{"id":467,"date":"2015-02-09T00:52:43","date_gmt":"2015-02-09T05:52:43","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=467"},"modified":"2015-08-26T16:26:49","modified_gmt":"2015-08-26T21:26:49","slug":"responding-to-craig-and-hunt-part-5-the-metaphysical-argument","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2015\/02\/responding-to-craig-and-hunt-part-5-the-metaphysical-argument\/","title":{"rendered":"Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 5 \u2013 the metaphysical argument)"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"branching_future\"<\/a><\/p>\n

This is the fifth installment in a series of posts responding to a 2013\u00a0paper<\/a>\u00a0by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H) entitled \u201cPerils of the Open Road\u201d. In the paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006\u00a0paper<\/a>\u00a0(hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled \u201cOpen Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future\u201d and a 2007\u00a0paper<\/a>\u00a0(hereafter, DT) by Dale Tuggy entitled \u201cThree Roads to Open Theism.\u201d<\/p>\n

In\u00a0part 1<\/a>\u00a0of this series I laid some groundwork by defining key terms like \u201copen theism\u201d and \u201cfuture contingent\u201d and distinguishing between different types of future contingent proposition (FCP). In\u00a0part 2<\/a>\u00a0I examined C&H’s dismissive discussion of arguments for the incompatibility of future contingency with an epistemically settled future. In part 3<\/a> I replied to C&H’s criticisms of RBB’s and DT’s use of branching diagrams to depict an indeterministic future. In part 4<\/a> I replied to C&H’s criticism of RBB’s semantic argument\u00a0for the\u00a0incompatibility thesis<\/em> (IT), the claim that a causally open future entails an alethically open future.<\/p>\n

In this installment I respond to C&H’s criticisms of RBB’s metaphysical argument for IT, wherein we argue that a causally and ontically open future entails an alethically open future.<\/p>\n

Overview of the metaphysical\u00a0argument for IT<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

As presented in RBB, the metaphysical argument (MA) assumes a correspondence theory of truth<\/em> (CTT) and a temporal ontology according to which concrete future events and states of affairs do not exist. Both presentism and the growing-block theory satisfy this ontological constraint, but for simplicity we focus on presentism. The central contention of MA is that since, given presentism, there is nothing in reality for\u00a0will<\/em> and will not<\/em> propositions about future contingents to correspond to, and since, given CTT, a proposition’s truth requires that there be<\/em> something in reality for it to correspond to, will<\/em> and will not<\/em> propositions about future contingents are not true<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In other words, if the future is ontically open (presentism) and causally open (future contingency), then it must also be alethically open because the correspondence condition for truth cannot be satisfied. If the future were ontically settled, as on a linear-block theory of time, then the truth of will<\/em> and will not<\/em> propositions about future events could be grounded in the future events themselves. Likewise, if the future were causally settled, then the truth of will<\/em> and will not<\/em> propositions about future events could be grounded in presently existing conditions and causal laws. But if there are no future events, and if determinism is false, then nothing in reality would be sufficient to underwrite the truth of will<\/em> and will not<\/em> propositions about future contingent<\/em> events.<\/p>\n

I develop this line of argument with greater sophistication in a later paper<\/a> (esp. pp. 82\u201383), but I think the formulation in RBB remains defensible, as I will now try to show.<\/p>\n

C&H’s formulation of MA<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In their paper, C&H provide (pp. 68\u201369) an 8-step distillation of MA that serves as the focus of their critique:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. A proposition is true iff the state of affairs it posits obtains (correspondence theory of truth).<\/li>\n
  2. No non-present states of affairs obtain (presentism).<\/li>\n
  3. Therefore, a proposition is true iff the state of affairs it posits obtains now.<\/li>\n
  4. Therefore, if there are true [contingent] propositions about the future, they must be true in virtue of the present obtaining of some future-tense state of affairs.<\/li>\n
  5. If a proposition about the future is now true, then it is true in virtue of what is now the case.<\/li>\n
  6. Therefore, future-tense states of affairs obtain only insofar as the future is present in its causes.<\/li>\n
  7. What is now the case must somehow bear upon<\/em> what will be the case.<\/li>\n
  8. The present bears upon the future in the manner of a cause upon its effect.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    It should be emphasized that this is their <\/em>formulation of MA. 1\u20134 are supposed to capture RBB’s explication of presentism and truth as correspondence (p. 68), whereas 5\u20138 are supposed to capture RBB’s argument based on 1\u20134 that “there are no true future contingent propositions” (p. 69). The first half (1\u20134) is clearly and fairly stated. There is a clear line of inference from 1 & 2 to 3 and from 3 to 4. But the second half (5\u20138) is a poor reconstruction, for several reasons:<\/p>\n