{"id":1254,"date":"2024-04-18T10:55:42","date_gmt":"2024-04-18T15:55:42","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=1254"},"modified":"2024-04-19T10:51:57","modified_gmt":"2024-04-19T15:51:57","slug":"philosophical-essays-against-open-theism-ch-5-helm","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2024\/04\/philosophical-essays-against-open-theism-ch-5-helm\/","title":{"rendered":"Philosophical Essays against Open Theism \u2013 ch. 5: Helm"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"PhilosophicalThis is part five of eleven in a series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism<\/em><\/a> (Routledge, 2019).<\/p>\n

In this post I tackle chapter 5 by Paul Helm, “The ‘Openness’ in Compatibilism” (pp. 80\u201392). Helm is a well-respected philosopher of religion and a long-time staunch defender of theistic determinism, the idea that God is the ultimate sufficient cause of everything that ever happens.<\/p>\n

In this essay, Helm argues that open theism is poorly motivated, incurs unacceptable theological costs, and that “compatibilism” (by which Helm means theistic determinism\u2014on p. 85 he refers to “the determinism of compatibilism”) can provide more than enough openness to “satisfy all who desire their theology to be ‘open'” (p. 80).<\/p>\n

In this essay review, I argue that Helm’s case against open theism has the same “flimsiness” (p. 80) that he thinks the case for open theism does. I also argue that his case for “compatibilism” is quite flimsy as well and, moreover, ignores the serious theological costs of theistic determinism.<\/p>\n

Helm on why open theism is poorly motivated (pp. 80\u201383)<\/strong><\/p>\n

In this section Helm discusses one of my earliest papers, “The Philosophical Case for Open Theism.”<\/a>\u00a0 In that 2007 paper, I present four very brief<\/em> arguments in favor of the “future contingency thesis,” the claim that there are future contingents, i.e., causally indeterministic future event-types. These reasons are (1) that in deliberation it seems<\/em> to us that our options are open-ended and that it is generally up to us (and nothing else) to determine which option comes to pass; (2) that quantum mechanics<\/em> suggests that there is genuine causal indeterminism in nature; (3) that commonly and deeply-held intuitions about moral responsibility<\/em> suggest that it traces back to what Robert Kane calls “self-forming actions,” which are inherently indeterministic; and (4) that the\u00a0problem of evil<\/em> poses a significantly harder challenge for theistic determinism than it does for libertarian free-will theism. Helm considers each argument in turn.<\/p>\n

With respect to (1), the “argument from deliberation,” Helm correctly notes that I only claim that this argument offers prima facie<\/em> evidence of future contingency, but he immediately challenges even that modest claim: “it is prima facie evidence of future contingency only if we conceive<\/span> of our situation as one in which we possess unconditional power to choose A or to choose B” (p. 81, emphasis mine). Helm apparently thinks this conception is wrong and that, instead, “our experience is of the kind of being able to do A if<\/span> we want to or B if<\/span> we want to, or neither if<\/span> that is what we want” (p. 81, emphasis mine).<\/p>\n

In response to Helm, I think he’s doing very poor phenomenology here. When I actively deliberate between two incompatible options\u2014with Helm, let’s call them A and B\u2014I’m not entertaining competing conditionals<\/em> (should I do A if<\/em> I want to or do B if<\/em> I want to?) but categoricals<\/em> (should I do A or do B?). Moreover, I don’t “conceive” of my deliberation as a situation in which I have “unconditional power to choose A or to choose B.” That way of framing things abstracts<\/em> from the concrete deliberative struggle and re-presents it at a meta-level in a purely conceptual manner. In contrast, when I deliberate, rather than “conceiving” of my deliberation as a “situation” of some sort, I perceive\u00a0<\/em>my own divided agency and I feel\u00a0<\/em>my own power to choose between A and B. Nor do I feel<\/em> my choice as something that happens<\/em> to me when one set of reasons becomes clearly dominant. Rather, I feel<\/em> myself making<\/em> that set of reasons dominant. (If my reasons for one option or another had been clearly dominant all along, then there wouldn’t have been anything to deliberate about.) Now, this feeling might be an illusion. Perhaps, unknown to me, there are subconscious psychological forces that will eventually cause me to settle on A over against B. And perhaps, when that happens, I will feel as if<\/em> I played a decisive role in settling on A when it was really a foregone conclusion all along. That’s why this argument is only prima facie<\/em> evidence of indeterministic freedom. But it’s evidence, nonetheless, and evidence that Helm casually dismisses because he does not approach deliberation with phenomenological sensitivity.<\/p>\n

With respect to (3), the “argument from intuition,” Helm claims that my argument is “question-begging” because “compatibilists” can make sense of self-forming actions too. [Note, when Helm speaks of “compatibilism,” he really means soft determinism<\/em>. Compatibilism proper is silent on the question of whether determinism is true. Helm is not silent on that point. He is an outspoken determinist.] On the soft determinist account, moral responsibility depends on whether the causal chains determining one’s choices and actions run through one’s psyche<\/em> in the right sort of way, such that the proximate<\/em> cause of one’s moral choices is, in some relevant sense, the agent himself. For comparison, a compatibilist who is not a determinist would typically say that moral responsibility depends on whether one’s choices and actions emerge from one’s psyche<\/em> in the right sort of way. Here, only the proximate<\/em> relation of choices to psyche is relevant. Either way, only proximate<\/em> causes and relations matter. In contrast, the moral responsibility argument for libertarianism is based on the intuition that the ultimate<\/em>, not merely proximate, cause of one’s moral choices must be the agent himself. This intuition conflicts with determinism because, if determinism were true, then the agent could at most<\/em> be a proximate cause of his choices\u2014whether he chooses moral good or moral evil on some occasion would ultimately be decided by determining causal factors laid down independently of the agent. A common libertarian worry is that, if this were true, then everyone would have a perfect moral alibi\/excuse\u2014the causal system made me do it!\u2014absolving them of any real moral responsibility.<\/p>\n

Now, this seems like a compelling argument to me, and not just to me. Most of the early Church Fathers of Christianity pressed exactly that sort of argument in favor of libertarian creaturely freedom. But Helm claims this is question-begging. Is it? Well, begging the question is a dialectical fallacy that occurs when one’s argument assumes, without independent support, a premise that would in all likelihood not be accepted by the audience the argument is aimed at. The relevant question, then, is what audience is my paper most plausibly aimed at on a charitable reading? If my argument were aimed at refuting hardened determinists like Helm, I would need to have started from premises they <\/em>accept and show that those premises lead to conclusions that they<\/em> would have difficulty accepting. But that’s not how my argument is presented. It’s presented as part of a cumulative case for<\/em> causal indeterminism \/ future contingency and not<\/em> as a refutation of determinism. My appeal to the prima facie<\/em> evidence of deliberation, for example, could not plausibly be construed as a refutation. As such, my argument is most plausibly aimed at those who are neutral<\/em> \/ on the fence with respect to determinism. I’m suggesting, for example, that if they reflect on their own<\/em> moral intuitions, they will see that we need some degree of ultimate<\/em> and not merely proximate responsibility. Some (like Helm) will insist that they don’t have such intuitions, so my argument surely won’t convince them, but it’s not question-begging if my argument wasn’t aimed at such people in the first place.<\/p>\n

With respect to (2), the argument from quantum-mechanics, my contention was simply that, according to the most “widely accepted” interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is causal indeterminism at the micro-physical level. This is obviously not a “refute determinism” type of argument. It’s part of a cumulative case for indeterminism. Helm responds in two ways. First, he suggests that quantum indeterminism is merely apparent. From the all-determining God’s eye perspective, there is no real<\/em> indeterminism. Second, he says that quantum indeterminism is irrelevant to creaturely libertarian freedom unless there’s a way to scale such indeterminism up from the micro-level to the macro-level (p. 82). I grant both of these points. With respect to the first, however, I didn’t present this argument as an empirical proof<\/em>, but merely as evidence pointing toward indeterminism that determinists, for their part, need to explain away<\/em>. With respect to the second, Helm’s point is irrelevant because I’m merely arguing here for indeterminism \/ future contingency, not creaturely libertarian freedom as such.<\/p>\n

Helm closes his brief discussion of (2) with the puzzling line that “the argument has little to do with logically indeterminate<\/span> futures” (p. 82, emphasis mine). Indeed, he speaks of “logical indeterminacy” rather frequently in this essay in connection with open theism. Frankly, however, I don’t understand what Helm means by this phrase. Nor do I understand its relevance. And he doesn’t explain it. Arguments (1)\u2013(4) have to do with causal <\/em>indeterminism, not logical indeterminism (whatever that could mean). And they have to do with indeterminism<\/em>, not indeterminacy. The only plausible sense I can give to the phrase “logical indeterminacy” is that of logical undecidability<\/em>\u2014as Kurt G\u00f6del proved, in any axiomatic system that includes basic arithmetic, one can formulate theorems that cannot be proven<\/em> true or false in that system. But that sort of indeterminacy is, as far as I can tell, irrelevant in the context of Helm’s paper.<\/p>\n

Finally, with respect to (4), the argument that the problem of evil is significantly\u00a0worse<\/em> for theistic determinism than for free-will theism (and esp. open theism), Helm’s response completely misses the point. Basically, he says that, according to theistic determinism, God has an “overall good” plan for creation, which plan “may” include notorious evils (p. 82). In contrast, he thinks open theists “say little about God’s plans” (p. 83), but because God can (on open theism) prevent all evils, God must have some sort of reason for not doing so. Hence, theistic determinism and open theism are in the same boat when it comes to the problem of evil.<\/p>\n

What Helm misses is that there’s a significant difference between God’s merely permitting\u00a0<\/em>(and thus not preventing) evil E to occur and God’s specifically intending and\u00a0ultimately causing<\/em> E to occur. This difference is particularly salient with respect to\u00a0moral evils<\/em> or\u00a0sins<\/em>. Open theists can and typically do hold that\u00a0no moral evils<\/em> are specifically intended or caused by God. All moral evils are objectively tragic<\/em>. The world would have been overall better had they not occurred. Their actual occurrence isn’t necessary for any “greater good.” It is only the possibility<\/em> of their occurrence that is necessary\u2014because it is good, all things considered, that creatures have moral freedom, and thus the ability to misuse that freedom by sinning. The theistic determinist can’t say that. He is committed to the highly counterintuitive claim that a perfectly good God specifically intends and ultimately causes\u00a0<\/em>every single instance of moral evil that ever occurs. This makes God, quite literally, the author of sin. Moreover, it generates an incoherence between God’s decretive “sovereign will” and His prescriptive “moral will” with God commanding us not<\/em> to sin (as in the Ten Commandments) while at the same time setting up a causal system that\u00a0ensures<\/em> we commit the very sins God tells us not to do. Finally, theistic determinists are committed to defending the highly implausible claim that every single evil<\/em> that ever occurs is somehow necessary<\/em> for the “greater good” God is aiming at. But, really??? Every single evil??? It seems much more plausible to me that whatever those greater goods might be, if God causally micro-manages all the details of history (as He does on theistic determinism), then He could easily have achieved all of those greater goods, or something comparably wonderful, without<\/em> nearly as many (as as severe) evils as we actually witness. Thus, even on theistic determinism, it seems a priori<\/em> highly plausible that most<\/em> actual evils, including all or nearly all moral evils, should be considered gratuitous and thus not necessary<\/em> for any greater good. This being so, theistic determinism calls the goodness<\/em> of God seriously into question because it strongly suggests that God has specifically caused a great many evils for no good reason. Open theism, in contrast, does not entail that any<\/em> specific evil is necessary <\/em>for a greater good. All it entails is that the possibility<\/em> of the types<\/em> of evil that we witness is necessary for a greater good. That claim, too, may seem implausible to some, but it’s not nearly<\/em> as implausible as the idea that every actual evil is necessary for a greater good. For these reasons, Helm’s claim that theistic determinism and open theism are in the same boat with respect to the problem of evil strikes me as morally obtuse.<\/p>\n

Summing up this section, Helm thinks that my reasons for affirming future contingency are “distinctly weak” (p. 83) and “flimsy” (p. 80). For my part, I think his dismissals of my reasons are distinctly weak. It seems to me that his ideological blinders prevent him from honestly considering how theistic determinism looks from the outside.<\/p>\n

Helm on the costs of libertarian freedom (pp. 83\u201384)<\/strong><\/p>\n

As Helm sees it, free-will theists “are prepared to go to extraordinary \u2026 lengths” to defend creaturely libertarian freedom (p. 83). He proffers Molinism <\/em>as an prime example of this claim: It’s apparatus of middle knowledge is widely thought by many philosophers and theologians (including myself<\/a>) to be extremely problematic. Helm then shifts to open theism, which, he says, is “even more” problematic than Molinism. How so? Helm mentions two costs, though they are really the same point:<\/p>\n