{"id":1408,"date":"2025-06-17T13:22:55","date_gmt":"2025-06-17T18:22:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=1408"},"modified":"2025-06-17T13:22:55","modified_gmt":"2025-06-17T18:22:55","slug":"the-hexagon-of-heresy-part-3-cosmology","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2025\/06\/the-hexagon-of-heresy-part-3-cosmology\/","title":{"rendered":"The Hexagon of Heresy \u2013 Part 3: Cosmology"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft\" style=\"margin-right: 20px;\" src=\"https:\/\/prodimage.images-bn.com\/pimages\/9781666754308_p0_v3_s600x595.jpg\" alt=\"The Hexagon of Heresy\" width=\"200\" \/> This post is the third in a series on a recent book by James D. Gifford, Jr. titled <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/dp\/1666754307\"><em>The Hexagon of Heresy: A Historical and Theological Study of Definitional Divine Simplicity<\/em><\/a> (Wipf &amp; Stock, 2022).<\/p>\n<p>In the <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2025\/03\/the-hexagon-of-heresy-part-1-the-dialectic-of-the-one-and-the-many\/\">first post<\/a> I discussed the problem of the One and the Many and why the idea of absolute or definitional divine simplicity (DDS) is problematic. I also explained how the &#8220;Hexagon of heresy&#8221; arises in response to the One\u2013Many dialectic spawned by DDS.<\/p>\n<p>In the <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2025\/04\/the-hexagon-of-heresy-part-2-christology\/\">second post<\/a> I applied the lessons of the first post to Christology. DDS, it turns out, makes it impossible to develop anything like an orthodox Christology because it sets Christ&#8217;s divinity and humanity in opposition to each other. This opposition can be (a) acquiesced to, resulting in the <em>dichotomist-dualist<\/em> Christological heresies of Ebionism, Arianism, and Nestorianism; (b) dialectically overcome with Christ&#8217;s divinity controlling and dominating his humanity, resulting in the <em>monist<\/em> Christological heresies of Docetism, Apollinarianism, and Monophysitism; or (c) avoided by rejecting DDS and related ideas in favor of Christological <em>orthodoxy<\/em>, which allows Christ&#8217;s divinity and humanity synergistically to\u00a0harmonize.<\/p>\n<p>In this post I apply the lessons of the first two posts to cosmology or how creation relates to God. The questions to consider, therefore, are whether\u00a0 creation is (a) fundamentally independent of God in <em>dichotomist-dualist<\/em> fashion, (b) ultimately wholly controlled by God in <em>monist<\/em> fashion, or (c) derivatively independent of God so that the two are not inherently opposed but rather able synergistically\u00a0to unite in Christologically <em>orthodox\u00a0<\/em>fashion. By &#8220;derivative&#8221; independence I mean that creation, while ultimately dependent on God as its creator, has a measure of <em>gifted<\/em> or\u00a0<em>delegated<\/em> independence from God. Creation, in other words, is genuinely free. This freedom is limited, but it is neither an illusion (as the <em>monists<\/em> would have it) nor is it fundamental (as the <em>dichotomist-dualists<\/em> would have it).<\/p>\n<p><strong>From Christology to Cosmology<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The ecumenical councils from 325 to 681 gradually dismantled the heretical Christological <em>symptoms<\/em>\u00a0of DDS, but they did not explicitly address or reject DDS itself. So, despite the defeat of DDS with respect to Christology, that defeat remained merely\u00a0<em>implicit<\/em>. This allowed DDS to continue influencing Christian theology in other areas, such as\u00a0<em>cosmology<\/em>\u00a0(how creation relates to God),\u00a0<em>providence<\/em>\u00a0(how God manages creation),\u00a0<em>soteriology<\/em>\u00a0(how God heals and saves a fallen creation), and\u00a0<em>theological method<\/em> (how creatures can best arrive at knowledge of God). In particular, Augustine of Hippo (354\u2013430), the single most influential Church father in the Latin West, made DDS a central assumption of his theology. He thereby effectively ensured (without quite realizing it) that the same heretical tendencies Origen&#8217;s affirmation of DDS injected into Christology would reemerge in other areas.<\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;ll say more about Augustine shortly. For now, we should observe that in Scripture Christology is intimately connected to cosmology. As Gifford puts it, &#8220;the New Testament, specifically in the opening verses of John, Colossians, and Hebrews, places Christ (as God) at the center of creation\u201d (p. 135). John 1:1\u20133, Colossians 1:15\u201317,\u00a0 and Hebrews 1:1\u20133a collectively teach that Christ, the divine Word or Logos, creates and sustains all (created) things and that all such things exist \u201cin,\u201d \u201cthrough,\u201d and \u201cfor\u201d him. Furthermore, as the preeminent mediator between God and man (1 Timothy 2:5), Christ is also the preeminent mediator between God and creation. For reasons having to do with both creation and the incarnation, therefore, Christology has direct implications for cosmology.<\/p>\n<p>An Arian Christology, for example, implies that God either cannot or will not interact <em>directly<\/em> with creation, but only indirectly, through a created intermediary. Thus, Christ, the fullest revelation of God to humanity, is (on the Arian scheme) a mere creature, albeit the greatest possible creature. And if God never interacts directly with creation, then it follows that creation can never interact directly with God. Of course, if creation cannot interact directly with God, then not even the created Arian Christ can interact directly with God. The Arian Christ therefore needs a mediator between God and himself, a mediator that, on the Arian scheme, does not exist. In short, the cosmological implication of Arianism is that not only creation, but Christ himself, is cut off from direct access to God. Us creatures cannot <em>experience<\/em> God. The best we can do is make <em>inferences<\/em> about God from what we observe in creation. And forget about miraculous divine intervention into creation. If God can do that, then he can become incarnate. But Arianism denies the incarnation and so, by implication, it must also deny the miraculous. The net result is that Christological Arianism entails its cosmological counterpart, namely, <em>deism<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Christian Cosmology through the 4th Century AD<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Prior to the great Christological debates of the 4th\u20137th centuries, the early Christians viewed cosmology through the lens of Christ&#8217;s double role as creator and incarnate mediator.<\/p>\n<p>Justin Martyr (c. 100\u2013c. 165) associated the Word (Logos) of John 1:1 with the Stoic notion of the <em>logoi spermatikoi<\/em>, the rational seeds &#8220;implanted by God in all humans&#8221; in virtue being created in God&#8217;s image. By virtue of these <em>logoi<\/em>, human reason is a finite participation in the divine Logos expressed throughout creation and preeminently in Christ (Gifford, p. 135).<\/p>\n<p>Irenaeus (c. 130\u2013c. 202) was the first prominent Christian to clearly affirm creation <em>ex nihilo<\/em> in contrast to Greek philosophical ideas of necessary emanation and eternally preexistent matter (Gifford, p. 136). For God to create <em>ex nihilo<\/em> is for God to create <em>freely<\/em> and by Himself <em>alone<\/em>, without external assistance or constraints.<\/p>\n<p>During the first two centuries there was nothing especially problematic about Christian cosmology. Early thinkers &#8220;articulated the received tradition well,&#8221; but their use of &#8220;pagan thought structures&#8221; and terminology harbored latent dangers that came to fruition in the third century work of Origin of Alexandria (184\u2013253). Because he accepted DDS, Origen was compelled to view creation as both eternal and necessary. He viewed the very coming-to-be of creation as a kind of metaphysical \u201cfall,\u201d a departure from God\u2019s perfect rest, toward which all creation must eventually and inevitably return (Gifford, pp. 136\u2013137).<\/p>\n<p>Athanasius (c. 294\u2013373) began the process of reversing Origen\u2019s cosmological confusion by reasserting creation <em>ex nihilo<\/em> and the essence\/energies distinction. Creation is God\u2019s <em>free act<\/em>, not something that flows inexorably from God\u2019s being or essence.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, Basil of Caesarea (329\u2013379) countered the Stoic idea that creation was a mere projection of God\u2019s thoughts (<em>logoi<\/em>), insisting that \u201ccreatures do not simply receive their form and diversity from God; they possess an energy, certainly also God-given, but authentically their own\u201d (Gifford, p. 138, quoting Meyendorff). In this context Basil cited\u00a0Genesis 1:24: \u201cLet the earth bring forth \u2026\u201d to argue that creation was gifted <em>its own<\/em> energy. Creatures were made to do things, not merely imitate divine rest \u00e0 la Origen.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Maximus the Confessor and the\u00a0<em>Logos\/<\/em><em>logoi<\/em> distinction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>A couple centuries later, Maximus the Confessor (c. 580\u2013662) drew together the various strands of the earlier Church fathers into a cosmological synthesis that eventually became normative for Eastern Christianity. His central idea is the <em>Logos<\/em>\/<em>logoi<\/em> distinction. It&#8217;s not easy to piece together exactly what he means because he doesn&#8217;t lay it out in any one place. Drawing on primary and secondary literature, Gifford provides over twenty different descriptions of the <em>logoi<\/em> in Ch. 8 of his book. Here are a few of them:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <em>logoi<\/em> \u201crepresent the unlimited potentiality of divine freedom\u201d (p. 139).<\/li>\n<li>The <em>logoi<\/em> are \u201cpreexistent\u201d and are \u201cidentical with God\u2019s purposes for this world\u201d (p. 140).<\/li>\n<li>Creation is \u201ca web with Christ at the center and everything connected to him via the <em>logoi<\/em>\u201d (p. 141, n. 39).<\/li>\n<li>The <em>logoi<\/em> \u201coccupy a \u2018middle\u2019 position between God and the created world\u201d (p. 142).<\/li>\n<li>Creation is \u201c\u2018in, by, and for\u2019 Christ \u2026 because the <em>logoi<\/em> of creation are eternal divine energies inhering in him. In this way, creation, in its very rational principles [<em>logoi<\/em>], is neither a mere extension of God\u2019s will nor is it autonomous. It exists really and distinctly from God, but is not separated from him\u201d (p. 144).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>As one can see from these quotes, the <em>logoi\u00a0<\/em>do a <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">lot<\/span> of work in Maximus&#8217;s system. After reflecting at length on these descriptions and others, here&#8217;s my reconstruction of what I think Maximus has in mind:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The\u00a0<em>logoi<\/em> are divine <em>ideas<\/em> of things God\u00a0could do. As things God could\u00a0<em>do<\/em>, they fall into the category of divine <em>energies<\/em>.<\/li>\n<li>As infinite and omnipotent, God&#8217;s nature\/essence contains infinitely many <em>logoi<\/em> of things that God could actualize.<\/li>\n<li>Because of the <em>essence\/energy<\/em> distinction, God is free to act (be energetic) in ways that are not dictated by His essence.<\/li>\n<li>In creating, God freely chooses to actualize <em>some<\/em> of His ideas (<em>logoi<\/em>). In doing so, God energetically projects these ideas into extra-mental created reality.<\/li>\n<li>Through these <em>logoi<\/em>, God (a) defines the natures (<em>physei<\/em>) of created beings, (b) provides a purpose or <em>telos<\/em> for their existence, and (c) grounds the stability and intelligibility of creation.<\/li>\n<li>Since all\u00a0<em>logoi<\/em>\u00a0are rooted in the divine nature, the incarnation hypostatically (not just energetically) unites Logos\u00a0and\u00a0<em>logoi<\/em>\u00a0in creation. As a result, all of creation exists \u201cin, by, and for\u201d Christ.<\/li>\n<li>The\u00a0<em>logoi<\/em> directly <em>connect<\/em> God and creation by being concurrently both in God (as divine ideas) and in creation (as the immanent natures and <em>teloi<\/em> of created beings).<\/li>\n<li>The <em>logoi<\/em>\u00a0don\u2019t collapse creation into God because individual creatures are <em>not reducible<\/em>\u00a0to their\u00a0<em>logoi <\/em>just as the category of person (<em>hypostasis<\/em>) is not reducible to that of nature (<em>physis<\/em>).<\/li>\n<li>God energetically sustains and guides creation through the <em>logoi<\/em> while gifting a measure of energetic freedom to His creatures, inviting them to synergize with Him in pursuit of their respective <em>teloi<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In sum, for Maximus, just as Christ the incarnate Logos\u00a0is the bridge uniting divinity and humanity, the uncreated divine ideas or\u00a0<em>logoi\u00a0<\/em>are projected\u00a0<em>into<\/em> creation and so are bridges that directly connect God and creation. They serve, if you will, as intentional conduits through which God structures and energetically sustains creation. Finally, because creatures are not reducible to their <em>logoi<\/em>, we aren\u2019t mere characters in a divinely authored novel. Creation is not just a divine simulation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Augustine Sows the Seeds of Cosmological Separation<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Augustine of Hippo (354\u2013430) affirmed DDS. As a result he couldn&#8217;t use the essence\/energies distinction like Maximus to keep creation both connected to and distinct from God. To avoid Origen\u2019s faulty \u201csolution\u201d of making creation eternal and necessary like God, Augustine had to <em>separate<\/em> God and creation. He did this by distinguishing the uncreated divine ideas (<em>logoi<\/em>) from <em>created\u00a0copies<\/em> of those ideas, which he called (following the Stoics) \u201cseminal reasons\u201d (<em>rationes seminales<\/em>). As created entities, these <em>rationes <\/em>provide an internally hardwired program governing creation\u2019s development. So, while creation depends on God for its <em>being<\/em>, it runs, effectively, <em>on its own<\/em> without need for Creator\u2013creature synergy. The collapse of synergy leads to a sort of <em>cosmological Nestorianism<\/em> and is the first step toward the later development of deism (cosmological Arianism) and theistic determinism (cosmological Apollinarianism). That is, without the possibility for synergy, God either has to let creation run on its own (deism) or has to pre-program it to develop exactly as He wishes (theistic determinism).<\/p>\n<p>Symptoms of Augustine&#8217;s confusion showed up first in his soteriology. By DDS, God = the Good and everything else stands in opposition to God just as the Many stands in opposition to the absolute One. Hence, everything distinct from God must in some way be <em>not good<\/em>. But if the very <em>being<\/em> of creation as distinct from God is <em>not good<\/em>, then whatever goodness creation has must be projected <em>onto<\/em> it from outside, as it were. And since goodness can\u2019t be brought to creation synergistically, it must be monergistically imposed (cosmological Monoenergism). Thus, the goodness of creation (such as it is) can only consist in its alignment with God\u2019s omnipotent <em>will<\/em>, its carrying out what God eternally and effectually predestines (cosmological Monothelitism). Election unto salvation thus becomes particular rather than corporate. That any of the &#8220;damnable mass&#8221; (<em>massa damnata<\/em>) of humanity are saved is ultimately due to nothing more than God\u2019s good pleasure. And since Augustine believed that no one, not even babies, can be saved without baptism, the only way God can ensure anyone\u2019s salvation is to meticulously control events leading to their baptism and continuing through their final perseverance. In short, if God&#8217;s going to save anyone, then He must monergistically determine the whole process.<\/p>\n<p>In sum, while Augustine remained <em>Christologically<\/em> orthodox, in the cosmological and soteriological spheres his commitment to DDS pushed him simultaneously in two opposite directions. First, toward <em>cosmological Nestorianism<\/em>, the functional separation of creation from God by taking immanent universals or <em>rationes<\/em>\u00a0to be <em>created<\/em> copies of the divine ideas (<em>logoi<\/em>). (Not coincidentally, according to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/dp\/1666719056\">Bean Branson<\/a>, Augustine was the first Church father to <em>deny<\/em> that Old Testament theophanies were Christophanies. He thought they were <em>created<\/em> angelophanies and even denied \u201cthe <em>possibility<\/em> of any vision of God in the present life\u201d [p. 70].) Second, toward\u00a0<em>cosmological Monophysitism<\/em>, that is, toward meticulous providence and theistic determinism (at least with respect to those chosen for salvation).<\/p>\n<p><strong>Post-Augustinian Developments (4th through 12th centuries)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>During Augustine&#8217;s life, his soteriological novelties provoked a reaction. Both Pelagius (c. 354\u2013418) and John Cassian (c. 360\u2013c. 435) objected to Augustine\u2019s determinism and his views on original sin and human depravity. Post-Fall humanity, they insisted, is <em>not<\/em> by nature opposed to God and thus can <em>will<\/em> the good without any special grace on God\u2019s part (though we do need God\u2019s help to <em>do <\/em>the good that we will). A century after Augustine&#8217;s death, the 2nd Synod of Orange (529) sought to resolve the soteriological dispute by confusingly trying to &#8220;meet both sides in the middle, affirming Augustine\u2019s teachings but rejecting their consequences\u201d (Gifford, p. 162). This effectively ensured that Augustine&#8217;s cosmological and soteriological confusions would persist.<\/p>\n<p>In the ninth century, as the West was emerging from the chaos of the barbarian invasions, the Carolingian Franks (800\u2013887) embraced Augustine\u2019s theology, including the <em>filioque<\/em>, partly to assert independence from the Byzantine East. After the Franks gained control of the Roman papacy, these commitments eventually led to the Great Schism (1054). In addition, Gottschalk of Orbais (c. 808\u2013868) caused a stir by taking the implications of Augustine\u2019s soteriology to their logical conclusions and affirming double predestination and thoroughgoing theistic determinism (cosmological Apollinarianism). John Scotus Eriugena (c. 800\u2013877), unlike Gottschalk, rejected any fundamental opposition of God and creation and instead combined DDS with a neoplatonic, emanation model of creation to conclude that \u201cGod and the world were one\u201d (Gifford, p. 164). The result was a kind of \u201cChristian\u201d pantheism in which creation is only virtually distinct from God.<\/p>\n<p>A little later, in the eleventh century, Peter Damian (d. 1072) emphasized God\u2019s direct, absolute power over creation (<em>potentia absoluta<\/em>) in contrast with the regular or ordinary power (<em>potentia ordinata<\/em>) by which God indirectly governs creation via created <em>rationes seminales<\/em>. As with Augustine, Damian leaves no room for Creator\u2013creature synergy. Either creation runs on its own, following its divine programming (<em>potentia ordinata<\/em>), or God externally manipulates creation (<em>potentia absoluta<\/em>). Similarly, Adelard of Bath (c. 1080\u2013c. 1050) and William of Conches (c. 1090\u2013c. 1154) held that God\u2019s <em>only<\/em> activity in creation, aside from creating in the first place, is to upset the natural order (Gifford, p. 165), which God only does rarely. We\u2019re now well on the way to cosmological Arianism, i.e., deism.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Cosmology in Aquinas<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas (1225\u20131274) synthesized the received, Augustinian understanding of Christianity in the West with Aristotle\u2019s recently rediscovered metaphysical and ethical writings. Following Aristotle, he argued that the non-eternity of creation is \u201cnot demonstrable in natural theology, but only in revealed theology\u201d (Gifford, p. 168). In other words, as far as <em>we<\/em> can tell independently of divine revelation, Origen\u2019s eternal creation could have been the case.<\/p>\n<p>Unlike Maximus, for whom God and creation are reciprocally related through God\u2019s uncreated energies (<em>logoi<\/em>) that do not overwhelm and thus can <em>synergize<\/em> with creaturely energies, for Aquinas (because of DDS) \u201cany [real] relation between God and creation can only be <em>created<\/em>\u201d (Gifford, p. 169, citing Loudovikos). Aquinas thereby cut creation off from God. We only have access to <em>created grace<\/em>, not to God Himself. Moreover, also because of DDS, \u201cthe relationship between God and creation is only real to the creature; it does not have reality in God\u201d (Gifford, p. 169). The reality of creation, in other words, <em>makes no difference<\/em> to God. In this respect Aquinas cut God off from creation.<\/p>\n<p>Having cut God and creation off from one another, Aquinas tried to repair the breach through his doctrine of the <em>analogy of being<\/em>, according to which all things participate in God&#8217;s being to varying degrees in accordance with their <em>natures<\/em>. But this doesn&#8217;t solve the problem. One can only stretch an analogy so far before it breaks and, in the Thomistic system, the analogical \u201crubber band\u201d must stretch across an <em>infinite gap<\/em>. The problem, in brief, is that Aquinas tries to bridge the gap via <em>nature<\/em>\u2014something that is impossible because on DDS the One and the Many are intrinsically opposed\u2014rather than, as with Maximus, via <em>energy<\/em> (the <em>logoi<\/em>) and the <em>person<\/em> of Christ (the Logos).<\/p>\n<p>Aquinas\u2019s view of the complete dependence (<em>contingence<\/em>) of creation upon God, namely, that it couldn\u2019t <em>exist<\/em> for a moment without God\u2019s continual gift of being, also precludes any genuine <em>contingency<\/em> in creation. Like a mere holographic projection, creation has no freedom to be other than what its source (God) projects into being.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Cosmology in the Later Middle Ages<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>John Duns Scotus (1265\u20131308), a Franciscan monk, wanted to recover <em>contingency<\/em> within creation and within God, especially God\u2019s freedom to create or not to create. So, while still affirming DDS, he sought to find \u201cwiggle room\u201d within the system. To that end he made three key adjustments. First, he rejected Aquinas\u2019s analogy of being for a <em>univocity<\/em> of being\u2014God and creation are on the same ontological plane, though God is obviously more fundamental. In short, there&#8217;s no infinite analogical gap to cross. Second, he introduced <em>logical moments<\/em> into God\u2019s creative decision-making to account for God&#8217;s creative freedom. Third, he proposed the notion of a <em>formal<\/em> distinction as intermediate between a <em>real<\/em> distinction and a merely <em>nominal<\/em> or verbal distinction. So, even if God isn&#8217;t &#8220;really related&#8221; to creation, creation can still make a &#8220;formal&#8221; difference to God.<\/p>\n<p>Unfortunately, while these adjustments are well-motivated, they don\u2019t go nearly far enough. The root of the problem is DDS. Merely logical moments (as opposed to chronological moments) aren\u2019t enough to accommodate genuine contingency in God and, without a <em>real<\/em> essence\u2013energy distinction to back it up, Scotus\u2019s formal distinctions collapse into merely nominal distinctions under pressure from the metaphysical &#8220;equals sign&#8221; that is DDS.<\/p>\n<p>William of Ockham (c. 1287\u20131347), another Franciscan monk, went further than Scotus toward affirming the integrity of creation and the freedom of God by virtually separating the two altogether. Again, while still affirming DDS, Ockham emphasized God\u2019s absolute power (<em>potentia absoluta<\/em>) to the extent that God remains radically free to do absolutely anything at any time, including things that seem absurd to us (e.g., making 2+2=7). As a nominalist, he also denied the existence of any created <em>rationes seminales<\/em>, thereby eliminating the \u201cmiddle man\u201d between God and creation (Gifford, p. 172). After all, if God is radically free and not really related to creation (Aquinas), then why posit created universals that don\u2019t really govern creation (since God can override them at any time) but are merely descriptive of how things have <em>usually <\/em>behaved (Gifford, p. 172)?<\/p>\n<p>Ockham&#8217;s nominalism would pave the way for later humanism and existentialism (we create our own meaning in the world), naturalism (humans are accidental by-products of purposeless material causes), and the Reformation (in its most radical forms, a rejection of Church authority and tradition; every man is his own \u201cpope\u201d).<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Reformation<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Ecclesiologically, Augustine&#8217;s DDS-inspired Creator\u2013creation split drove the medieval Roman Church to assume the role of mediator between God and creation, with the papal magisterium assuming unilateral authority (ecclesiological Monoenergism) to dispense created divine grace in a mechanical <em>ex opere operato<\/em> fashion (sacramental Nestorianism).<\/p>\n<p>Broadly speaking, the Protestant Reformers, under the influence of Ockhamistic nominalism, saw no need for the institutional Church to play a mediating role since God, by his absolute sovereign power (<em>potentia absoluta<\/em>), could dispense grace directly however and whenever He saw fit. While Augustine only affirmed <em>single predestination<\/em> (i.e., God actively steers the lives of the elect toward salvation but remains merely passive toward the non-elect), DDS\u2014which the Reformers followed Augustine and the Roman Church in affirming\u2014rules out any real distinction between what God actively wills and passively permits. Hence, it was only a small step from Augustinian single predestination to <em>double predestination<\/em>, the idea that God actively and unilaterally decides the ultimate fate of every creature.<\/p>\n<p>All of the magisterial Reformers, Martin Luther (1483\u20131546), Ulrich Zwingli (1484\u20131531), and John Calvin (1509\u20131564), held to double predestination, meticulous providence, and universal theistic determinism.<\/p>\n<p>As a nominalist, Luther rejected mediation through the <em>rationes seminales<\/em> and\/or <em>logoi<\/em>. Thus, the only way left for God to govern creation was deterministically to cause things to happen. As a Christian, however, Luther continued to take creation seriously, on account of (a) the incarnation\u2014Luther was committed to Jesus as God in the flesh and as the chief revelation of God to man\u2014and (b) the reality of evil. (Without evil, there&#8217;s no clear need for Christ as savior.) Because of DDS, though, and because \u201ceverything occurs of necessity due to the will of God\u201d (Gifford, p. 185), it follows that evil is grounded in the will God. To make sense of this, Luther posited a split between God as revealed in Christ and the <em>deus absconditus<\/em> (the hidden God), who ordains all events, including evil ones. \u201cGod in Christ truly weeps over Jerusalem, but at the same time, God (the hidden one) ordains the apostasy of the Jews and the destruction of their city\u201d (Gifford, p. 187). In short, \u201cLutheranism took the contradictions posed by divine determinism seriously \u2026 and moved the contradiction back into God himself\u201d (Gifford, p. 187). Gifford notes (p. 187, n. 25) that this split in God means that we can\u2019t fully trust God\u2019s revelation, whether in Christ or in the Bible, because for all we know the hidden God behind the scenes has ordained it to contain falsehoods for reasons inscrutable to us. It\u2019s no accident, therefore, that liberal theology started in Germany with the Lutherans.<\/p>\n<p>Lutherans and Calvinists responded to the apparent contradiction of a good God decreeing evil in contrasting ways. \u201cLutherans, \u2026 to uphold the validity of created history[,] put the contradiction in God. [Calvinists], to uphold the unity of God, deny that history produces any contradictory events\u201d (Gifford, p. 189). In other words, while Luther accepted the tension as real and moved it into God, inadvertently undermining DDS in the process, Calvin denied that the tension was real and insisted that it was merely apparent\u2014what <em>seems<\/em> evil to us isn\u2019t <em>really<\/em> evil from God\u2019s transcendent perspective. Historically, the former approach led to liberal theology and to cosmological Arianism\/Ebionism (i.e., deism and atheism), whereas the latter led to fundamentalism and to cosmological Apollinarianism\/Docetism (i.e., theistic determinism and occasionalism\/pantheism).<\/p>\n<p>Calvinism also taught the novel doctrine of <em>limited atonement<\/em> (i.e., that Christ only atones for the elect). Given the falsity of universalism, the all-determining divine decree entails double predestination and soteriological monergism. Moreover, because of the Reformers\u2019 nominalism, the incarnation\u2014the Son\u2019s taking on human nature\u2014could not be salvific <em>per se<\/em>, as the Church Fathers had taught (cf. Gregory Nazianzus, \u201cwhat is not assumed is not healed\u201d). After all, if there are no universal natures (as per nominalism), then Christ can\u2019t take on <em>human nature<\/em> as such. He can only take on <em>a<\/em> human nature, one distinct from ours. So, Christ\u2019s death \u201cis reduced to a transaction between the Father and the Son\u201d (Gifford, p. 193), a transaction that cannot unite us with God but can only cover our guilt and assuage God\u2019s anger, and that only for the elect. Calvinism thus emphasizes the <em>office<\/em> of Christ as sacrificial mediator\u2014this is in the category of <em>energy<\/em> or what Christ does\u2014over against the <em>person<\/em> of the Son hypostatically united with creation. Christ is therefore not a cosmological mediator (\u00e0 la Maximus) but a <em>merely <\/em>soteriological mediator.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Cosmological Docetism: Jonathan Edwards<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Unlike in Christology where the development and defense of orthodoxy moved from major errors (Ebionism and Docetism) to more refined and subtle errors (Nestorianism and Monophysitism), in cosmology things moved in the other direction, from the relatively less serious errors of Augustine (cosmological Nestorianism and Monophysitism) to the full flowering of those errors during the Reformation and the Enlightenment periods (cosmological Ebionism, i.e., atheism, and cosmological Docetism, i.e., occasionalism\/pantheism).<\/p>\n<p>Jonathan Edwards (1703\u20131758) is a prime example of Reformed thinking leading to cosmological Docetism. Edwards affirms DDS and the equivalent idea that God is <em>pure act<\/em>, i.e., without any unrealized potential. As pure act, God necessarily is whatever He is. Thus, not even God is free to do otherwise.<\/p>\n<p>Cosmologically, Edwards affirmed a blend of \u201cidealism, occasionalism, and continuous creationism\u201d (Gifford, p. 198). Idealism holds that \u201cideas [and minds] are <em>more real<\/em> than material things\u201d (Gifford, p. 198, emphasis added). Material things are merely <em>projections<\/em> of minds. Occasionalism says that God is the <em>only<\/em> causal agent. Creaturely activity is merely apparent. Continuous creation is the view that the being of creation is <em>wholly<\/em> dependent on God at every moment. That is, creation cannot subsist for any length of time unless God actively renews its constitutive gift of being. Thus, \u201cat the end of the day, Edwards believes that the only real substance is God \u2026. Creation \u2026 is just God\u2019s tool for his own self-glorification, and he is determined by his own simple nature to create it that way\u201d (Gifford, p. 201). The end result is a kind of <em>pantheism<\/em> in which nothing in creation matters at all. Evil in creation is ultimately unreal. It\u2019s no surprise, then, that \u201cUnitarianism came to dominate Edwards\u2019s New England a half century after his death\u201d (Gifford, p. 205). They just removed the vestigial trinitarian distinctions that Edwards (as a Christian) continued to affirm.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Early Modern Era: Cosmological Arianism<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>As we&#8217;ve seen, Ockham&#8217;s extreme voluntarism and nominalism were outgrowths of Augustine&#8217;s DDS-entailed Creator\u2013creation split. Left no way to synergize with creation, God&#8217;s only options were to either let creation play out according to its own internal programming (<em>rationes seminales<\/em>) or to take direct control over it. Given God&#8217;s <em>potentia absoluta<\/em>, however, the internal programming didn&#8217;t really matter, and so Ockham dispensed with it in favor of nominalism. Nominalism meant that creation has no internal structure or integrity. What apparent order it has is imposed by God more or less arbitrarily (as far as we can tell). Needless to say, this idea, along with other traumatic events like the Black Death, created a lot of conceptual angst in Western Europe, which led to three great movements:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Humanism: prioritizes humanity over God and nature; we create our own meaning in the world.<\/li>\n<li>Reformation: prioritizes God over humanity and nature; rejection of Church authority and tradition in favor of God\u2019s allegedly direct revelation (i.e., Scripture).<\/li>\n<li>Naturalism: prioritizes impersonal nature over God and humanity; humans are products of nature; God is at most only morally relevant.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The subsequent development of Western thought reflects the complex interplay of these movements, all of which were ultimately predicated on an implicit commitment to DDS. I&#8217;ll note some of the highlights.<\/p>\n<p>Francis Bacon (1561\u20131626), an English philosopher and stateman, was a pragmatically oriented technocrat. His slogan was \u201cknowledge is power,&#8221; and he advocated an empiricist \u201cinductive method\u201d aimed at humanistic mastery over nature. Bacon also held that \u201cnature and grace were two separate kingdoms\u201d of God\u2019s <em>ordinary<\/em> power (Gifford, p. 209) in contrast with the Reformers who viewed grace in terms of God\u2019s absolute power. On Bacon&#8217;s view, therefore, miracles were inherently problematic.<\/p>\n<p>Ren\u00e9 Descartes (1596\u20131650) was a French philosopher, mathematician, and scientist writing in the wake of the Copernican revolution, the Protestant\u2013Catholic religious wars, and nominalism-induced skepticism. Given nominalism there are no universals, immanent or otherwise, that we can grasp in perception. So, he wondered, how can we take our experience of the world reliably to reveal how the world actually is? His solution was to propose a rationalist \u201cmethod of doubt\u201d to reach an absolutely certain foundation. The isolated thinking self\u2014<em>cogito ergo sum<\/em> (\u201cI think, therefore I am\u201d)\u2014lies at the core of that foundation. Analyzing the <em>cogito <\/em>inference, Descartes derived a rationalist criterion of certain knowledge that he used to prove (a) God\u2019s existence and (b) that God is not a deceiver. From this, he deduced that sense perception is broadly reliable. God, for Descartes, was little more than a <em>theoretical posit<\/em> needed to make natural science possible. His ultimate goal was to develop a \u201cuniversal mathematics\u201d covering medicine, mechanics, and morals. \u201cFor man to become god, he must utilize his will to become master of nature\u201d (Gifford, p. 211, n. 14, quoting Gillespie)\u2014this was Descartes&#8217; humanistic replacement for <em>theosis<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>In contrast to Descartes, for whom the human self (<em>res cogitans<\/em>), in quasi-godlike fashion, is free and transcends the deterministic, mechanical material world (<em>res extensa<\/em>), Thomas Hobbes (1588\u20131679), an English philosopher and political theorist, denied the existence of any immaterial realm. All things, even God, are material and determined. God is thus brought down to our level. (Incidentally, if the material world is deterministic in its own right, as Descartes believed, then his godlike self can make <em>no difference <\/em>to it. His immaterial self is thus an impotent god. This is another prelude to deism, i.e., cosmological Arianism.)<\/p>\n<p>Baruch Spinoza (1632\u20131677), a Dutch philosopher and secular Jew, was a rationalist whose &#8220;geometric method&#8221; supposedly demonstrated that everything had to be exactly as it was. He held \u201cto the necessity of all that is\u201d (Gifford, p. 223) and equated God with &#8220;Nature,&#8221; speaking of \u201c<em>deus sive natura<\/em>\u201d (God or Nature) as though the name doesn\u2019t matter because it&#8217;s all the same thing. For Spinoza, \u201cnothing transcendent can affect human decisions, because transcendence has been brought completely down to earth in the identification of God and creation\u201d (Gifford, p. 224).<\/p>\n<p>Isaac Newton (1642\u20131727), an English mathematician and physicist, \u201cis perhaps the best example of those who desired to domesticate the nominalistic God by identifying him more and more (though not fully in Newton\u2019s case) with creation\u201d (Gifford, p. 218). For Newton, God does not transcend space and time; rather, spatial extension and temporal duration are essential aspects of God\u2019s own being. The wholly mechanical and material creation exists\u00a0<em>within\u00a0<\/em>God and impersonal space, not Christ, mediates between God and creation. Not coincidentally, Newton denied the deity of Christ.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, Immanuel Kant (1724\u20131804), a noted German philosopher, tried to synthesize the skeptical empiricism of David Hume (1711\u20131776) with the deterministic rationalism of Christian Wolff (1679\u20131754) in order to explain how Newtonian mechanics could yield certain knowledge of the world. He proposed <em>transcendental idealism<\/em>, according to which the world as we know it is a <em>mere projection or construct<\/em> of the human rational mind imposing structure on the sense data of experience. This means that whatever cannot be presented to us via bare sense data\u2014such as God, morals, or the self\u2014is either (a) a human construct or (b) is completely unknowable. God and the human self, for Kant, are <em>regulative<\/em> ideas, mere theoretical posits that help us make sense of the <em>possibility<\/em> of morality and scientific knowledge while remaining intrinsically unknowable. Kant\u2019s philosophy thus leads to a \u201cnon-supernatural religion that bears little or no relation to biblical Christianity and that becomes essentially a system of ethics\u201d (Gifford, p. 228). This vision would eventually be pursued by liberal theologians like Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768\u20131834).<\/p>\n<p>One general feature of the early modern era is the search for an <em>ab<\/em><em>solutely certain<\/em> foundation, whether of pure reason (rationalism), brute experience (empiricism), some combination of the two (Kant), or divine revelation (the Reformers). To build properly on this foundation, one had to adopt the right <em>method<\/em>, whether inductive (Bacon), geometric (Spinoza), transcendental (Kant), exegetical (the Reformers), or what have you. The main weakness of sort of foundationalism is its rigidity, its \u201cinability \u2026 to adapt to any sort of give-and-take\u201d (Gifford, p. 216). The ironic result is dogmatic fundamentalism. Those who don\u2019t arrive at the same conclusions \u201cmust\u201d be at fault.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Early European Atheism: From Cosmological Arianism to Cosmological Ebionism<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Gifford observes that \u201catheism, in its modern variety, \u2026 did not begin with the new science, \u2018but with the disintegration of a common religious confession sustained by a teaching Church\u2019\u201d (p. 221).<\/p>\n<p>Case in point, Leonard Lessius (1554\u20131623), a Jesuit philosopher and apologist, approached atheism as a purely philosophical issue, not a theological one. His case for God\u2019s existence is entirely natural theology, arguing from creation to God. He uses the same kinds of arguments, mainly variations on the design argument, that the Stoics used against the atheistic Epicureans. His arguments from prophecy and miracles feature Jesus as a paradigmatic example, but not as uniquely revelatory of God. The result is that Jesus\u2019s life becomes one fact among others that <em>points<\/em> us toward God without actually allowing us to <em>see<\/em> God (cf. John 14:9). Lessing&#8217;s whole apologetic, then, is fundamentally Arian.<\/p>\n<p>Newton brought nature <em>within<\/em> God; Spinoza <em>equated<\/em> God and nature; Kant left God as a \u201cwe know not what\u201d <em>outside<\/em> of nature. The trajectory of modern thought displays a progressive marginalization of God. God becomes increasingly irrelevant. Denis Diderot (1713\u20131784) turned Spinoza\u2019s equation into an opposition: \u201cEither God or nature.\u201d Ludwig Feuerbach (1804\u20131872) argued that God is just a human projection. We created God. Some modern atheists even invested nature with quasi-divine status, as Carl Sagan (1934\u20131996) did when he spoke of the &#8220;Cosmos&#8221; as &#8220;all that is or was or ever will be,&#8221; an imitation of the Biblical doxology describing God as the one &#8220;who\u00a0was,\u00a0and\u00a0is,\u00a0and\u00a0is\u00a0to\u00a0come&#8221; (Rev. 1:8; 4:8).<\/p>\n<p>Ironically, in trying to vindicate creation and humanity by <em>excluding<\/em> the monistic, all-controlling God, atheism strips all <em>meaning<\/em> and purpose out of creation. When the Many rises up against the One, the only way left to <em>unify<\/em> the Many is by some kind of external imposition, i.e., \u201cmight makes right.\u201d To overcome atheism we need to replace the\u00a0monistic God of DDS with the personal, free, living, and interactive God revealed in Christ.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This post is the third in a series on a recent book by James D. Gifford, Jr. titled The Hexagon of Heresy: A Historical and Theological Study of Definitional Divine Simplicity (Wipf &amp; Stock, 2022). In the first post I discussed the problem of the One and the Many and why the idea of absolute\u2026 <span class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2025\/06\/the-hexagon-of-heresy-part-3-cosmology\/\">Read More &raquo;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[214,95,200,261],"tags":[260,257,256],"class_list":["post-1408","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-church-fathers","category-divine-providence","category-divine-simplicity","category-the-one-and-the-many","tag-cosmology","tag-hexagon-of-heresy","tag-james-gifford"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1408","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1408"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1408\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1435,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1408\/revisions\/1435"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1408"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1408"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1408"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}