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Prominent Christian philosopher, apologist, and analytic theologian William Lane Craig is in the process of releasing his magnum opus<\/em>, a 5-volume Systematic Philosophical Theology<\/em> (Wiley Blackwell, 2025\u20132026). Volume 2a (released in 2025) focuses on God’s attributes and includes a 100-page chapter on omniscience. Now aged 76, Craig presumably intends this chapter to be the crowning summary of his nearly 40-year publication record on the topic of divine omniscience and foreknowledge.<\/p>\n In this 4-part blog series I review and critique Craig’s omniscience chapter. The chapter is divided into four main sections\u2014\u00a71 Biblical data, \u00a72 Omniscience, \u00a73 Foreknowledge, and \u00a74 Middle Knowledge\u2014which correspond to the four parts of this blog series. This post is on \u00a74. For my previous posts on \u00a71, \u00a72, and \u00a73, see here<\/a>, here<\/a>, and here<\/a>.<\/p>\n Part 4. Molinism (pp. 251\u2013284)<\/strong><\/p>\n The final section of Craig’s omniscience chapter is all about his favorite theory of divine providence, i.e., Molinism. This section is divided into three main parts: (1) explicating Molinism, (2) arguing for Molinism, and (3) rebutting arguments against Molinism.<\/p>\n (1) Explicating Molinism<\/strong><\/p>\n (1.a) How Molinism works<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n Craig’s description of Molinism is straightforward. He goes into the historical background, the driving motivations, and the basic framework. There’s nothing new or controversial here, so to make things easy on myself and also to introduce greater precision than Craig himself does, I’m going to borrow from a post I wrote previously<\/a>:<\/p>\n The term \u201cMolinism\u201d comes from Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina (1535\u20131600), who sought to understand how God could exercise meticulous providence<\/strong> without compromising human libertarian free will (LFW)<\/strong>. Meticulous providence is the idea that every detail<\/em> of creation, across its entire history (past, present, and future), has been specifically<\/em> selected and ordained by God. As for LFW, this is the idea that at least some of the time some of God’s creatures, humans especially, can exercise in an original way an intrinsic power to choose among multiple open, live options. Because this power is exercised in an original way, it is incompatible with determination by outside causes, whether those be secondary (i.e., creature-to-creature) or primary (i.e., God-to-creature). The obvious problem is that these two views seem to be in direct conflict with each other. If God providentially specifies everything creatures do, then how can there be any leeway left over for creatures to choose their own course of action? (Analogy: If the scriptwriter writes\u00a0all<\/em> the lines, spells out all<\/em> the stage directions in minute detail, and the play has to go exactly<\/em> as he specifies, then how can the actors still have any freedom with respect to how they play their parts?)<\/p>\n Molina’s proposed solution to this dilemma centers around the novel idea that God has middle knowledge\u00a0(MK)<\/strong>. Let’s break this down. First<\/strong>, MK is\u00a0non-natural<\/em> because it deals with logically <\/em>contingent\u00a0<\/em>truths that are independent of God\u2019s absolutely necessary nature. Second<\/strong>, MK is\u00a0pre-volitional<\/em> because it is explanatorily prior<\/em> to any act of God\u2019s will, including God\u2019s free decision to create.\u00a0Third<\/strong>, because MK is explanatorily prior to God\u2019s will, it constrains<\/em> God\u2019s options with respect to creation. God cannot bring about, directly or indirectly, anything that conflicts with His MK.<\/p>\n As to the content of God\u2019s MK, it assigns determinate truth values to all settled conditional future contingents\u00a0<\/em>(CFCs)<\/strong>. A settled CFC specifies for some internally consistent and fully causally specified indeterministic scenario (S) and some outcome (O) that is causally contingent<\/em>\u00a0with respect to that scenario, either that O\u00a0would\u00a0<\/em>occur if S or that O\u00a0would not<\/em> occur if S. For example, suppose S involves Bob\u2019s being about to make a LFW choice between chocolate and vanilla ice cream. For S to be \u201cfully causally specified\u201d its antecedent has to specific all\u00a0<\/em>causally relevant information including Bob\u2019s motives and deliberations up the very moment before Bob\u2019s choice. If we assume that chocolate and vanilla are Bob\u2019s only options (he can\u2019t abstain and he can\u2019t have both), then Molinism says that either<\/em>\u00a0<If S were realized then Bob would freely choose chocolate>\u00a0or<\/em> <If S were realized then Bob would freely choose vanilla> is true. Furthermore, there are true conditionals of this sort for any\u00a0<\/em>internally consistent and fully causally specified indeterministic scenario and\u00a0any<\/em> partition of causally contingent outcomes given that scenario. So, for example, we could replace Bob in the ice cream scenario with any<\/em> other hypothetical individual (Mary, Peter, etc.), changing only what needs changing to reflect that individual\u2019s causal history, and there would be (according to Molinism) a determinate truth as to what that<\/em> individual would freely do in the revised scenario.<\/p>\n Note 1: <\/em>Many discussions of Molinism focus on so-called \u201ccounterfactuals of creaturely freedom\u201d or CCFs. But focusing exclusively on creaturely freedom<\/em> is too narrow. To support God\u2019s meticulous providence, MK needs to provide God determinate information about the outcomes of every conceivable indeterministic scenario<\/em>, even those that do not involve free will, such as, say, quantum-level events. That\u2019s why I explicate Molinism in terms of CFCs rather than CCFs.<\/p>\n Note 2:<\/em> In the previous post<\/a> in this series I distinguished between\u00a0settled future contingent propositions\u00a0<\/em>(SFCPs) and\u00a0open future contingent propositions\u00a0<\/em>(OFCPs). A similar distinction can be made here. Thus, the Molinist’s CFCs are really settled\u00a0<\/em>CFCs (SCFCs). They present the consequent as following determinately (albeit contingently) from the antecedent. This is why they are expressed in terms of what “would” happen given some FCSI scenario. Molinists generally ignore open\u00a0<\/em>CFCs (OCFCs). These are standardly expressed in terms of what “might” (and might not) happen given some scenario.<\/p>\n Finally<\/strong>, God\u00a0uses<\/em> MK to inform His decision about what sort of world, if any, to create. And because (according to Molinism) God has exhaustive<\/em> MK of all true SCFCs, He can exercise meticulous control over every detail of creation throughout its entire history subject only to the constraints that MK places on God\u2019s options. God achieves this meticulous control by considering various initial conditions, causal laws, and interaction policies. Together these define a “fully causally indeterministic specified” (FCSI) scenario. By His MK God knows exactly what “would freely” happen where He to insert one or more specific free creatures (say, Adam and Eve) into that scenario. That “would freely” outcome transforms the initial scenario into a new FCSI scenario in which, again, by His MK God knows exactly what “would freely” happen. And so on. By using His MK and imaginatively chaining SCFCs together, with the “would freely” consequent of one becoming the FCSI antecedent for the next, God can meticulously map out an entire timeline of creation history. After comparing various such timelines, God decides which one, if any, He wants to implement. And that, according to Molinism, is how God obtains exhaustively definite foreknowledge<\/em> (EDF) and exercises meticulous providence without causally<\/em> determining what creatures “would freely” do in FCSI scenarios.<\/p>\n (1.b) Problems with Craig’s and Molina’s explications of Molinism<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n While reading this subsection of Craig’s omniscience chapter, I noticed a couple problems with both Craig’s and Molina’s explications of Molinism. Craig quotes from Molina extensively and rather uncritically, and so tends to copy Molina’s mistakes.<\/p>\n The first problem is their tendency to think of middle knowledge as innate<\/em> or intrinsic to God. This is a problem because, as MK is non-natural, contingent, and pre-volitional it seems there is nothing in God<\/em> to which MK can correspond. What in God<\/em> specifies for a given FCSI scenario S with causally contingent outcome O whether O “would freely” result or “would freely” not result were S to obtain? As non-natural it can’t be anything in God’s essence. As contingent it can’t be anything in God’s natural or non-contingent energies. As pre-volitional it can’t be anything in God’s free will or contingent energies. (See this post<\/a> for explanation of the essence\u2013energies distinction<\/em>.) I’ll call this Problem 1 (P1).<\/p>\n The second problem is that Craig and Molina repeatedly talk about merely possible<\/em> creatures as if they were actual creatures with an actual ability to exercise LFW. This is a problem because merely possible creatures are just\u00a0ideas<\/em> in God’s mind. They have no actual will of their own by which they<\/em> can specify for themselves whether outcome O “would freely” result or “would freely” not result where S to obtain. I’ll call this Problem 2 (P2).<\/p>\n P1 and P2 are closely related. Indeed, together they form the basis of the infamous grounding objection<\/em> against Molinism to be discussed below. All I’d like to note for now is that both Craig and Molina walk right into P1 and P2, seemingly without realizing that there is anything problematic about them. In some passages both problems occur side by side. Thus, in Molina’s words, God has MK because<\/p>\n in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each free will [P2], he saw in his own essence [P1] what each such will would do with its innate freedom [P2] were it to be placed in this or that or, indeed in infinitely many orders of things\u2014even though it would really be able [P2], if it so willed, to do the opposite. (p. 255)<\/p>\n In his gloss on this and another Molina passage Craig says that “the content of divine middle knowledge \u2026 depends on what the creatures themselves [P2] would do” (p. 256), that “such knowledge depends on a decision of free will [P2]” (p. 257) by a creature, and that God by His MK takes into account “the free decisions of creatures [P2] in his planning” (p. 258).<\/p>\n In another passage from Molina quoted by Craig, Molina again speaks of “God’s comprehension in his essence [P1] of each created free will [P2] through his natural [i.e., middle] knowledge” (p. 258). Note that Molina himself seemingly confuses MK with natural knowledge at this point, hence the editorial correction by Craig.<\/p>\n At this point Craig poses a very sensible question: How is it that “in knowing his own essence alone God is able to have middle knowledge” (p. 258)? He then approvingly cites Molina’s answer: God has\u00a0supercomprehension<\/em>. More specifically, God “comprehends in the deepest and most eminent way whatever falls under his omnipotence [P1], to penetrate created free choice<\/em> [P2] in such a way as to discern and intuit with certainty which part it is going to turn itself to by its own innate freedom [P2]” (p. 259) As Craig explains,<\/p>\n Because his [God’s] intellect is infinite, whereas a free creature is finite, God’s insight into the will of a free creature [P2] is of such surpassing quality that God knows exactly what the free creature [P2] would do were God to place him in a certain set of circumstances. (p. 259)<\/p>\n In a footnote, Craig further suggests that we “think of Molina’s doctrine of supercomprehension in terms of individual essences’ having contingent counterfactual properties discerned by God” (p. 259). As to how an individual essence<\/em> could even have contingent<\/em> properties, Craig doesn’t say.<\/p>\n In parallel with Molina’s supercomprehension idea, Craig also approvingly references Francisco Su\u00e1rez’s (1548\u20131617) suggestion that God knows MK simply because He essentially knows all truths and equates this with his own “conceptualist model” of divine omniscience (p. 259). (See \u00a72.e of the previous post<\/a> in this series for my discussion of this so-called “model.”)<\/p>\n What are we to make of all this? Molina and Craig need both P1 and P2 to make Molinism\u00a0sound<\/em> halfway plausible. Without P1 it follows that contingent MK information comes from outside<\/em> God and constrains God’s own omnipotence. For any standard creation ex<\/em> nihilo<\/em> (CEN)-affirming monotheist, this is absurd. According to CEN, apart from creation there is nothing<\/em> but God and God alone, and so there can be no contingent information external to God. Since Molina and Craig both want to be orthodox Christian monotheists, they therefore somehow have to locate MK information in God. Hence, P1. But, as I have already explained, P1 is incredibly problematic because there doesn’t seem to be any locus in God from which that information could be sourced.<\/p>\n As for P2, Molinists need this to avoid their view collapsing into determinism. If we don’t reify merely possible creatures or individual creaturely essences into quasi-actual free agents, then the contingent specification of MK toward a “would freely” as opposed to a “would freely not” (or vice-versa) is not a specification that comes from<\/em> that creaturely individual or any creaturely individual. It’s simply God imagining things as if<\/em> so-and-so “would freely” do such-and-such in an imagined FCSI scenario. This is similar to J. K. Rowling’s imagining Harry Potter’s “freely” choosing to do such-and-such in some scenario. But imagined freedom is obviously not real freedom. Hence, P2. But, as I have already explained, P2 is incredibly problematic because God’s innate ideas<\/em> of possible creatures are not<\/em> creatures, much less free creaturely agents.<\/p>\n (2) Arguments for Molinism<\/strong><\/p>\n Craig offers three lines of argument for thinking that God has MK. The first is biblical. The second is philosophical. And the third is “theological” or, more accurately, pragmatic.<\/p>\n (2.a) A biblical argument for MK<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Craig’s biblical argument for MK is brief and inconclusive. He refers back to his biblical survey (discussed in part one<\/a> of this series) but then quickly concedes that “this does not settle the matter” of whether God has MK. This is because “the scriptural passages show only that God possesses counterfactual knowledge” (p. 260) and are silent on whether this knowledge is pre-volitional, as Molinism requires. Consequently, “no amount of proof-texting” can prove that God’s counterfactual knowledge “is possessed logically prior to God’s creative decree” (p. 261).<\/p>\n So far, the cumulative case for MK looks very weak.<\/p>\n (2.b) A philosophical argument for MK<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Craig’s main argument for Molinism is philosophical. Here’s the core argument (adapted from Craig, p. 262):<\/p>\n (1) If there are true SCFCs, then God knows them. I’ll grant Craig the validity of this argument. If premises (1)\u2013(4) are all true, then (5) logically follows and with it the core thesis of Molinism. The question, then, is whether (1)\u2013(4) are all true.<\/p>\n As for (1), I will not contest it. It follows from God’s propositional omniscience (though see my second post<\/a> in this series for discussion of the limits of propositional omniscience).<\/p>\n Premise (2) is just plain false. There are no true SCFCs. I’ll give my argument against (2) in the course of reviewing how Craig tries to support it. He proposes three arguments. I’ll take them in reverse order.<\/p>\n First, Craig says that “Scripture itself gives examples of \u2026 true counterfactuals,” such as 1 Cor. 2:8 (p. 263). But this is cheating on Craig’s part. He shifts the target from a specific type of counterfactual (i.e., an SCFC) to counterfactuals in general. If Scripture is to provide support for Molinism, it needs to provide examples of true SCFCs<\/em>, not merely true counterfactuals. And as Craig himself has already conceded in his discussion of the Biblical case for MK (see \u00a72.a above), there are no Biblical prooftexts for Molinism. So, Craig’s first supporting reason for (2) is irrelevant.<\/p>\n Second, Craig argues that “we ourselves often know the truth of counterfactuals about how people would act or react under particular circumstances” (p. 263). I grant the claim but deny its relevance. Notice that Craig again speaks generically here of “counterfactuals” rather than specifically of SCFCs. As before, this is cheating on his part, for it doesn’t matter if we know the truth of some counterfactuals if none of the counterfactuals we know are SCFCs. Indeed, it is far from obvious that we do know any SCFCs for, in general, the more confident we are that some “would” counterfactual is true, the less confident we should be that its “would freely” correlate is true. The reason for this will soon become apparent.<\/p>\n Side note<\/em>: Craig’s “cheating” with these first two reasons is so blatant that it calls out for explanation. One theory is that it’s deliberate deception on his part. He appeals to counterfactuals in general rather than Molinist-style SCFCs in hopes that readers won’t notice the switch. A more charitable theory is that he genuinely believes there is no additional difficulty when it comes to SCFCs being true and knowable than there is for counterfactuals in general. I suspect the latter is closer to the truth.<\/p>\n Third, Craig says “it is plausible that” there are true SCFCs because the antecedents of these conditionals are fully causally specified (p. 263). This is a pretty weak claim on Craig’s part. He is correct that a “fully specified” antecedent removes one way<\/em> in which a counterfactual can fail to have a determinate truth value. In a footnote he references the famous pair of examples from David Lewis: <If Verdi and Bizet were compatriots, they would both be French> and <If Verdi and Bizet were compatriots, they would both be Italian>. Lewis’s examples seem to have no determinate truth values because we have no reason for thinking either conditional is more likely to be true (or false) than the other. But we can easily change this perception by further specifying the antecedent<\/em>. For example, if the antecedent said “If Verdi and Bizet were compatriots\u00a0and Bizet was born in Paris<\/em>” then we would be much more inclined to conclude that they would both be French. So\u00a0antecedent strengthening<\/em>, as it is called, can resolve counterfactual ambiguity. But this is not the problem with SCFCs. The problem with SCFCs is not the specificity of the antecedent but the contingency of the connection<\/em> between antecedent (A) and consequent (C). This contingency is essential to Molinism. Given any FCSI scenario it must be really possible<\/em> for a causally contingent outcome (relative to that scenario) both to occur and not to occur. Hence, as far as the FCSI antecedent is concerned, it remains an\u00a0open question<\/em> whether C “would freely” occur or “would freely not” occur given A. That’s the problem. The problem in other words, is that the Molinist’s SCFCs don’t cohere with the requite contingent relation<\/em> between antecedent and consequent. If it’s an open question whether<\/em> C “would freely” occur given A, then it can’t also be a settled fact that<\/em> C “would freely” occur given A. Hence, there can be no true SCFCs.<\/p>\n In sum, then, Craig’s support for premise (2) is not only largely irrelevant and weak but, once we appreciate the contingency of the connection between antecedent and consequent in a CFC, it becomes readily clear that premise (2) is necessarily false. SCFCs by their very nature are incoherent since, again, it can’t both be an open question whether C would obtain given A and a settled fact that C would obtain given A.<\/p>\n Turning to premise (3), Craig thinks it must be true because pre-volitional and post-volitional are “logically exhaustive alternatives” (p. 263). This doesn’t seem quite right, however, for there is, in theory at least, a third possibility. Perhaps God’s knowledge of some SCFC is neither<\/em> pre-volitional nor post-volitional but merely\u00a0coincident with<\/em> God’s volitional decree. On this suggestion, God comes to know an SCFC while<\/i> issuing the decree and not because of the decree. If this is a coherent possibility, then Craig’s got to do a little more work to establish premise (3). That said, I won’t press the point further. I’ll concede the premise.<\/p>\n We come, finally, to premise (4). It is not the case, says Craig, that God’s knowledge of SCFCs is post-volitional. His argument for this is that, if (4) were false, then by premise (3) God’s knowledge of SCFCs would be post-volitional in which case “it is God who determined what every creature would do in every circumstance” (p. 263). But then, says Craig, “there really are no counterfactuals of creaturely freedom” (p. 264), which conflicts with premise (2). In short, Craig’s defense of (4) presupposes his prior defense of premise (2). Since I’ve already argued that premise (2) is false and that, at any rate, Craig’s defense of it is weak, I conclude that premise (4) has little to recommend it.<\/p>\n Overall, then, Craig’s philosophical argument for MK is a failure. Premise (2) is the lynchpin, and it has not only not been adequately defended, but there is very good reason to think the premise is not only false but necessarily so on grounds of incoherence.<\/p>\n (2.c) A theological argument for MK<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n By Craig’s estimation this is “[p]erhaps the strongest” argument for MK (p. 264). It’s actually a collection of arguments the overall gist of which is that MK “is astonishing in its subtlety and power” and “one of the most fruitful theological concepts ever conceived” (p. 264). Somewhat crudely put, the argument is basically “The thesis that God has MK must be true because it’s just so dang useful!” In this vein Craig refences several publications (mostly his own and Thomas Flint’s) in which MK is applied to various topics in theology, including not only divine foreknowledge and providence, but also biblical inspiration, soteriological particularism, perseverance of the saints, Christology, and papal infallibility.<\/p>\n Craig’s most developed argument of this sort focuses on divine providence. He references a couple biblical passages:<\/p>\n [T]his Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men. (Acts 2:23, ESV)<\/p>\n [F]or truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place. (Acts 4:27\u201328, ESV)<\/p>\n He then offers a Molinist reading of these passages which, to his mind, present a “staggering assertion of divine sovereignty over the affairs of men” (p. 265). As Craig puts it,<\/p>\n When one reflects that the existence of the various circumstances and persons involved was itself the result of myriads of prior free choices on the part of these and other agents, and these in turn of yet other prior contingencies, and so on, then we see that only an omniscient mind could providentially direct a world of free creatures toward his sovereignly established ends. (p. 266)<\/p>\n In response to Craig, there is a major hole in his reasoning, for the biblical passages he references say nothing about when<\/em> “the definite plan and foreknowledge of God” concerning the crucifixion was established nor how detailed<\/em> the plan was. Craig seems to just assume that this plan\u00a0and all of the details as events actually transpired<\/em> must have been part of God’s settled plan\u00a0from the outset of creation<\/em>. Molinism requires that assumption, but the biblical text is compatible with a much more proximate and much less detailed plan. In short, we don’t need Molinism<\/em> to make sense of these passages. All we need is a God who can engineer the requisite<\/em> details when necessary<\/em>. Perhaps all that God had originally “predestined to take place” is that the Son would need to become incarnate. After the Fall the plan is amended to require that He eventually die. As history unfolds, the plan gradually becomes more precise until eventually it requires that Christ be born of Jewish decent and die by crucifixion in Jerusalem at the hand of the Romans by the instigation of the Jewish leaders. Maybe there’s a bit more to it than that, but my point is merely that the plan didn’t need to be fully settled in meticulous detail at the moment of creation. And so, these passages do not<\/em> give us a strong argument for Molinism. The argument is in fact quite weak.<\/p>\n In sum, the theological argument for MK is easily overblown. While there are many facets of it that I have not looked at and that Craig himself merely footnotes, that MK helps us in various theological debates and offers “stunning” interpretations of certain biblical passages is not a strong argument in its favor. Other ideas, such as open futurism, are arguably just as fruitful. Moreover, the alleged theological benefits of Molinism are simply irrelevant if Molinism proves to be incoherent, something I have already argued is the case. (And which I have argued in detail elsewhere<\/a>.)<\/p>\n (3) Answering objections to Molinism<\/strong><\/p>\n Craig’s final subsection is a response to two common philosophical objections against Molinism. Both are variations on the so-called grounding objection<\/em>. The first, which occupies about 75% of this subsection, contends that there are no true SCFCs. The second, which occupies the remaining 25%, contends that SCFCs can’t be prevolitionally<\/em> true. Obviously, if the first objection succeeds then the second one is moot. But potentially the second could succeed even if the first one fails. So, they are different objections, despite their overlap.<\/p>\n Craig does make clear that these are not the\u00a0only<\/em> philosophical objections that have been leveled against Molinism, and he says that he will deal with additional objections in a later volume of his systematic (p. 266).<\/p>\n Side note<\/em>: I sketch seven objections to Molinism here<\/a>. The first five are philosophical objections. The sixth is biblical. The seventh is theological.<\/p>\n (3.a) Are there true SCFCs?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n This first objection is what we might call the metaphysical grounding objection<\/em> (MGO). It contends that there are no MK truths because there is nothing in reality that suffices to underwrite or ground those truths. Such truths cannot be grounded in God’s metaphysically necessary nature because they are logically contingent. They cannot be grounded in God’s will because they are pre-volitional. And they cannot be grounded in creation because they are explanatorily prior to God’s creative decree. What, then, could possibly ground MK truths? By the nature of such truths it would have to be something intrinsic to God that is both metaphysically contingent and pre-volitional. But what in a monotheistic framework could possibly fill that role? To my knowledge Molinists have never given even a remotely plausible answer to this question. Indeed, I don’t think they can answer it<\/a>.<\/p>\n Rather than meeting the objection head-on, Craig’s strategy is dismissive. He first contends that the MGO “has scarcely ever been articulated or defended in any depth by its advocates” (p. 267), as though the objection is inherently confusing or counterintuitive, leaving the objector with the burden of first stating it clearly. I don’t think this is a serious reply on Craig’s part. As I’ve just described it above, the MGO is quite intuitive. Fortunately, Craig doesn’t stop with bare dismissal but aims to provide an undercutting defeater<\/em> by challenging the intuition that truths need to be grounded in anything more than whatever abstract “facts” or “states of affairs” are disclosed by the disquotation principle. Let me explain what this means.<\/p>\n The\u00a0disquotation principle<\/em> (i.e., “p<\/em>” is true iff p<\/em>) takes the linguistic predicate “is true” to be a device of metalinguistic ascent<\/em>. That is, we can use it replace a first-order or object language statement p<\/em> with a second-order or metalanguage statement about<\/em> the object language statement, namely, that “p<\/em>” is true. For example, instead of saying “The cat is on the mat” (first-order expression) we can say “‘The cat is on the mat’ is true” (second-order expression). The disquotation principle simply says that we can use the truth predicate to switch back-and-forth between the first- and second-order expressions as needed. Now, when Craig talks about the “facts” disclosed by this principle, all he’s saying is that if we need to find a “ground” for a second-order expression like “‘p<\/em>‘ is true” then we can just dis-quote it by removing the quotations and the “is true” predicate to bring us back to the first-order expression p<\/em>. The “fact” disclosed by dis-quoting “‘p<\/em>‘ is true” is simply\u00a0p<\/em>. In sum, Craig thinks that insofar as truths need grounds at all, finding grounds is metaphysically trivial<\/em>. Basically, we just restate<\/em> the proposition we want to find grounds for, call that restatement a “fact” or “state of affairs,” and say “there’s your grounds.” Thus, what grounds or makes <the cat is on the mat> true is simply the “fact” that the cat is on the mat. If that sounds trivial to the point of absurdity, it’s because it is. As I said in the previous installment<\/a> of this series, while Craig pays lip service to the correspondence theory of truth, he actually holds to a deflationary<\/em> theory of truth. This is the view that the disquotation principle tells us all<\/em> we need to know about truth. Truth is merely<\/em> a device of metalinguistic ascent and therefore has no<\/em> metaphysical implications whatsoever. That’s why “grounding” is trivial for Craig.<\/p>\n Most critics of Molinism are anti-deflationists about truth, however. They aren’t satisfied with vacuous “grounding” of the sort that Craig suggests. They want metaphysically robust grounding<\/em> for MK truths. But that’s something Molinism seems unable to provide. Hence, the MGO. Craig’s main strategy against the MGO, therefore, is to challenge this robust grounding intuition. He does this by listing several statements that, he thinks, cannot plausibly be grounded in a metaphysically robust way. Here they are:<\/p>\n (6) No physical objects exist. I’ll work through Craig’s treatment of (6)\u2013(12) shortly. First, I need to introduce the concept of a truthmaker<\/strong>. This is something the\u00a0existence<\/em> of which “makes” a true proposition true. In other words, a truthmaker explains<\/em> or grounds<\/em> the truth of a proposition. I bring this concept up because Craig frames his discussion of (6)\u2013(12) in terms of truthmaking. But he misunderstands the truthmaking principle. As he puts it, a truthmaker is “[a]n entity a <\/em>[that] makes a proposition p\u00a0<\/em>true if and only if\u00a0that\u00a0a\u00a0<\/em><\/span>exists<\/span> entails<\/span> that\u00a0p<\/em>” (p. 268, my underlines). There are two problems with this statement. First, “that\u00a0a<\/em> exists” represents a\u00a0proposition<\/em>. But truthmaking is not (in general) a relation between a proposition p<\/em> and another proposition <a<\/em> exists>. It is not, as Craig states in a footnote, “essentially a logical relation” (p. 268). No. Truthmaking is an\u00a0explanatory<\/em> (not logical) relation between concrete reality (what exists) and a proposition. Second, truthmaking is not best understood as an\u00a0entailment<\/em> relation. This is because entailment is typically understood as a relation between\u00a0propositions<\/em>, whereas truthmakers (in general) are not propositions. Take, for example, the proposition <Tat the cat is on the mat>. If we suppose that this proposition is true, then\u2014according to the truthmaker idea\u2014there exists something that suffices to make that proposition true. Most plausibly that “something” is not a proposition or any abstract “fact” but consists of an actual cat named Tat, a physical mat, and the concrete state of affairs that is Tat’s being on said mat. So, to correct Craig’s statement of what a truthmaker is we should instead say something like this:<\/p>\n truthmaker (TM)<\/strong> =def.<\/sub> An entity a<\/em> the existence of which provides a sufficient metaphysical ground or explanation for the truth of some proposition.<\/p>\n And if we suppose additionally that all<\/em> truths have truthmakers\u2014this is in fact a corollary of the correspondence theory<\/a>\u2014then we arrive at a principle called truthmaker maximalism<\/em>:<\/p>\n truthmaker maximalism (TMmax<\/sub>) <\/strong>= def.<\/sub> For every true proposition p<\/em>, there exists a truthmaker, i.e., an entity a<\/em> the existence of which provides a sufficient metaphysical ground or explanation for the truth of p<\/em>.<\/p>\n Craig’s main goal in listing (6)\u2013(12) is to argue that either<\/em> (a) TMmax<\/sub> is false or<\/em> (b) it’s true but trivial, since we can easily obtain truthmakers by disquotation, as explained above.<\/p>\n Let’s now consider statements (6)\u2013(12). (6), says Craig, “could be true” and (7) is true “yet they preclude truthmakers which are or imply the existence of the relevant concrete objects (such as dinosaurs)” (p. 270). But why should we accept this? It seems to me that if (6) were true, then it would be true in virtue of the concrete<\/em> state that is God’s having a physical object-free experience of reality. Likewise, (7) is true in virtue of the concrete state that is God’s present memory of dinosaurs. Craig seems to think this doesn’t work because memories aren’t the “relevant” sort of concrete object. I disagree. God has the memories He does because He was there when dinosaurs existed and observed first-hand when they became extinct. So long as God cannot have faulty memories, why isn’t that relevant?<\/p>\n As for (8), Craig says that this “is a universally quantified statement which as such does not carry existential implications” and so cannot be made true by “existing ravens’ being black” (p. 271). (8), however, is ambiguous. There are two different propositions it could be expressing. One is <All actual<\/em> ravens are black>. The other is <Ravens are essentially black>. The first is straightforwardly existential and would be made true by all existing ravens concretely being black. The second is not existential because it could still be true even if all ravens went extinct or never existed in the first place. But even if ravens don’t exist, raven nature<\/em> still does because it’s an eternal idea in God’s mind. The existence of that concrete idea makes the proposition true.\u00a0Something similar can be said for (9). Even if no children ever exist, still the\u00a0idea<\/em> of children exists in God’s mind. And it is plausibly in virtue of that idea and the consequent value that God would place on children were they to exist that (9) is true.<\/p>\n Moving on, Craig says that (10) and (11) “are tensed statements about persons who no longer or do not yet exist \u2026 and so cannot have such persons among their truthmakers” (p. 271). But the right thing to say here, at least for an open futurist, is that (10) is probably false<\/em> because it is plausibly a future contingent and so, while it is possible that a woman is President in 2070, it is not the case (at least not yet) that a woman\u00a0will<\/em> be President in 2070. But suppose this isn’t a future contingent. They we can say that the truthmaker for (10) is the (locally) deterministic causal structure of concrete reality, which structure ensures that a woman is President in 2070. Craig’s position on (11) is more puzzling because, as a professed Christian who presumably believes in the general resurrection of the dead, he should not<\/em> affirm that Napolean no longer exists. He could say that Napoleon no longer exists\u00a0in the land of the living<\/em>, but not that he doesn’t exist\u00a0period<\/em>. In any case, that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo has a concrete truthmaker in the same way that (7) does, namely, God concretely remembers Napoleon’s loss.<\/p>\n Finally, (12) is a true counterfactual about an apparently non-existent entity (the luminiferous aether) that was hypothesized by 19th-century physicists but eventually rejected because of failed experimental tests based on propositions like (12). Craig thinks it’s hard to find a plausible truthmaker for (12). I disagree. Just as with (8) and (9), even if the aether doesn’t exist, the idea\u00a0<\/em>of the aether concretely does in God’s mind<\/em>.<\/p>\n In sum, Craig’s examples don’t pose any problems whatsoever for TMmax<\/sub>\u2014at least not if we assume Christian theism, which Craig and I both affirm. That he doesn’t see how there could be truthmakers for (6)\u2013(12) is more a reflection of his poor understanding of truthmaking and a lack of metaphysical imagination than a problem with TMmax<\/sub>. (For my full discussion and defense of TMmax<\/sub>, see this post<\/a>.)<\/p>\n But Craig obviously doesn’t see matters that way. He thinks he’s successfully shown that there are statements “which either are true without having truthmakers or else have as their truthmakers abstractions like facts or states of affairs,” with the latter being “disclosed” by disquotation. He concludes that the idea that truthmakers are concrete entities is “untenable” and “na\u00efve.” Applied to Molinism, the idea that the truthmakers of true SCFCs must be “any sort of concrete object” is, he says, “extraordinary” (p. 272).<\/p>\n At this point, since Craig thinks he’s adequately made his case against any metaphysically robust interpretation TMmax<\/sub>, he turns his attention to rebutting some of the more forceful proponents of the MGO, particularly Tim O’Connor and William Hasker.<\/p>\n (3.a.i) Craig contra O’Connor<\/p>\n
\n(2) There are true SCFCs.
\n(3) If God knows a true SCFC, then He knows it either pre-volitionally or post-volitionally.
\n(4) It is not the case that God knows true SCFCs post-volitionally.
\nTherefore,
\n(5) God knows true SCFCs pre-volitionally. (from 1\u20134)<\/p>\n
\n(7) Dinosaurs are extinct today.
\n(8) All ravens are black.
\n(9) Torturing a child is wrong.
\n(10) Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo.
\n(11) The U.S. President in 2070 will be a woman.
\n(12) If a rigid rod were placed in uniform motion through the aether, it would suffer a FitzGerald\u2013Lorentz contraction. (pp. 269\u2013270)<\/p>\n