On Biblical Inerrancy

When most Christians speak of Biblical “inerrancy” they have in mind what could more accurately be called “strong” or “dogmatic” inerrancy. It is a kind of methodological stance, amounting to something like this: strong inerrancy (SI) = If something in the Bible looks implausible or mistaken, then either you haven’t understood it properly, you have… Read More »

The Modal Openness of the Future

There’s a simple and valid argument for fatalism based on a proposition which most analytic philosophers would accept. The assumption is this There is an actual world, alpha, which contains a complete history. Unlike other merely possible worlds, alpha is the possible world that “obtains”. For the sake of argument I take this assumption for… Read More »

Three Models of Divine Sustaining

Theists believe that God is not only responsible for creating or bringing about (the initial state) of a world of concrete finite beings but also that God in some sense sustains those beings throughout their existence. But what does divine sustaining amount to? I’d like to identify three possible models of divine sustaining. continuous creation:… Read More »

Cahn on Ockhamist Semantics

By ‘Ockhamist semantics’ (‘Ockhamism’ for short) I mean the thesis that what’s true at a time about other times depends entirely on what occurs at those other times. Thus, if a coin is flipped at T and lands heads at T*, then Ockhamism implies that “The coin will land heads at T*” was true at… Read More »

On a Misguided Application of Excluded Middle

Many discussions of logical fatalism and of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and future contingency turn on the question of whether propositions about future contingents are true in advance. More exactly, they raise questions about whether any ‘will’ or ‘does’ propositions about events which have an intermediate chance of occurring (i.e., a current single-case objective… Read More »

Theism and Truthmaking

Trenton Merricks claims that truthmakers must be what truths are “about” in some unarticulated sense of “about”. He then argues against truthmaker-type principles by claiming that there are truths of various sorts for which his undefined aboutness criterion cannot be met. In two of my last three posts I have criticized Merricks for leaving this… Read More »

More on Merricks on Truthmaking

I’ve now finishing my re-reading of Trenton Merricks’ book Truth and Ontology and I’m still quite unconvinced by his contention that what’s true does not depend on what exists in any substantive way. A couple posts ago I noted my main reasons for dissatisfaction with Merricks’ arguments: He loads down truthmaker principles, which affirm a… Read More »

Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence

I’m really happy right now because a paper of mine (“Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence”) was just accepted at Religious Studies. In my experience, at least, the turnaround at that journal is phenomenally fast. This is the second paper I’ve submitted there. On both I received an acceptance notice within a week or less. I’ll… Read More »

Merricks on Truthmaking

I’ve recently been rereading Trenton Merrick’s book Truth and Ontology (Oxford, 2007) in which he argues against the substantive dependence of truth on being. Thus, he rejects theses like TM – Every truth has a truthmaker, a parcel of reality the existence of which necessitates, and thereby grounds, that truth. TSB – Truth supervenes on… Read More »