{"id":1366,"date":"2025-03-21T14:29:52","date_gmt":"2025-03-21T19:29:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=1366"},"modified":"2025-03-26T09:42:14","modified_gmt":"2025-03-26T14:42:14","slug":"the-hexagon-of-heresy-part-1-the-dialectic-of-the-one-and-the-many","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2025\/03\/the-hexagon-of-heresy-part-1-the-dialectic-of-the-one-and-the-many\/","title":{"rendered":"The Hexagon of Heresy \u2013 Part 1: The Dialectic of the One and the Many"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft\" style=\"margin-right: 20px;\" src=\"https:\/\/prodimage.images-bn.com\/pimages\/9781666754308_p0_v3_s600x595.jpg\" alt=\"The Hexagon of Heresy\" width=\"200\" \/> This blog post is the first in a series on a recent book by James D. Gifford, Jr. titled\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/dp\/1666754307\"><em>The Hexagon of Heresy: A Historical and Theological Study of Definitional Divine Simplicity<\/em><\/a> (Wipf &amp; Stock, 2022).<\/p>\n<p>I have several reasons for interest in this book.<\/p>\n<p>First, its discussion of &#8220;definitional divine simplicity&#8221; (DDS), which modern philosophers of religion more commonly call <em>absolute<\/em> divine simplicity, reinforced for me a conclusion I reached <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2017\/02\/evaluation-of-thomistic-metaphysics-part-1-intro\/\">some 8 years ago<\/a>. My conclusion was that DDS\u2014the thesis that everything intrinsic to God is identical to God\u2014leads to either (a) modal collapse or (b) providential collapse. (I borrow the latter term from <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/archive\/SCHFMC-2.pdf\">Joe Schmidt<\/a>.) That is, either all of reality is metaphysically necessary because everything is implicated in God&#8217;s metaphysically necessary essence, or God is absolutely indifferent to all non-divine realities and thus literally couldn&#8217;t care less about creation. Either result is theologically disastrous, resulting in top-down pantheism and\/or occasionalism on the modal collapse side and extreme deism and\/or atheism on the providential collapse side.<\/p>\n<p>Second, Gifford&#8217;s book connected the dots for me between cosmology, providence, and Christology. I&#8217;ve long advocated for a robustly <em>relational<\/em> model of divine providence called <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/9781009349390\">open theism<\/a>, but I hadn&#8217;t thought all that deeply about Christology until I read Gifford&#8217;s book. He showed me that an <em>orthodox<\/em> Christology (i.e., one aligned with the early ecumenical councils) naturally goes hand-in-hand with a relational theology that gives both God and creation their full due and allows both to connect with each other at a deep level. Conversely, orthodox Christology is deeply antithetical to the DDS-infused &#8220;classical&#8221; or <em>non-relational<\/em> theism that eventually (post-Augustine) became dominant in the Christian West.<\/p>\n<p>Third, the Christology\/cosmology connection that Gifford highlights with his &#8220;hexagon of heresy&#8221; generalizes to any context in which we want to relate a fundamental &#8220;One&#8221; (God) with a distinct &#8220;Many&#8221; (creation). Gifford helpfully explores some of these connections, but in a historical and not in a fully systematic way. That&#8217;s where my philosophical background comes in. After reading Gifford&#8217;s book I recognized that the problems with DDS that he focuses on are rooted in something deeper, a rationalistic impulse that seeks to <em>reduce<\/em> the Many to the One and ultimately to <em>eliminate<\/em> the Many in favor of the One. It&#8217;s this impulse that gives rise to DDS. After realizing this I spent several weeks thinking through the Christological and cosmological dialectic that Gifford documents, tracing out parallel &#8220;hexagons&#8221; with respect to divine providence, soteriology, religious epistemology, ecclesiology, sacraments, the Trinity, and so forth. (Gifford has helped me <em>significantly<\/em> with this in private conversation. We&#8217;ve been chatting back-and-forth for about a year now.)<\/p>\n<p>My plan for this blog series is to summarize Gifford&#8217;s book and present my reflections on the broader dialectic that his book brings to light. I won&#8217;t cover historical developments (ecumenical councils, etc.) in detail. Readers can consult the book for that\u2014Gifford&#8217;s book is dense reading, but very insightful. My approach will be thematic, beginning with the underlying dialectic (post #1), then Christology (post #2), then cosmology\/providence (post #3), and finally constructively expanding the &#8220;hexagon of heresy&#8221; into other domains (post #4).<\/p>\n<p>That said, let&#8217;s begin.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Problem of One and the Many<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>When we look around we encounter a world with a diverse plurality: people, animals, plants, minerals, stars, ideas, sensations, etc. This plurality, however, is obviously not a <em>brute<\/em> plurality\u2014it&#8217;s not a random chaos where anything and everything is possible. It has structure. It has limits. This allows us conceptually to organize reality and, to some extent at least, make sense of it.<\/p>\n<p>Some 2600 years ago, a group of ancient philosophers known today as the Presocratics became dissatisfied with the crude polytheism of their pagan forbearers in which the &#8220;gods&#8221; and the rest of reality were thought to have spontaneously emerged from a primordial chaos. The gods imposed some semblance of order on the rest of the chaos, but were themselves fickle and unreliable, often fighting among themselves and engaging in all the sorts of stupidity to which humans themselves are prone. The Presocratics reckoned that this was no proper way to run a universe and so scrapped the pagan pantheon and sought for a more stable and fundamental ground for reality. Noting that reality had <em>structure<\/em>, they looked for ways to account for that structure. They looked for an <em>explanatory unity<\/em> (a One) amid the plurality (the Many).<\/p>\n<p>Some looked for a <em>material<\/em> principle of unity. Thales thought that <em>water\u00a0<\/em>might be the fundamental element. Anaximenes thought it might be\u00a0<em>air<\/em>. Heraclitus thought it might be\u00a0<em>fire<\/em>. Before long, however, they started thinking that the unity of reality must be something more <em>mind-like<\/em>. Thus, Empedocles proposed that in addition to the four material elements (earth, air, fire, and water) there were two motive principles, <em>love<\/em> and\u00a0<em>strife<\/em>, that explained why the elements combined or opposed each other in the ways they did. Anaxagoras went further and said that the fundamental principle was\u00a0<em>nous<\/em> (mind). There was a unified guiding intelligence behind the cosmos. Still other Presocratics sought for unity in something quite <em>abstract<\/em>. Anaximander thought the principle of unity was indescribable, infinite, and unlimited (Greek, <em>to apeiron<\/em>). Pythagoras thought it was <em>number<\/em>. And Parmenides thought it was an absolute and immutable principle of unity that he called the &#8220;One.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Now, the <em>root idea<\/em> behind the Presocratic quest is a good one: When confronted with a plurality, look for an underlying principle of unity to explain that plurality. This is one of the core ideas underlying modern science. But some of the Presocratics\u2014Parmenides most especially\u2014pushed this idea to the extreme. He viewed the quest for unity not just as a\u00a0<em>heuristic<\/em> (a guiding rule of thumb) but as a\u00a0<em>rationalistic imperative<\/em>: We\u00a0<em>must<\/em> transcend every plurality in order to explain its existence or even possible existence. The inevitable result of this imperative is that everything must reduce to an <em>absolute<\/em> One which, because it is beyond all plurality and all distinctions, must be &#8220;beyond being,&#8221; &#8220;beyond good and evil,&#8221; &#8220;beyond logic,&#8221; and beyond anything that could possibly give us any conceptual purchase on the One. With Parmenides, the extreme rationalistic drive for unity undermines human reason itself and bottoms out in absurdity.<\/p>\n<p>Much later, Leibniz, an equally rationalistic thinker, argued that all of reality\u00a0<em>must<\/em> obey an explanatory principle that he called the <em>principle of sufficient reason<\/em> (PSR). According to PSR, there must be a logically sufficient (i.e., necessitating) reason for every logically contingent state of affairs (i.e., everything that could conceivably have been otherwise). From this it follows that there can\u00a0<em>be<\/em> no logically contingent states of affairs, for whatever necessarily follows from the necessary is itself necessary. Appearances to the contrary, Leibniz insisted that this is the &#8220;best of all possible worlds&#8221; and, therefore, the <em>only<\/em> possible world God could have created. The result is <em>modal collapse<\/em>: everything is necessary; nothing is contingent. An ironic consequence of rationalizing everything via PSR is again a kind of absurdity because, if all of reality is an eternally frozen block of absolute, immutable necessity, then no room is left for the <em>activity<\/em> of sense-making. In short, we can&#8217;t make sense of our own ability to make sense of things.<\/p>\n<p>In general, the problem of the One and the Many is to find intrinsic unity within an otherwise chaotic Many. On the one hand, without any intrinsic unity, the Many is a meaningless chaos, a random jumble. On the other hand, if we insist on reducing the Many to an <em>absolute\u00a0<\/em>unity, then everything fuses into an undifferentiated whole and we lose the possibility of any conceptual <em>contrast<\/em> by which we can meaningfully say that something is <em>this and not that<\/em>. Both of these extreme &#8220;solutions&#8221; to the problem of the One and the Many are dead ends. One &#8220;solves&#8221; the problem by eliminating all unity. There is just a brute Many and no One. The other &#8220;solves&#8221; the problem by eliminating the Many. There is only the One. Obviously, if we&#8217;re going to do full justice to our own experience, then some kind of balance must be struck. A true solution must posit a fundamental One that is <em>also<\/em> in some sense irreducibly Many. Ideally, we would also want to make sense of this fundamental unity-in-difference by showing how its inherent many-ness follows from its own unity. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity offers one possible solution, and perhaps the only solution. There are different models of the Trinity, but any good model posits a fundamental principle of unity\u2014either the Father or the divine essence\u2014and holds that that principle inevitably requires a Trinitarian plurality, such that the One is, necessarily, also a Many.<\/p>\n<p><strong>DDS and the Hexagon of Heresy<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>But if we\u00a0<em>define<\/em> the One as an\u00a0<em>absolute<\/em> unity\u2014this is why Gifford speaks of &#8220;definitional&#8221; divine simplicity (DDS)\u2014then there can be no mediating solution. If the One is absolute, then nothing <em>in<\/em> the One can reflect the many-ness of the Many. Its many-ness\u2014that is, its status <em>as Many<\/em>\u2014must be <em>excluded<\/em> from the One. This means that either<\/p>\n<ol style=\"list-style-type: lower-alpha;\">\n<li>The One includes the Many by\u00a0<em>negating its many-ness<\/em>. This is the\u00a0<strong>monist solution<\/strong> whereby the Many is absorbed into the One and thus\u00a0<em>does not exist<\/em> as Many.<\/li>\n<li>The One utterly excludes the Many. This is the\u00a0<strong>dichotomist\/dualist solution<\/strong> whereby neither the One nor the Many have anything to do with each other. From the perspective of each, it is as if the other\u00a0<em>does not exist<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Sane people of commonsense cannot tolerate either of these extremes. They have a choice, either reject DDS or affirm DDS but mask or obscure its stark implications by <em>pretending<\/em> that those implications don&#8217;t follow and trying instead to &#8220;damage control&#8221; the One\u2013Many tension by shifting from the fundamental category of <em>existence\/being<\/em> (whether something is) to a conceptually less fundamental category like <em>essence\/nature<\/em> (what something is) or <em>energy\/action\/event<\/em> (what something does; what&#8217;s happening). The different categorical levels at which people try to damage control the One\u2013Many tension under DDS generate what Gifford calls the &#8220;hexagon of heresy&#8221; (hereafter, the Hexagon).<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><em>Side note #1<\/em>: The categories of\u00a0<em>existence<\/em>,\u00a0<em>essence<\/em>, and\u00a0<em>energy<\/em> are not the only levels at which one might try to mitigate the fallout from DDS. In theory one could try to do so at the level of\u00a0<em>mode\/trope\/state\/accident<\/em> (how something non-essentially is) or at the level of\u00a0<em>relation<\/em> (how something relates to other things). Doing so could in principle generate an\u00a0<em>octagon<\/em> or\u00a0<em>decagon<\/em> of &#8220;heresy.&#8221; But these distinctions are somewhat less clear than <em>existence<\/em>,\u00a0<em>essence<\/em>, and\u00a0<em>energy<\/em> and in some cases overlap with those. For example, there are many different kinds of relation (logical, causal, spatial, etc.); logical ones are essential and (efficient) causal ones are energetic. Likewise some <em>modes\/states\/etc.<\/em> are energetic, e.g., that I am now sitting is due to my activity of sitting down. Because too many distinctions muddies the water, I&#8217;ll stick with the three that figure most prominently in Gifford&#8217;s analysis.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, attempts to damage control the One\u2013Many tension while holding on to DDS are ultimately exercises in self-delusion. The problem is that DDS functions like an equals sign (=). If everything <em>in\u00a0<\/em>the One\u00a0<em>is<\/em> (=) the One, then the One&#8217;s existence = the One&#8217;s essence = the One&#8217;s activity\/energy. So all attempts to contain the fallout of DDS to a metaphysical level less inclusive than\u00a0<em>existence\/being<\/em> are unstable and ultimately doomed to failure. Humans, however, are <em>very<\/em> good at self-deception. For various reasons, many Christians (and Jews and Muslims) continue to affirm DDS while vainly fooling themselves that the fallout can be contained in a way that is religiously adequate.<\/p>\n<p>The graphic below is my reconstruction of the Hexagon as it pertains to the problem of the One and the Many. Open the image in a new tab to enlarge.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter\" src=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Screenshot-2025-03-19-163519.jpg\" alt=\"The Hexagon of Heresy\" width=\"640\" \/><\/p>\n<p>The top row expresses the basic One\u2013Many dialectic under DDS. That is, if the One is an <em>absolute<\/em> unity, then the Many must either be absolutely excluded from the One (A) or the Many must be completely absorbed into the One (B). On the first option (A), the Many is nothing but pure chaos, having no unity whatsoever. Either there is no One at all, or the One has no connection at all with the Many. From the perspective of each it is as if the other <em>does not exist<\/em>. On the second option (B), the One doesn&#8217;t even allow the Many to exist. There is <em>only<\/em> the One and nothing else. Either way, the implications of the dialectic play out at the fundamental level of <em>existence\/being<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>The second row attempts to contain the dialectic to the level of <em>essence\/nature<\/em>. We suppose that both the One and the Many can <em>exist<\/em> without tension. Because an absolute One is intrinsically <em>opposed<\/em> to the Many, however, by nature they <em>bound<\/em> each other. This leaves two possibilities. One possibility is that the Many limits the One. The One and the Many exist <em>alongside<\/em> each other with no intrinsic overlap (C). They cannot occupy the same &#8220;space.&#8221; Like two stones lying side-by-side in a river bed, then can &#8220;touch&#8221; or &#8220;see&#8221; each other, but can only interact extrinsically (i.e., indirectly or from the outside). On (C) the Many has no <em>intrinsic<\/em> unity. Whatever unity it has is projected <em>onto<\/em> it. The result is pure <em>nominalism<\/em>. The other possibility (D) is that the Many doesn&#8217;t limit the One at all. The One overcomes the boundary separating it from the Many by wholly dominating the Many (without absorbing it as in (B)). On (D) the Many has intrinsic unity, but that unity is entirely projected <em>into<\/em> it from the One. The Many, in other words, has no intrinsic facility for self-organization and so is wholly <em>passive<\/em> in relation to the One.<\/p>\n<p>The third row attempts to contain the dialectic to the level of <em>energy\/action<\/em>. Here we suppose that both the One and the Many exist and that the Many has its own <em>internal<\/em> structure or unity that isn&#8217;t passively received from the One. Again, because an absolute One is intrinsically <em>opposed <\/em>to the Many this means at the level of <em>energy\/action<\/em> that the two cannot <em>synergize<\/em>. They are functionally or energetically <em>exclusive<\/em>. This leaves two options. On the first option (E), the Many has <em>complete<\/em> functional independence or autonomy from the One and is therefore self-organizing. The One can interact directly with the Many and make unifying &#8220;suggestions&#8221; to it, but cannot &#8220;make&#8221; the Many do anything. Moreover, because the two cannot synergize, whenever one acts in a way that bears on the other, the latter has to passively &#8220;wait&#8221; for the former with respect to that activity. As in a game of checkers, the players have to &#8220;take turns.&#8221; They cannot work together, in concert, simultaneously and with reciprocal feedback (i.e., synergistically). On the second option (F), the Many has <em>no<\/em> functional independence or autonomy from the One. Instead, the Many is functionally dominated by the One, not allowing the Many to &#8220;do&#8221; anything that the One doesn&#8217;t specifically endorse.<\/p>\n<p>Each of the positions outside the Hexagon (A\u2013F) represents a different kind of &#8220;heresy.&#8221; That is, they fail to give <em>both<\/em> the One <em>and<\/em> the Many their full due in an integrated way that allows for synergy. The position inside the Hexagon that I describe as &#8220;synergistic balance&#8221; is the &#8220;non-heretical&#8221; or &#8220;orthodox&#8221; alternative. This position flat-out <em>rejects DDS<\/em>. It rejects the\u00a0absolute unity\/simplicity of the One that generates the either\u2013or tension between the One and the Many and replaces it with a both\u2013and, unity-in-difference model. The <em>monist\u00a0<\/em>right-hand side (RHS) of the Hexagon supposes that the absolute One is fundamental and that the Many is therefore wholly derivative. The <em>dichotomist\/dualist<\/em> left-hand side (LHS) of the Hexagon supposes that the One and Many are co-fundamental but, because the One is absolute, they are also incompatible and exclusive. The &#8220;orthodox&#8221; alternative in the middle denies that the One is absolute and affirms instead that what&#8217;s fundamental is unity-in-difference. The One and the Many are thus fundamentally <em>unified<\/em> and <em>compatible<\/em>. They can synergize and interact directly without compromising either the unity of the One or the many-ness of the Many.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Hexagon Illustrated: Cosmology and Providence<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Hexagon presented above is very abstract. To make matters more concrete and hopefully easier to grasp, let&#8217;s apply the Hexagon to God and creation, where &#8220;the One&#8221; = God and &#8220;the Many&#8221; = creation. The resulting dialectic has enormous implications for both <em>cosmology<\/em> (i.e., how creation relates to God) and <em>providence<\/em> (i.e., how God relates to creation).<\/p>\n<p>For starters, if God is <em>absolutely\u00a0<\/em>simple, then nothing &#8220;in&#8221; God can possibly reflect any of the diversity within creation. Consequently, either (B) there is no diversity within creation (and no creation either distinct from God) or (A) God and creation are essentially <em>indifferent<\/em> to one another. They can&#8217;t even &#8220;see&#8221; each other. From the perspective of each, it is as if the other does not exist. Cosmologically, (B) amounts to <em>top-down pantheism<\/em> or <em>absolute monism<\/em>. Providentially, (B) amounts to <em>occasionalism<\/em>, the thesis that God is the only actor on the stage of history. There may <em>seem<\/em> to be independent creaturely actors, but there really are no such things. Cosmologically, (A) amounts to <em>practical atheism<\/em> (as far as creation is concerned, there is no God of any relevance) and\/or <em>bottom-up pantheism<\/em> (there is no transcendent God; rather, the Cosmos itself is &#8220;divine&#8221;). Providentially, (A) leads to a God who is wholly indifferent to creation. As far as both God and creation are concerned, creation is on its own.<\/p>\n<p>If those options seem too stark, then one might try to damage control the dialectic at the level of\u00a0<em>essence\/nature<\/em>. We affirm that both God and creation are real and can in some sense &#8220;see&#8221; each other, but they cannot occupy the same &#8220;space&#8221; without one or other having to give something up\u2014that is, without its <em>nature<\/em> being constrained by the other. If God occupies the whole space as in (D), then creation can only exist as something wholly dependent on God. God must wholly <em>determine<\/em> creation. Conversely, if creation occupies its own space as in (C), then God must remain on the periphery of that space. God and creation can only relate to each other <em>extrinsically<\/em>, from the outside. Cosmologically, (C) implies that creation subsists on its own apart from God and God has to &#8220;butt out&#8221; of its space. Providentially, (C) amounts to an extreme form of <em>deism<\/em> wherein God cannot manifest immanently in creation <em>even if He wants to<\/em>. Cosmologically, (D) amounts to a kind of <em>qualified monism <\/em>or <em>panentheism<\/em> wherein creation is analogous to God&#8217;s &#8220;body&#8221; and God is creation&#8217;s all-controlling &#8220;mind.&#8221; Providentially, (D) amounts to <em>theistic determinism<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>If those options also seem too stark, then one might try to damage control the dialectic at the level of\u00a0<em>energy\/action<\/em>. We suppose that both God and creation are real and that God and creation can <em>overlap<\/em> to some extent, i.e., they can interact directly. Since God is absolutely simple (DDS), however, if the fundamental opposition between the One (God) and the Many (creation) is limited to the level of energy, then it follows that either (F) creation <em>never<\/em> has any &#8220;freedom&#8221; to do otherwise than God wants, or (E) creation <em>always<\/em> has &#8220;freedom&#8221; to do otherwise that God wants. Cosmologically, (F) entails that God must <em>specifically concur<\/em> or &#8220;sign off&#8221; in order for creation to &#8220;do&#8221; anything. God doesn&#8217;t necessarily <em>determine<\/em>\u00a0everything that happens as in (D), but God nevertheless <em>bounds<\/em> creation tightly so that nothing can happen that God doesn&#8217;t specifically want to happen. In a picture, God corrals creation lest the wild horses run amok\u2014can&#8217;t have the pesky creatures foiling God&#8217;s plans, after all. Providentially, (F) amounts to <em>meticulous providence<\/em> (e.g., Molinism) whereby God unilaterally decrees &#8220;whatsoever comes to pass&#8221; albeit, allegedly, without necessarily determining everything that comes to pass.\u00a0Cosmologically, (E) implies that creation develops (evolves) in complete automony from God. Creation <em>ex nihilo<\/em> is, therefore, false. Providentially, (E) amounts to <em>process theism<\/em>. God makes suggestions to creation at every step, but cannot effectively do anything in creation.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, the &#8220;orthodox&#8221; position in the middle of the Hexagon holds that God and creation both exist and can mutually affect each other in real time (synergy). God is free and responsive (i.e., there is a real <em>essence\/energy<\/em> distinction). God actively guides creation and can act effectively within creation, but God also affords creatures a significant degree of freedom to act contrary to how God ideally wants. Cosmologically, the world is created <em>ex nihilo<\/em> and is energetically sustained by God, but is not exhaustively specified by God. Creation has a significant degree of gifted or delegated independence. Providentially, this is <em>open theism<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Concluding Remarks<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This post has largely been my own systematization of the Hexagon that Gifford identifies. His book doesn&#8217;t supply a diagram of the Hexagon, and he restricts his focus mainly to Christology and cosmology. In my next post I will draw much more heavily on Gifford&#8217;s work and discuss the Christological analog of the Hexagon. As we&#8217;ll see, the six &#8220;heresies&#8221; around the Hexagon correspond rather closely to the six major Christological heresies rejected by the first six ecumenical councils.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This blog post is the first in a series on a recent book by James D. Gifford, Jr. titled\u00a0The Hexagon of Heresy: A Historical and Theological Study of Definitional Divine Simplicity (Wipf &amp; Stock, 2022). I have several reasons for interest in this book. First, its discussion of &#8220;definitional divine simplicity&#8221; (DDS), which modern philosophers\u2026 <span class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2025\/03\/the-hexagon-of-heresy-part-1-the-dialectic-of-the-one-and-the-many\/\">Read More &raquo;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[95,261],"tags":[259,260,114,257,256,258],"class_list":["post-1366","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-divine-providence","category-the-one-and-the-many","tag-christology","tag-cosmology","tag-divine-providence","tag-hexagon-of-heresy","tag-james-gifford","tag-problem-of-the-one-and-the-many"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1366","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1366"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1366\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1385,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1366\/revisions\/1385"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1366"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1366"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1366"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}