{"id":1451,"date":"2025-09-05T14:50:45","date_gmt":"2025-09-05T19:50:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=1451"},"modified":"2026-03-06T17:11:01","modified_gmt":"2026-03-06T22:11:01","slug":"making-sense-of-the-essence-energies-distinction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2025\/09\/making-sense-of-the-essence-energies-distinction\/","title":{"rendered":"Making Sense of the Essence\u2013Energies Distinction"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"This post is about the essence\u2013energies distinction<\/strong>, that is, the distinction between God’s essence and God’s energies. The distinction is central to Eastern Orthodox theology, but is largely ignored and often denied in Western Christianity. So what gives? What is this distinction supposed to be? Why do Eastern Christians think it’s vitally important? And why are most Western Christians indifferent and\/or hostile to it?<\/p>\n

These are some of the questions I’m going to tackle. Along the way I take issue with some common affirmations of both Eastern and Western Christianity.<\/p>\n

Against the West, I argue that the essence\u2013energies distinction is vitally important and that it should not be neglected, much less denied. Without some such distinction one cannot make sense of (a) divine freedom, (b) divine responsiveness to creation, (c) the Incarnation, and (d) salvation as theosis<\/em>, i.e., true creaturely union with God without creatures literally becoming or merging with God, and (e) divine sustaining of creation.<\/p>\n

Against the East, I’m going as to argue (a) that there are actually two<\/em> essence\u2013energies distinctions\u2014one is a type of “real” distinction and the other is a type of “formal” distinction\u2014and (b) that some Eastern Christians have erroneously followed Pseudo-Dionysius into extreme apophaticism<\/em> about the divine essence by drawing the essence\u2013energies distinction in the wrong<\/em> place.<\/p>\n

My main sources for reflection on the essence\u2013energies distinction are both recent (2023) works of scholarship by well-regarded experts: David Bradshaw, Divine Energies and Divine Action: Exploring the Essence\u2013Energies Distinction<\/em><\/a> and Tikhon Pino, Essence and Energies: Being and Naming God in St. Gregory Palamas<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

1. Developing the distinction<\/strong><\/p>\n

1.1. Energy<\/strong><\/p>\n

Let’s start with energy. As Bradshaw explains (p. 3), the term “energy” comes from the Greek energeia<\/em>, which comes from\u00a0ergon<\/em>, meaning “work.” Aristotle used the term to describe “the active exercise of a capacity, such as that for sight or thought, as distinct from the mere possession of the capacity.” From there the term took on the double meanings of “activity” and “actuality” and was contrasted with the term dunamis<\/em>, which took on the double meanings of “capacity” and “potentiality.” In short,\u00a0energeia<\/em> came to refer both to an activity (e.g., thinking) and the fulfillment or completion of that activity (e.g., knowledge or understanding). These senses merged in Aristotle’s notion of the Prime Mover, which as “pure act” or “pure energy” was described as “thought thinking itself”\u2014an activity that is always already completed in itself.<\/p>\n

Because it contains, indeed is<\/em>, all intelligible content, Aristotle’s Prime Mover is intrinsically intelligible. This contrasts with Plato’s conception of the Good\/One as “beyond being” and, therefore, beyond intelligibility (Bradshaw, p. 6). The Neoplatonic tradition of Plotinus and his successors would later harmonize Plato and Aristotle by positing that the Good\/One is the absolutely simple, ineffable source<\/em> of Intellect (Nous<\/em>), i.e., Aristotle’s Prime Mover. Despite demoting the Prime Mover to secondary status, Plotinus retained the Aristotelian idea that the ultimate source is “pure energy.” He thus distinguished the intrinsic<\/em> energy identical to the Good\/One (energeia tes ousias<\/em>, the energy of its substance\/essence) from the outward manifestation of that energy in the production of Intellect (energeia ek tes ousias<\/em>, the energy that comes forth from its substance\/essence) (Bradshaw, pp. 7\u20138).<\/p>\n

In the wider Hellenistic context, the dominant senses of “energy” (energeia<\/em>) were that of “activity” and of “characteristic activity, operation,” but in the New Testament, the apostle Paul restricts usage of energeia<\/em> to describe “the action of spiritual agents \u2026 God, Christ, angels, or demons” (Bradshaw, p. 9). This restriction became standard in early patristic literature, with the effect that the noun energeia<\/em> and the verb energein<\/em> took on the dominant senses of “a capacity for action or accomplishment” and “to be active in a way that imparts an energy,” respectively (Bradshaw, p. 10). In other words, when God (or another spiritual agent) acts energetically upon creatures He bestows upon them power to do stuff. Used in this way, the Aristotelian contrast between\u00a0energeia<\/em> as activity\/actuality and dunamis<\/em> as unactualized capacity\/potentiality is blurred. In both Pauline and patristic usage, creaturely activity and creaturely capacity for activity are “energized” by God. See, for example, Colossians 1:29 where Paul says that he strives according to Christ’s energy (energeia<\/em>) working effectively (energoumenen<\/em>) in him in power (dunamis<\/em>).<\/p>\n

Side note:<\/em> The dual Pauline\u00a0sense of energeia<\/em> as both activity and unactualized capacity for activity is analogous to the modern distinction in physics between kinetic energy<\/em> and\u00a0potential energy<\/em>. (I do not claim, nor does Bradshaw, that modern usage of “energy” derives in any straightforward way from Pauline or patristic usage.)<\/p>\n

By the time we get to Gregory Palamas (1296\u20131359), the preeminent Eastern Orthodox defender of the essence\u2013energies distinction, the blurring of Aristotle’s energeia<\/em>\/dunamis<\/em> distinction is complete. Palamas does not distinguish between\u00a0energeia<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0dunamis\u00a0<\/em>at all. The two terms are interchangeable for him (Pino, pp. 61\u201362), at least when it comes to God. In part, this is because for Palamas, practically anything<\/em> we might truthfully say about God is counted as a divine “energy” (Pino, p. 59). I’ll explain below (\u00a73.2.2) why I believe he holds this expansive (and problematic) conception of divine energies. For now, I’ll just note that for Palamas the divine essence (ousia<\/em>) is unknowable by us, and so whatever we might affirm of God has to fall under the catch-all category of “energy.” The divine energies include all the things that are “around God” or “around the essence” as distinguished from the divine essence itself of which we can predicate nothing (Pino, p. 65). So, it follows that anything we might think of as a divine attribute, power, or faculty, whether positive or negative, is an “energy” of God’s.<\/p>\n

1.2. Essence<\/strong><\/p>\n

In its most basic sense, an essence (Greek, ousia<\/em>) or nature (Greek, physis<\/em>) defines\u00a0what<\/em> a thing is and cannot not be as long as it is. The essence defines the boundaries of what a thing can do and become at every stage of its existence. It is of the essence of water, for example, that its molecules contain one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms, that at standard Earth surface conditions it freezes at 0\u00b0C and boils at 100\u00b0C, and that it cannot turn into (say) wine without outside help.<\/p>\n

When used of God,\u00a0ousia<\/em> refers to the core of God’s being, what God is and cannot not be. God, for example, cannot not exist, cannot depend on anything else for existence, and cannot be other than the source and ground of all other actual and possible beings. To say that the Father, Son, and Spirit are homoousias<\/em> (of the same essence) is to say that all three Trinitarian persons share these and other essential divine qualities in one concrete instance of the divine essence.<\/p>\n

Side note:<\/em> Unlike most other essences (e.g., humanity), the divine essence is not multiply instantiable. There can be many distinct human beings, but there can be only one God. This follows from the above-stated entailments of the divine essence. If God cannot depend on anything else for existence and if the existence of everything other than God is ontologically dependent on God, then nothing other than God can be God. If two Gods somehow existed, each would have to ground the other’s existence in which case neither would be God. So, there is either exactly one God, or there is no God at all.<\/p>\n

As Pino notes, while the terms\u00a0ousia<\/em> (essence) and\u00a0phusis<\/em> (nature) have not always been perfectly synonymous, by the time we get to Palamas, the two terms are interchangeable (p. 51). I say more about Palamas’s conception of the divine essence below (\u00a73.2.2).<\/p>\n

Side note:<\/em> While ousia<\/em> and phusis<\/em> may be interchangeable for Palamas, Bradford helpfully points out that the term ousia<\/em> has in fact carried several different meanings during its long history. He distinguishes between (a) ousia<\/em> as “‘reality itself,’ that which is permanently and fundamental real” (p. 181); (b) ousia<\/em> as “the core reality of<\/em> something, that which makes the thing what it is” (p. 181); and (c)\u00a0ousia<\/em> as individual substances, “distinct things that are fundamentally real” (p. 182). In sense (a) ousia <\/em>carries roughly the sense of “being” or “reality” or the Latin esse<\/em>. Sense (b) corresponds to the modal\/metaphysical sense that I describe above. In this sense it refers to the essential “whatness” of a thing (e.g., humanity). Sense (c) corresponds to what eventually became known as a hypostasis<\/em>, that is, a subsistent concrete individual (e.g., Socrates).<\/p>\n

1.3. The essence\u2013energies distinction(s)<\/strong><\/p>\n

Essence, as I have explained, is a modal<\/em> and metaphysical<\/em> concept. It defines what something must be<\/em> as long as it is. A thing’s essence, therefore, cannot change. For a thing’s essence to change would be for that thing to\u00a0cease existing<\/em> and for it to be replaced either by something else <\/em>or by nothing at all.<\/p>\n

Now, a key question concerning God is whether God is<\/em> (identical to) the divine essence. If so, then it immediately follows that God cannot change\u00a0at all<\/em>. But if God is free<\/em> to become or not to become a creator or free to become or not to become incarnate, then God cannot be identical to the divine essence. There must instead be more <\/em>to God than the divine essence. The question, in other words, is whether everything God does <\/em>(or can do) is specified in the divine essence, or whether God’s essence affords God leeway to do things that are not<\/em> specified in the divine essence. If the latter is the case, then we have an essence\u2013energies<\/em> distinction. What God is (essence) does not wholly define what God is able to do (energy).<\/p>\n

In this latter case, in which God’s power exceeds the divine essence, we get a real<\/em> essence\u2013energies distinction. There really is<\/em> more to God than the divine essence. There can be contingent specifications of God’s being, modes of free divine activity, that are not themselves essential to God. Let’s call these God’s contingent energies<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

But this is only one kind of essence\u2013energies distinction. The Church fathers, in fact, tended to emphasize a rather different sort of essence\u2013energies distinction by focusing on non-contingent<\/em> expressions of God such as the divine glory that Christ displayed during His transfiguration (Matthew 17:2). The thought is that God is essentially energetic<\/em>. As a personal, living (Jeremiah 10:10), and loving (1 John 4:8) God, one who is the light of the world (John 8:12), God cannot not be energetic. Christ, as fully divine, always<\/em> participates in and expresses the divine glory (John 17:5) but the disciples as they were then could not perceive that glory until God enabled them to do so at the transfiguration. The Church’s conception of theosis<\/em> is that we Christians will eventually come to participate fully\u2014as fully as our human nature allows\u2014in Christ’s divine life and glory. We will become “partakers of the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4) and will “be like Him [i.e., the resurrected and glorified Christ], for we shall see Him as He is” (1 John 3:2).<\/p>\n

These non-contingent or\u00a0natural energies\u00a0<\/strong>of God are ways in which God\u00a0must<\/em> act. Unlike God’s freely becoming a creator or becoming incarnate, which are contingent, God cannot not be good, wise, loving, etc. God’s natural energies are essential <\/em>because God cannot not act in these ways. Because these energies are essential, they are not really distinct from the divine essence. That is, they cannot be added<\/em> to or subtracted<\/em> from God’s essence in the way that being a Creator<\/em> is a divine self-modification added by God’s free decision to create. The natural energies may perhaps best be thought of as f<\/em>ormally distinct<\/em> from the divine essence and from each other. As defined by Duns Scotus, two things are “formally distinct when they cannot exist separately \u2026 but nonetheless can be defined or understood without reference to the other” (Bradshaw, p. 110). In short, formally distinct things are not intrinsically identical but are nevertheless non-separable.<\/p>\n

In the case of God, the divine essence is distinct from God’s natural energies in roughly the way that a disposition\/propensity is distinct from its manifestations\/actualizations. Suppose we think of God’s essence as consisting of various overlapping propensities <\/em>(e.g., being<\/em> good, wise, loving, etc.) that are energetically manifested by the actualization<\/em> of those propensities (e.g., acting<\/em> good, wisely, lovingly). We might think of these essential propensities as the\u00a0source<\/em> from which their manifestations come in much the same way as we think of the Sun as the source of the electromagnetic radiation that it emits. The Sun’s rays are not identical to the Sun because they do not and cannot express the\u00a0whole<\/em> of the Sun’s being\u2014the Sun is more than a mere collection of rays. But the Sun’s rays are not separable from the Sun either\u2014a Sun without any rays at all would not be a sun because it is of the essence of a sun to undergo fusion and energetically express itself through its rays. Likewise, God’s natural energies are not identical to God’s essence because they do not and cannot express the whole<\/em> of God’s being\u2014however much goodness, wisdom, love, power, etc. God manifests, there is always more to God as the inexhaustible source of those perfections. But God’s natural energies are not separable from God’s essence because it is of the essence of God to be energetic in those ways. The essentially living and loving God cannot be simply a static metaphysical principle any more than a star can be merely a densely packed collection of (mostly) hydrogen atoms.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, just as God’s natural energies express God’s essence, God’s contingent energies express God’s natural energies<\/strong>. Given that the natural energies cannot exhaust the divine essence but only express it, God is essentially free with respect to how<\/em> those natural energies are expressed. The contingent energies are, if you will, the particular ways in which God has freely chosen to express the natural energies. It is not essential, for example, that God creates. So creating is a contingent energetic expression of God’s. But in creating<\/em> God expresses the natural energies of wisdom, love, providence, power, etc.<\/p>\n

Summing up so far, there are two<\/em> essence\u2013energy distinctions<\/strong>, depending on which category of divine energies is in view:<\/p>\n