{"id":1292,"date":"2024-05-10T11:05:08","date_gmt":"2024-05-10T16:05:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=1292"},"modified":"2026-03-12T14:05:38","modified_gmt":"2026-03-12T19:05:38","slug":"philosophical-essays-against-open-theism-ch-8-anderson","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2024\/05\/philosophical-essays-against-open-theism-ch-8-anderson\/","title":{"rendered":"Philosophical Essays against Open Theism \u2013 ch. 8: Anderson"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"PhilosophicalThis is part eight of eleven in a series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism<\/em><\/a> (Routledge, 2019).<\/p>\n

In this post I tackle chapter 8 by James N. Anderson, “‘May It Have Happened, Lord!’: Open Theism and Past-Directed Prayers” (pp. 121\u2013139). This is one of the more interesting essays in the volume because it tackles an issue that is rarely discussed\u2014”past-directed prayers” and whether different models of divine providence can accommodate them.<\/p>\n

In what follows, I first discuss Anderson’s conception of open theism and argue that it misses the mark. Second, I discuss the nature of past-directed prayers or what could be more accurately be termed “retrospectively answered prayers” (RAPs). Third, I discuss whether such prayers are coherent<\/em>. Could they be meaningfully prayed? And could God affirmatively answer them? Fourth, I critically examine Anderson’s review of five different models of divine providence and whether they can accommodate such prayers. Fifth, I critique Anderson’s attempt to develop an argument from RAPs against open theism. Anderson argues that open theism is uniquely disadvantaged in relation to RAPs in comparison with the other models. I argue that, if anything, open theism fares better<\/em> than all of the other models. Sixth and finally, I examine Anderson’s most impressive example of a putative RAP and argue that there are perfectly good ways of making sense of it without supposing it to be an actual RAP.<\/p>\n

1. Anderson on Open Theism<\/strong><\/p>\n

In my recent Open Theism<\/em><\/a> book (Cambridge, 2024), I inadvertently misquoted Anderson on p. 3, attributing to him the claim that, for open theism, “God lacks comprehensive foreknowledge.” This was a misquote of p. 121 of Anderson’s essay where he attributes to open theists the claim that “God lacks comprehensive foreknowledge of the future free decisions of His creatures.” My apologies to Anderson for the misattribution.<\/p>\n

That said, however, Anderson’s actual claim about open theism is false. The word “comprehensive” is the main problem because this implies that open theists believe God has either merely<\/em> partial<\/em> foreknowledge of future free creaturely decisions or no<\/em> foreknowledge of future free creaturely decisions whatsoever. Indeed, <S lacks comprehensive knowledge of X> seems to entail <S lacks comprehensive knowledge (period)>, in which case my misquote of Anderson remains “fake, but accurate.” But, regardless of whether that entailment holds, both alternatives\u2014that open theists believe God’s foreknowledge of future free creaturely decisions is either merely partial<\/em> or\u00a0altogether nonexistent<\/em>\u2014are false. Most published open theists are open future open theists<\/em> (OFOTs). They think God does have comprehensive<\/em> foreknowledge of future free creaturely decisions. They differ from non-open theists (NOTs) by affirming that the content<\/em> of that foreknowledge consists of propositions that represent the future as indeterminate<\/em> with respect to those decisions. For example, instead of God knowing propositions like <S will do action A at future time T>, which OFOTs regard as not true<\/em>, OFOTs believe God knows propositions like <S\u00a0will-with-probability-k<\/em> do action A at future time T> and <S might and might not do action A at future time T>.<\/p>\n

A few pages later, Anderson describes open theism slightly differently. Here he says that, for open theists, “God does not foreknow the free choices of humans” but does possess “some\u00a0<\/em>foreknowledge, namely, foreknowledge of events that do not depend on (future) human free choices” (p. 129). This gloss drops the word “comprehensive” and is thus, in my view, more defensible. But it does assume something that OFOTs would not grant, namely, that all divine foreknowledge is knowledge of propositions that represent the future as\u00a0determinate<\/em> in some respect or other (e.g., will<\/em> and will not<\/em> propositions). This is a dialectically safe assumption only if Anderson takes his readership to consist almost entirely of NOTs. Otherwise, it’s question-begging.<\/p>\n

Finally, at the very end of the essay, in the final endnote, Anderson, like many other NOTs, describes open theism as giving a “weak account of divine providence” (p. 139). I’m sorry, but no. Process theism arguably qualifies as a “weak” account of divine providence\u2014because on that model God can’t unilaterally do anything in creation\u2014but open theism does not. On open theism God really could have done exactly what theistic determinists believe God has done, namely, unilaterally ordain “whatsoever comes to pass” (Westminster Confession, 3.1), but God deliberately <\/em>chose not to<\/em>. This does not render God any\u00a0less provident than on theistic determinism, for God specifically permits<\/em> whatsoever comes to pass (without necessarily ordaining it). All it means is that God is free to exercise<\/em> His providence differently than theistic determinists suppose.<\/p>\n

2. What Are Past-Directed or “Retrospectively Answered” Prayers?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Anderson offers a 4-part definition of “past-directed” prayers (pp. 122\u2013123). His account mostly follows a 2005 paper by Kevin Timpe titled “Prayers for the Past.”<\/a> I here present my own simplified version of Anderson’s account. It incorporates both Anderson’s own minor criticisms of Timpe’s definition and his inclusion of prayers that, while not explicitly<\/em> past-directed, nevertheless\u00a0implicitly<\/em> require for their fulfillment that God have specifically brought about something in the past. Because such prayers need not be explicitly past-directed, I replace Anderson’s and Timpe’s talk of “past-directed” prayers with the more precise “retrospectively answered prayers” (RAPs). Anderson himself proposes that phrase on p. 123.<\/p>\n

RAP =def.<\/sub> A collection of petitionary prayers (P) that meet the following criteria:<\/p>\n