{"id":114,"date":"2006-08-24T04:27:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-24T08:27:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=114"},"modified":"2006-08-24T04:27:00","modified_gmt":"2006-08-24T08:27:00","slug":"can-a-timeless-god-freely-create","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2006\/08\/can-a-timeless-god-freely-create\/","title":{"rendered":"Can a Timeless God Freely Create?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>I don&#8217;t think so. Let me explain.<\/p>\n<p>To say that God freely creates is to say that he could have refrained from creating and that he could have created a different sort of world, one with different initial and boundary conditions.<\/p>\n<p>To say that God is timeless is to say that he undergoes no change in any respects whatsoever. In other words, it is to say that God is absolutely immutable.<\/p>\n<p>Given these two assumptions (and assuming, of course, that there is a God who has in fact freely created), we can derive a contradiction:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>God is absolutely immutable.<span style=\"font-style: italic;\"><\/span><\/li>\n<li>God has freely created.<\/li>\n<li>A free act proceeds from a free decision from among several mutually exclusive possibilities.<\/li>\n<li>Therefore, God made a free decision to create from among several mutually exclusive possibilities. (2,3)<\/li>\n<li>A free decision from among several mutually exclusive possibilities involves a <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">change <\/span>in one&#8217;s &#8216;intentional stance&#8217; from regarding something as indeterminate (as one of several possibilities) to regarding it as determinate (as the chosen course of action).<\/li>\n<li>Therefore, in freely created God undergoes a change in his intentional stance. (4,5)<\/li>\n<li>Therefore, God has changed in some respect. (6)<\/li>\n<li>Therefore, God is not absolutely immutable. (7)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>But (8) contradicts (1), and since (8) follows from (2), it follows that (2) contradicts (1). Hence, God cannot both be absolutely immutable (and timeless) and freely create.<\/p>\n<p>The only way to avoid the conclusion is to challenge the logic at some point or reject one of the independent premises, namely, (3) or (5). As far as I can see, the argument is valid, so the logic  seems to check out. One might, however, try rejecting premise (3) by arguing that a free act need not proceed from a free decision. Perhaps God never <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">decided <\/span>to create. Perhaps he has just immutably <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">willed<\/span> to create. Okay, but what makes this &#8220;willing&#8221; <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">free<\/span>? That God has immutably willed to create could just as easily be said of a God who had no freedom, who had to create precisely the sort of world that we find ourselves in. Perhaps one could say that God&#8217;s immutably willing to create is free because nothing about God&#8217;s nature constrains God to will as he does. But if that&#8217;s so, then why does God will as he does? Why does he immutably will to create precisely <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">this <\/span>type of world and not another or no world at all? It&#8217;s not clear that any answer can be given unless it&#8217;s along the lines of &#8220;because that&#8217;s what he <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">decided<\/span> to do,&#8221; in which case premise (3) is conceded. On the current proposal, therefore, it is just a <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">brute fact<\/span> that God wills as he does. He didn&#8217;t <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">choose<\/span> to will as he does; he just does will as he does. I think it&#8217;s safe to say that that&#8217;s a rather lame explanation.<\/p>\n<p>What&#8217;s more, how is a denial of (3) to be squared with divine providence (i.e., God&#8217;s manner of ruling creation)? <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">Every <\/span>theory of providence that I am aware of &#8211; Calvinism, Molinism, open theism, etc. &#8211; makes <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">explicit<\/span> reference to God&#8217;s &#8216;deciding&#8217; on or &#8216;choosing&#8217; one possibility from among several others. The Biblical writers talk that way as well (for example, the nation of Israel is said to be &#8220;chosen&#8221; of God).<\/p>\n<p>As for premise (5) it too seems to be highly plausible. Certainly when <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">we<\/span> make decisions we move from a state of indecision to a state of decision and a clear change in our intentional stance vis-a-vis our deliberative options takes place. Does this have to be the case for a timeless God? Perhaps not. Perhaps God&#8217;s deliberative process can be understood in terms of distinct <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">logical<\/span> moments, rather than distinct <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">temporal<\/span> moments. An example of this distinction is the order of the steps in the proof of a mathematical theorem. It takes a human mathematician time to trace through the logical steps in performing the proof. That&#8217;s a temporal sequence. But in the proof itself, considered abstractly as an ordered set of propositions connected by logical rules, there is only a logical sequence. The axioms from which the proof sets out are <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">logically prior<\/span> to the conclusion, but not temporally prior to it. Could God&#8217;s decision to create be understood along similar lines? In other words could we say that God&#8217;s contemplation of possibilities and his deciding to actualize one of them occur simultaneously, as it were, with the &#8220;change&#8221; in God&#8217;s intentional stance reflecting a mere logical sequence and not a temporal one?<\/p>\n<p>I don&#8217;t think this will work because the relation between (1) God&#8217;s contemplation of a set of creative possibilities and (2) his selecting one of those is <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">not<\/span> a logical sequence. In other words, no purely logical relation is going to get you from a proposition describing a set of possibilities (&#8220;Either A or B or C &#8230;&#8221;) to a proposition affirming just one of those possibilities (&#8220;A&#8221;). The latter just doesn&#8217;t follow from the former. What we need is not a logical rule, but something substantive, namely, the exclusion of the other possibilities (&#8220;Neither B nor C &#8230;&#8221;). This exclusion is due to a volitional act on God&#8217;s part, an act that effects a transition from volitional indeterminacy (&#8220;Either A or B or C &#8230;&#8221;) to volitional determinacy (&#8220;A&#8221;). And it is simply incoherent to suppose that God (or anyone else) could be in both states <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">at once<\/span>. There are two distinct intentional stances here, and they are incompatible. Hence a free decision to create involves a <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">qualitative change <\/span>in God&#8217;s mental life. And qualitative changes are <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">temporal<\/span>, not logical.<\/p>\n<p>I conclude, then, that the above argument is sound. A timeless God could not freely create. On the assumption that God has freely created, therefore, it follows that God is not timeless.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>I don&#8217;t think so. Let me explain. To say that God freely creates is to say that he could have refrained from creating and that he could have created a different sort of world, one with different initial and boundary conditions. To say that God is timeless is to say that he undergoes no change\u2026 <span class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2006\/08\/can-a-timeless-god-freely-create\/\">Read More &raquo;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-114","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=114"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=114"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=114"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=114"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}