Many discussions of logical fatalism and of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and future contingency turn on the question of whether propositions about future contingents are true in advance. More exactly, they raise questions about whether any ‘will’ or ‘does’ propositions about events which have an intermediate chance of occurring (i.e., a current single-case objective… Read More »
I’ve now finishing my re-reading of Trenton Merricks’ book Truth and Ontology and I’m still quite unconvinced by his contention that what’s true does not depend on what exists in any substantive way. A couple posts ago I noted my main reasons for dissatisfaction with Merricks’ arguments: He loads down truthmaker principles, which affirm a… Read More »
I’m really happy right now because a paper of mine (“Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence”) was just accepted at Religious Studies. In my experience, at least, the turnaround at that journal is phenomenally fast. This is the second paper I’ve submitted there. On both I received an acceptance notice within a week or less. I’ll… Read More »
I’ve recently been rereading Trenton Merrick’s book Truth and Ontology (Oxford, 2007) in which he argues against the substantive dependence of truth on being. Thus, he rejects theses like TM – Every truth has a truthmaker, a parcel of reality the existence of which necessitates, and thereby grounds, that truth. TSB – Truth supervenes on… Read More »
of 200+ living philosophers of religion.
In my two previous posts, I have explained the notion of ‘truth at a time’ and argued that for a (contingent) proposition to be true at T it must supervene upon what exists at T. In short, truth at T requires a truthmaker at T. A question that remains concerns accessibility relations among times. If… Read More »
As a follow-up to my previous post, I’d like to say a bit about how truth at a time and truth at a world relate to truth simpliciter. Unlike ‘truth at a world’ and ‘truth at a time’, truth simpliciter is not evaluated from the perspective of any given time or world, but absolutely. In… Read More »
In my previous post I made the following claim without argument: “for a proposition to be true now, what it represents as being the case must correspond to … what is the case now.” I’m now going to give that argument. Every argument for any categorical conclusion requires some categorical assumptions which are not defended… Read More »
The future is ‘alethically’ open at time T with respect to possible state of affairs X and future time T* > T if and only if neither “X will obtain at T*” nor “X will not obtain at T*” is true at T. I believe that the future is alethically open with respect to future… Read More »
I’ve been reflecting a bit about the following analogy proposed by Enigman: Given someone who knows that she can move freely anywhere within an infinitely dimensional space, does she know that she has complete freedom of motion? The problem is that such a space is isomorphic to a hyperspace containing such a space as a… Read More »