantically closed. ... Why think the causative force must show up in the semantics? After all, there's a very important distinction between saying and indicating - when I say that p, I am also indicating that I believe that p, but 'p' in my mouth doesn't have anything about me in its semantics. So 'It will be the case that p' may very well indicate something causal without that showing up in the semantics at all.Why think that predictive propositions about the future have 'causal force' as part of their semantic content? We argue for this in some detail in the paper, but the gist of it is that to make a genuine prediction (as opposed to a mere guess) about the future is to make an assertion about the future. An assertion must express a sincere belief that the future to going to turn out a certain way rather than otherwise. And, we argue, such a belief must involve the conviction that the predicted event is at least probable in light of what is the case at the (putative) time the prediction is made. In other words, to genuinely predict that something 'will' happen is at least to say that it 'will probably' happen. That's what we mean by saying that predictions have 'causal force'.
Ian seems willing to concede that predictive uses of 'will' may indicate that the predicted event is believed to be probable, but he denies that this need amount to saying that the predicted event is probable. True enough, but the significance of this observation hinges upon an ambiguity in the notion of 'saying'. It is correct that for me to say (i.e., utter the sentence) "p is true" indicates that I believe that p, but does not necessarily say (i.e., assert the proposition) . But for that matter, it need not even amount to saying (asserting the proposition) that p. After all, I might be lying or joking when I utter "p is true". Now, the focus in my paper is on what it means to assert a proposition about the future. To do so in a way that could communicate to others, I have to utter a sentence like "X will obtain". But I could also utter that same sentence without having any intent to assert
In fact, their whole argument seems to trade on a confusion between evidence or conditions of rational assertibility on the one hand and truth conditions or semantics on the other.This is a misunderstanding of our position. We do not base meaning and truth conditions on the speaker's evidence but on the speaker's beliefs, irrespective of their evidential grounding. In other words, when we speak of assertibility, what we have in mind is not epistemic or 'warranted' assertibility but merely psychological assertibility - the platitude that to assert p you have to believe p.
But let's say 'will' does function in the way the authors suggest. This tells us nothing about tenseless sentences that don't use 'will'. So you can still have sentences about the future with determinate truth values so long as you don't use 'will'. Or if that's not kosher, we could decide to use 'will' stripped of its causal significance and so still have sentences about the future with determinate truth values even in the face of causal openness.These comments puzzle me. Tenseless propositions cannot be about the future. 'Future' is an inherently tensed concept, so for a proposition to be about the future as such it must be tensed. Tenseless propositions can be construed as disjunctively tensed - either was, or is, or will be - but, again, that doesn't give you a claim about the future. Since predictions are essentially about the future, we can't use these propositions to make predictions. As for the idea of stripping 'will' of any causal force, that is what Ockhamists do. For them, to say that X will happen just means that X does happen at some time subsequent to the (putative) time when the prediction is made. But if the argument of our paper is correct, then to strip the causal force of 'will' is to strip the proposition of its predictive character. This suggestion therefore fails to engage with our argument.
5 Comments:
Hey Alan, thanks for considering my comments! It's nice to have them considered. As for your comments on the first quote, I stand corrected - that was quite a bit sloppy for me to miss the exact formulations of all the relevant notions.
As for the principle of charity, I think it's highly defeasible and not at all constitutive of meaning, though for the purpose of discussion I'll go with it for now and agree on how you apply it. But I still don't think that gets what you want. You say,"Given the principle of charity, any genuine predictive utterance must express the speaker's belief that the predicted event is probable with respect to state of the world at the (putative) time the prediction is made." But what do you mean by "express"? If you mean that the person must believe that the event is probable, fair enough, but that doesn't get you semantic openness since believing that A is probable is perfectly compatible with it being determinately true. If you mean that the person must be asserting that it is probable, I don't see how this follows from a principle of charity. Yes, Sally should be interpreted to believe that A is probable when she predicts it, but that doesn't mean that when she asserts the proposition that it will happen that what she is asserting is merely that it is probable. In order to make a claim of any kind at all, whether about past or present or future, if I'm making a genuine assertion and what I'm asserting is by my lights assertible, I will take it that what I am asserting is probable - but in no case does that necessarily mean that what I am asserting is that something is probable. So I still don't see how the Sally case or charity is really relevant to the semantics of the sentences used or the propositions asserted.
As for the last quote, I agree that a tenseless sentence can't be about the future under that description but it can still be about the future nonetheless. "It rains in 2010", for instance, is about the future even though not under the description "future" or designated as such by a future-tensed verb. When you say, "But if the argument of our paper is correct, then to strip the causal force of 'will' is to strip the proposition of its predictive character. This suggestion therefore fails to engage with our argument." I'm not quite sure I'm following this. You'll have to explain it a bit more clearly - the idea is that even if ordinary English 'will' functions in the way you say it does, we could introduce a new use that doesn't have anything about probability in its semantic content. For all that's been said, I don't see why we couldn't or how the arguments of the paper would rule it out. Maybe I'm just being dense - you'll have to spell it out to me.
Let me just say a bit more (yes, I know, I've already said quite a lot!):
When I try to formalize your argument, I get something like this:
1. If X rationally asserts that it will be the case that p then X believes that p is probable.
2. If (1) then (if X rationally asserts that it will be the case that p then what X is really asserting is that p is probable)
3. So if X rationally asserts that it will be the case that p then what X is really asserting is that p is probable.
But why think (2) is true? The only argument I can think of is something like this:
4. If X rationally asserts that p then X believes that q.
5. If (if X rationally asserts that r then X believes that q) then what X is really asserting is that p is probable.
6. So, (2)
But I see no reason to accept (5) - in fact, it seems obviously false as a general, necessary rule about propositions, assertion and belief.
Maybe I'm missing something - in which case you can help me out by formalizing the argument in a way that doesn't have these same sorts of problems (or formalize a different argument for (2) or one for (5)).
Oops! I noticed (5) should actually say:
5. If (if X rationally asserts that p then X believes that q) then what X is really asserting is that q.
Darn typos.
Hi Ian,
Thanks for your reply. I just got back into town from Boston and things are a bit hectic. As soon as things settle down (in the next couple days), I'll try to respond.
Alan
Ian,
Sorry for taking so long to get back to you. I'm going to make a new post to address what I see as the central issue, namely, whether 'will' propositions about the future carry causal force as part of their semantic content, or whether causal force has to do with something over-and-above the semantics (the pragmatics of future-tense discourse, say).
On a different point, you say, "a tenseless sentence can't be about the future under that description but it can still be about the future nonetheless". Again, I don't think 'sentences' are what we should be focusing on, but regardless, I don't think this is right. For a tenseless sentence to really be about the future the context of use has got to tell us that the times or events referred to are actually future. But if the context supplies that information then the sentence as used in that context expresses a tensed proposition. It's not tenseless after all. If the sentence as used were genuinely tenseless, and we fully comprehended its meaning, we would be completely unable to say whether the events spoken of are past, present, or future. That's what being tenseless means - conveying no information about how something is temporally related to the present.
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