{"id":1304,"date":"2024-05-17T13:25:31","date_gmt":"2024-05-17T18:25:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=1304"},"modified":"2024-12-03T10:16:51","modified_gmt":"2024-12-03T15:16:51","slug":"philosophical-essays-against-open-theism-ch-9-welty","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2024\/05\/philosophical-essays-against-open-theism-ch-9-welty\/","title":{"rendered":"Philosophical Essays against Open Theism \u2013 ch. 9: Welty"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"PhilosophicalThis is part nine of eleven in a series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism<\/em><\/a> (Routledge, 2019).<\/p>\n

In this post I tackle chapter 9 by Greg Welty, “Open Theism, Risk-Taking, and the Problem of Evil” (pp. 140\u2013158). Welty’s argument, roughly, is that open theism enjoys virtually no advantages over theistic determinism when it comes to the problem of evil. This argument, if cogent, would supply a significant undercutting defeater<\/em> for open theism. That is, it would neutralize one of the main selling points for open theism (namely, the problem of evil) over against providential models like theistic determinism and Molinism in which God specifically intends<\/em> (for the sake of some greater good) every single instance of evil that ever occurs.<\/p>\n

I begin by examining Welty’s understanding of open theism (\u00a71). I then consider his discussions of open theism and gratuitous evil (\u00a72), meticulous providence (\u00a73), moral motivation (\u00a74), and divine risk-taking (\u00a75). I argue throughout that Welty’s efforts to blunt the\u00a0prima facie<\/em> advantages of open theism over theistic determinism with respect to the problem of evil fail. With respect to evil, open theism remains\u00a0significantly<\/em> more plausible than theistic determinism.<\/p>\n

1. Welty on open theism and risk vs. no-risk models of providence<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the very beginning of his essay, Welty characterizes open theism as the view that “God lacks foreknowledge of undetermined future events, such as the knowledge of how humans will or would use their libertarian freedom” (p. 140). One nice thing about this characterization is that it is not limited to creaturely libertarian choices but applies to undermined events generally. One downside is that it puts a negative (“God lacks”) spin on the open theistic content of God’s knowledge rather than offering a neutral description (e.g., “God knows the future as open-ended because it is open-ended”). As such, it is question-begging if understood as assuming that there are<\/em> truths, such as ones about how undermined future events will<\/em> or\u00a0would<\/em> turn out, the knowledge of which an open theistic God lacks.<\/p>\n

In the middle of his essay, however, Welty characterizes the knowledge of God at the moment creation on open theism as one of “massive divine ignorance” (p. 148). This is a total straw man, for many open theists like myself would say that God is unqualifiedly omniscient\u00a0at every moment<\/em>. It’s just that the\u00a0content<\/em> of God’s knowledge changes as contingencies are resolved.<\/p>\n

Welty rightly characterizes open theism as “risky” model of divine providence. It is risky in the sense that, by delegating<\/em> aspects of how creation plays out to His creatures, God opens up the possibility that His creatures might specify those aspects of creation in ways that are objectively less than ideal\u2014for example, by misusing their God-given freedom. In contrast, theistic determinism and Molinism are risk-free<\/em> models of providence because, on those models, God doesn’t delegate to creatures at all but sovereignly ordains “whatsoever comes to pass,” as the Westminster Confession (3.1) famously put it. God, in short, is an omni-specifying micro-manager<\/em> and is guaranteed always to get exactly<\/em> what He ordained. As for non-deterministic divine timelessness and simple foreknowledge, they barely qualify as models of providence at all for in them, upon choosing to create, God simply finds Himself<\/em> with a completely specified creation history. Welty summarizes:<\/p>\n

[T]heological determinism and Molinism require risk-free providence, open theism and ‘incremental’ simple foreknowledge require risky providence, and divine timelessness and ‘complete’ simple foreknowledge are (by themselves) not systems of providence at all. (p. 140)<\/p>\n

Welty seems inclined to discount Molinism because it arguably faces “insuperable, independent objections” (p. 140). In light of my own reflections on Molinism<\/a>, I’m happy to concede the point. Setting Molinism aside allows Welty to restrict his focus to open theism, on the one hand, and theistic determinism, on the other.<\/p>\n

2. Open theism and gratuitous evil (pp. 141\u2013146)<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the context of the problem of evil, an “evil” may be understood as anything that, when considered without regard<\/em> for the “big picture,” would seem on its face to be a net negative for reality. So understood, evils may be either gratuitous or non-gratuitous. A non-gratuitous<\/em> evil is one that, when considered\u00a0with regard<\/em> for the “big picture,” is not<\/em> a net negative because it (or something equally bad) is necessary<\/em> for realizing a greater good or preventing a worse evil. In contrast, a\u00a0gratuitous evil<\/em> is one that, when considered with regard<\/em> for the “big picture”, remains a net negative for reality because it is\u00a0not necessary<\/em> for realizing a greater good or preventing a worse evil. In other words, gratuitous evils are evils that, all things considered, the world would have been better off without.<\/p>\n

As Welty points out (p. 141), on a risk-free<\/em> model of providence like theistic determinism, there can be no gratuitous evils, for God, being perfectly good, simply would not ordain any evil at all unless it (or something equally bad) were necessary<\/em> either to realize a greater good or to prevent a worse evil. In contract, on a\u00a0risky<\/em> model of providence like open theism, there can be gratuitous evils because what’s necessary for the greater good is not that each and every evil (or something equally bad) be actual<\/em>, but merely that such evils be\u00a0possible<\/em>. For example, an open theist might say that it was not necessary for any greater good that Adam and Eve actually sin in the Garden of Eden. All that was necessary is that it be\u00a0possible<\/em> for them to sin\u2014because God’s creating humans with moral freedom is necessary for great goods that would not be obtainable by wholly determined creatures.<\/p>\n

Welty goes too far, however, when he claims that, for open theism, “[n]o moral or natural evil\u00a0must\u00a0<\/em>occur \u2026 for any of these great goods to be realized” (p. 142). He’s saying that, for open theism,\u00a0all<\/em> evils are gratuitous. This is false. Some open theists may wish to endorse such a claim, but it’s not an entailment of open theism as such. An open theist might say, for example, that while all moral<\/em> evil is gratuitous\u2014the world would have been overall better had no sin ever occurred\u2014not all natural<\/em> evil is gratuitous. Perhaps some instances of natural evil are necessary to create a “vale of soul-making” so that morally free creatures can develop virtues like courage and generosity that presuppose the existence of real dangers and real scarcity.<\/p>\n

In any case, that open theism allows for gratuitous evil seems to give it a significant advantage over theistic determinism when it comes to the\u00a0evidential problem of evil<\/em>. As formulated by William Rowe, this problem takes the following form:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Theological premise: If God existed, then there would be no gratuitous evils.<\/li>\n
  2. Evidential premise: There are gratuitous evils.<\/li>\n
  3. Therefore, it is not the case that God exists.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    In terms of what’s already been noted, theistic determinism is committed to (1) and the falsity of (3) and so has to reject (2). But (2) certainly looks<\/em> very plausible in that many evils not only do not seem<\/em> to be necessary for realizing any greater goods or for avoiding worse evils, but also seem not<\/em> to be necessary in those ways. The need to reject (2) thus commits the theistic determinist to a strong form of skeptical theism<\/em>. Unlike moderate skeptical theism, which claims merely that we can’t reliably reason from <Evil E does not seem<\/em> to be non-gratuitous> to <Evil E is gratuitous>, strong skeptical theism claims that we can’t even defeasibly reason from <Evil E seems<\/em> to be gratuitous> to <Evil E is<\/em> gratuitous>. In other words, even if we’ve carefully considered evil E and it really looks gratuitous to us, we should dismiss that as evidentially irrelevant. The main problem with strong skeptical theism is that it promotes moral skepticism<\/em> by denying our ability to reason defeasibly from seems overall bad <\/em>to is overall bad<\/em>. It thus undermines our ability to ascertain whether states of affairs are compatible or incompatible with overall goodness. As such, it also undermines our ability meaningfully to say that God\u00a0<\/em>is good. This is a high cost to pay to defend theistic determinism. It’s also a cost that Welty completely overlooks.<\/p>\n

    Open theism, in contrast, denies (1) and affirms (2). By affirming (2), open theism rejects strong skeptical theism and so does not undermine our ability to reason defeasibly from <Evil E seems<\/em> to be gratuitous> to <Evil E is<\/em> gratuitous>. So, open theism does not promote moral skepticism. The main advantage open theists have with respect to the evidential problem of evil is not, as Welty says, that they can contest both premises of the argument (p. 143), but rather that they can concede the highly plausible (2) while denying the less plausible (1), whereas theistic determinists have to deny the much more plausible (2) in order to protect the less plausible (1). Theistic determinists have a much bigger bullet to bite.<\/p>\n

    [As an aside, it might be helpful to reflect on just\u00a0how implausible<\/em> denying (2) is, especially on theistic determinism. After all, why couldn’t an all-determining God obtain whatever “greater goods” He’s aiming at without far<\/em> less evil than there actually is? Even if those goods require that there be\u00a0some<\/em> sins, why so many? Even if those goods requires that there be some<\/em> suffering, why so much? On the face of it, it emphatically does not seem<\/em> as if every evil is specifically necessary <\/em>for some greater good. Moreover, for serious moral evils at least, it emphatically seems <\/em>that such evils are not<\/em> specifically necessary for any greater good but are in fact tragic<\/em>. They are net minuses<\/em>, things the world would have been overall better without.]<\/p>\n

    Welty argues, however, that open theists can’t coherently accept (2) and deny (1):<\/p>\n

    Although open theists reject the view that any particular evil is\u00a0necessary<\/em> in God’s providential scheme \u2026, it seems they must accept a parallel view: with respect to any particular actual evil, God’s following his general policy of nonintervention in this case<\/em> was necessary to maximize opportunities for great goods that could only be obtained by God’s following such a non-interventionist policy. \u2026 (Why else<\/em> wouldn’t he intervene when he is fully able to do so, except for a judgment of this sort on God’s part?) It follows that for any evil in God’s universe, God had to permit it upon pain of violating a policy grounded in his moral goodness. In this sense,\u00a0no<\/em> evil is gratuitous. (p. 143)<\/p>\n

    To make matters more concrete, Welty considers an actual example of a five-year-old girl Sue who was “beaten, raped, and strangled by her mother’s boyfriend” (p. 144). Why didn’t God intervene to prevent this? Welty sees only four possibilities (I’ve adapted them slightly):<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. God didn’t intervene because Sue’s suffering was specifically necessary<\/em> for a greater good.<\/li>\n
    2. God didn’t intervene\u00a0because He lacked the power<\/em>, goodness, or knowledge to do so.<\/li>\n
    3. God didn’t intervene because\u00a0intervening would have undermined a general policy<\/em> that is necessary for a greater good.<\/em><\/li>\n
    4. God didn’t intervene\u00a0even though He could have done so\u00a0without undermining any general policy<\/em> that is necessary for a greater good. (p. 144)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Welty attributes option (a) to theistic determinism, option (b) to “sub-theistic” views like process theism, and option (c) to open theism. He anticipates that open theists will reject (d) because “on that option permitting the gratuitous evil remains wholly unjustified” (p. 144). But, if the open theist goes with option (c), then “the demands of morality required<\/em> [God] to permit the evil” (p. 144). But then, “how is this so different” from the theistic determinist’s position? On both views “no evil is gratuitous” because every evil is “necessary to obtain outweighing goods,” whether specific goods or general goods (pp. 144\u2013145).<\/p>\n

      Welty’s reasoning is faulty, though. The problem is that (d) is ambiguous. It can be read as saying either (d\u2013<\/sup>) or (d+<\/sup>):<\/p>\n

      d\u2013<\/sup>. God didn’t intervene despite having no good reason whatsoever<\/em> for not intervening.<\/p>\n

      d+<\/sup>. God didn’t intervene because His general policies require that He permit evils of that type<\/em>.<\/p>\n

      When read as implying (d\u2013<\/sup>), Welty is correct that open theists would reject (d). God, being perfectly good, cannot allow evil\u00a0without good reason. But what Welty misses is that (d) is also compatible with (d+<\/sup>), and the latter is something that open theists can accept. What (d+<\/sup>) says is that God’s reason for permitting Sue’s suffering need not be token-specific<\/em>. Open theists, recall, are committed to the idea that, for at least some<\/em> token evils (particularly moral ones), it is only their possibility<\/em> that is necessary for a greater good, not their actuality. In Sue’s case, therefore, we can suppose that her actual suffering was neither token-necessary<\/em> for some particular greater good (a) nor token-necessary<\/em> for upholding some general policy aimed at a greater good (c). Rather, we can suppose that the possibility<\/em> of suffering like Sue’s was type-necessary<\/em> for a greater good. After all, if God has good reasons for giving humans significant moral freedom, including the freedom to physically harm one another, then He can’t dictate precisely how, when, where, and how often they exercise that freedom. God may decide to prevent some instances of Sue-like suffering, but His general freedom-giving policy requires that He allow some such evils to occur subject only to whatever frequency and distribution constraints His perfect goodness requires. Those instances that God decides not<\/em> to prevent remain, by definition, gratuitous because they are not token-necessary<\/em> for a greater good, but only type-necessary <\/em>with respect to their possibility<\/em>, not their actuality.<\/p>\n

      So, contrary to Welty, open theists can<\/em> consistently accept (2) and deny (1). Open theism and theistic determinism are thus not<\/em> in the same moral boat when it comes to gratuitous evil.<\/p>\n

      3. Open theism and meticulous providence (pp. 146\u2013149)<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Welty next argues that the difference between theistic determinism’s meticulous<\/em> providence and open theism’s\u00a0general<\/em> providence is much smaller than might be supposed. Open theists, he contends, are committed to “meticulish” providence (p. 147). Let’s look at his argument.<\/p>\n

      Welty first tries to correct a “misleading” impression about the meticulous providence \/ general providence contrast. Meticulous providence says that, at the moment of creation, God unilaterally ordains whatsoever comes to pass. General providence says that, at the moment of creation, God unilaterally ordains only the initial conditions and a “world-type” (p. 146), leaving many of the details of that type as yet-to-be-filled-in by free creaturely agents and God’s responses to those agents. So far so good, but Welty thinks we need to move the comparison point away from the moment of creation and that, when we do so, the contrast between meticulous and general providence starts to blur:<\/p>\n

      [S]ince on open theism God is temporal, he is continually making decisions<\/span> as history unfolds and as his awareness of present human tendencies changes. And that implies that \u2026 [w]hether or not good decisions\u00a0actually<\/em> occur, or bad decisions\u00a0actually<\/em> occur, depends quite a bit on God’s ongoing decisions about what to\u00a0actually<\/em> permit. \u2026 Yes, “the particular way things will go” cannot be known by God at the moment of creation<\/em>. But it will be known by God (or believed with a high likelihood of truth) just prior to the choices themselves<\/span><\/em>, at precisely a time when God is in a position to prevent those choices. (p. 146, underlined emphasis is mine)<\/p>\n

      What Welty is arguing is that, for open theism, God specifically permits <\/em>each and every evil that occurs and does so under conditions where, just prior to each evil, He has virtually certain knowledge<\/em> of what’s going to happen.<\/p>\n

      Based on this conclusion, Welty contends that open theism arrives at a “meticulish” model of providence:<\/p>\n

      [On open theism] although God cannot guarantee the actualization of any specific possible world through any creative decision he makes at the\u00a0outset<\/em> of world history \u2026, God\u00a0can<\/em> virtually guarantee the actualization of a specific possible world\u2014and not just a ‘world type’\u2014by way of his providential decisions\u00a0as world history unfolds<\/em>. (p. 148)<\/p>\n

      On these grounds Welty concludes that open theism is committed to “literal micromanagement” (p. 149) and therefore, just like theistic determinism, open theism cannot<\/em> consistently accept (2) and deny (1) (p. 149).<\/p>\n

      In response to Welty I have two main points to make.<\/p>\n

      First, when Welty describes the open theist God as “continually making decisions,” this is incorrect. As I argue in my Open Theism<\/em><\/a> book (Cambridge, 2024), the best version of open theism will affirm that God does exhaustive contingency planning<\/em> explanatorily prior to actually creating. On this version of open theism, all of God’s decisions have already been made under the same epistemic conditions<\/em> that God is in prior to creation. Welty is wrong, therefore, that the particular way future contingencies will go cannot be known by God at the moment of creation but somehow can be known by God (or believed with high likelihood) in such a way as to inform God’s decisions just prior to the resolution of those contingencies.<\/p>\n

      Second, Welty is simply wrong that probabilities invariably rise (or lower) to near certainties (i.e., either 1 or 0) “just prior to the choices themselves.” Probabilities can certainly change as contingencies resolve. This is particularly true where there is a chain of future contingencies. For example, if an indeterministically fair coin is tossed five times, the probability that it lands heads all five times<\/em> is 1\/32 at the outset but becomes 1\/2 after four heads have already been tossed and zero if it lands tails at any point during the first four tosses. In contrast to such contingency chains, individual <\/i>indeterministic events have a base probability<\/em> defined by the type of event in question. In our coin toss example, the base probability of head versus tails is 1\/2. It doesn’t matter how close we get to the time of the coin toss, that probability is going to stay at 1\/2. Likewise, the probability of a individual libertarian free choice cannot deviate significantly from one over the number of parallel live options. So, if there are exactly two live options, and the free agent is in a torn condition between them, then the agent could just as easily choose either way up until the very moment<\/em> of the choice itself. The only reasonable probability estimate under these conditions is 1\/2. In general, as long as we’re still dealing with future contingencies, probabilities do\u00a0not\u00a0converge<\/em> to either zero or one. They remain at the base probability for the relevant type of event.<\/p>\n

      If we put these two points together, we can see that Welty’s argument that open theism is a “meticulish” model of providence morally on par with theistic determinism’s meticulous model of providence abjectly fails. Unlike meticulous providence, God does not specifically ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Unlike meticulish providence, God does not specifically permit whatsoever comes to pass with near-certain confidence that it is going to come to pass. What open theism affirms, rather, is that God permits a wide range of future contingencies, including various evils, without any advance certainty, or near-certainty, as to how those contingencies are going to play out. He engages in contingency planning to pre-decide how He will respond<\/em> to each contingency, but even if He does exhaustive<\/em> contingency planning, this is not “literal micromanagement.” Responses, after all, come too late<\/em> for that.<\/p>\n

      4. Open theism and moral motivation (pp. 150\u2013153)<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Welty next considers an objection against theistic determinism by noted open theist philosopher William Hasker. Hasker argues that those who reject the possibility of gratuitous evils are committed to an\u00a0offsetting good principle<\/em>:<\/p>\n

      Offsetting good principle (OG)<\/strong>: Any harm resulting from a morally wrong action will be offset by a ‘greater good’ that God could not have obtained without [ordaining] the evil in question. (p. 150)<\/p>\n

      My insertion of “ordaining” here replaces Hasker’s “permitting.” The point is that, for theistic determinism, nothing is merely “permitted” by God. In any case, Hasker argues that OGP is at odds with another principle that is much more fundamental to the Christian worldview:<\/p>\n

      Divine moral intention principle (DMI)<\/strong>: It is an extremely important part of God’s intention for human persons that they should place a high priority on fulfilling moral obligations and should assume major responsibility for the welfare of their fellow human beings” (p. 150)<\/p>\n

      According to Hasker, OG and DMI are in conflict, for “if we really believed that the \u2026 [OG principle] obtained in God’s universe, then that knowledge would undermine our moral decision-making, and that would be at odds with the \u2026 [DMI principle]” (p. 150). The thinking seems to go like this: If we thought that every bad thing was specifically necessary<\/em> for a greater good, in most cases a greater good that\u2014per strong skeptical theism\u2014is utterly beyond our ken, then we would have no reason for trying to change<\/em> the\u00a0status quo by helping people to improve their lot (e.g., by campaigning against human slavery or sex trafficking). For all we know, working to change things would be working\u00a0contrary to<\/em> the offsetting goods that God is aiming at. Hence, best to accept the status quo and passively wait for God to change things. In such a way, it may be argued, OG undermines DMI.<\/p>\n

      Welty, for his part, will have none of this.<\/p>\n

      His first line of response to Hasker (pp. 150\u2013151) is to appeal to the arguments we’ve just considered relating to gratuitous evil (\u00a72 above) and meticulous providence (\u00a73). But, as we’ve seen, those arguments don’t work.<\/p>\n

      Welty second line of response (pp. 151\u2013153) is to deny that OG and DMI are in conflict:<\/p>\n

      Hasker’s key mistake is to\u00a0only<\/em> draw our attention to the following principle, implicit in \u2026 [theistic determinism]: [3] If I were to harm P, then the world would be better off off than if I hadn’t harmed P. But he seems to overlook the complementary principle \u2026 : [4] If I were to refrain from harming P, then the world would be better off than if I had harmed P. \u2026 Assuming that both [3] and [4] are true, the key observation to be made is that, in my moral deliberations, I don’t know which will come to pass \u2026 But then the convictions of a theological determinist \u2026 wouldn’t lead her in\u00a0either<\/em> direction with respect to harming P. Since these cancel each other out \u2026 any previous (independent) reasons for thinking that harming P is wrong or blameworthy come into play, and\u00a0those\u00a0<\/em>motivations are not undermined by my convictions about divine providence. (pp. 152\u2013153, numeration of [3] and [4] changed to avoid conflation with (1) and (2) above).<\/p>\n

      Welty’s idea here is that, even though OG by itself<\/em> leaves us agnostic how to behave, we have\u00a0independent<\/em> reasons to pursue the welfare of our fellow human beings. These reasons are not<\/em> undermined by OG. Thus, OG is compatible with DMI.<\/p>\n

      I don’t think this response works as well as Welty thinks it does. The central issue here is whether or not OG undermines our supposedly independent reasons for pursuing human welfare. If it does, then OG does undermine DMI after all. Do we, then, have any reason to think that OG would undermine whatever other reasons we may have for pursuing human welfare? Yes, we do. Recall from above that theistic determinism requires a strong<\/em> version of skeptical theism in order to resist the inference from <There seem to be gratuitous evils> to <Probably, there are gratuitous evils>. We can replace “gratuitous evils” here with “all-things-considered evils” or “objective evils” as opposed to merely subjective or perspectival evils, i.e., things that\u00a0seem<\/em> evil when viewed from a finite, human perspective but that are not evil<\/em> when viewed from God’s perspective. Indeed, given OG, all seeming evils are really objective instrumental goods<\/em> because they are specifically necessary<\/em> for some “greater good.” When understood in this way we can see that strong skeptical theism tells us to distrust<\/em> our moral seemings for it implies that whatever in reality may seem <\/em>objectively bad to us is actually good. But if we can’t trust our moral seemings, then we can’t trust whatever independent reasons we might think we have for pursuing human welfare, for those reasons must ultimately bottom out in moral seemings if they are to motivate us.<\/p>\n

      In sum, then, I don’t think Welty succeeds in deflecting Hasker’s criticism.<\/p>\n

      5. Open theism and divine risk-taking (pp. 153\u2013155)<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Throughout most of Welty’s essay his main goal is to argue that open theism enjoys no significant advantage over theistic determinism with respect to the problem of evil and moral motivation. In the final section of his paper he attempts to show that theistic determinism does enjoy at least one significant advantage over open theism, particularly with respect to the ethics of divine risk-taking.<\/p>\n

      Welty first notes that, given a risky model of providence, there is an asymmetry between God’s exposure to risk versus that of His creatures: “God’s risk-taking exposes humans to risks that are much severer [sic<\/em>] than the risks that God undertakes for himself” (p. 154). Thus, God risks being disappointed, but is otherwise invulnerable to any real harm. Humans, in contrast, face tremendous risks, such as being “subject to involuntary, torturous pain for years on end” (p. 154).<\/p>\n

      Welty then appeals to certain moral intuitions about risk-taking:<\/p>\n