{"id":483,"date":"2015-03-29T22:23:47","date_gmt":"2015-03-30T03:23:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=483"},"modified":"2015-03-30T13:32:53","modified_gmt":"2015-03-30T18:32:53","slug":"truth-in-truth-at-and-just-plain-truth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2015\/03\/truth-in-truth-at-and-just-plain-truth\/","title":{"rendered":"Truth-in, Truth-at, and Just Plain Truth"},"content":{"rendered":"

This post continues a series on issues related to\u00a0truth<\/strong>. In previous posts I have looked at (a)<\/a> the correspondence theory of truth and its relation to truthmaking, (b)<\/a> disquotation principles, and (c)<\/a> the conflict between correspondence and disquotation principles, to the detriment of the latter.<\/p>\n

In this post I want to look at a distinction introduced by philosopher Robert Adams in an important article called “Actualism\u00a0and Thisness”<\/a>\u00a0(A&T). The distinction is\u00a0between\u00a0truth-at<\/strong> and\u00a0truth-in<\/strong> and just plain truth, or\u00a0truth\u00a0simpliciter<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Adams’ occasion for introducing this distinction is to address a metaphysical debate about the nature of singular\u00a0<\/strong>propositions<\/strong>\u00a0in relation to logically possible worlds<\/b>.\u00a0According to a view known as\u00a0actualism<\/strong>, which Adams endorses, “there are no things that do not exist in the actual world” (A&T, p. 7). In other words, possibilities, in so far as they are real, are ontologically dependent on actualities. There are no self-subsisting possibilities.<\/p>\n

Adams is not only an actualist, but\u00a0a\u00a0serious actualist<\/strong>. This is the view that properties and relations, in additional to possibilities, are ontologically dependent on actualities. In other words, there are no self-subsisting properties or relations. All properties are properties of actually existing things. All relations are relations among actually existing things. This point is often put by saying that properties and relations are “existence entailing”.<\/p>\n

Actualism and singular propositions<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

A\u00a0singular proposition<\/strong> is a proposition that refers to or denotes specific individuals, either by way of a definite description (e.g., <The first man to walk on the moon died in 2012>) or by naming (e.g., <Neil Armstrong<\/a> died in 2012>). There is nothing metaphysically problematic about singular propositions when the individuals referred to are, like Neil Armstrong, actual<\/em> individuals, individuals that either have existed<\/em>,\u00a0currently exist<\/em>, or timelessly exist<\/em>. But given actualism and serious actualism (hereafter I will refer to both simply as “actualism”) the status of singular propositions about individuals that do not and never have existed is very problematic.<\/p>\n

Consider, for example, <The present king of France is bald> and <King Louis XXV of France is bald>. There is no past, present, or timeless individual who is the present<\/em> king of France or who is named\u00a0King Louis XXV<\/em>. By actualism, there is no merely possible individual for these propositions to refer to. And by serious actualism it is impossible to even refer<\/i> to non-existent individuals or to predicate properties like baldness, regality, or even their contraries to such. Based on such considerations, Adams argues that actualism entails that “there are no singular propositions about non-actual individuals” (A&T, p. 7).<\/p>\n

I agree with Adams in affirming both actualism and serious actualism, and I am tempted to agree with him in affirming that there are no singular propositions about non-actual individuals, though I would nuance this by setting the definite description cases aside. If Adams is right, then neither <The present king of France is bald> nor<King Louis XXV of France is bald> expresses a proposition, and therefore neither is capable of being either true or false for the same reason that, as I noted in my\u00a0previous post<\/a>, <The slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe> does not express a proposition. Namely, the sentences enclosed in angle brackets fail to carry a definite sense. But on a\u00a0Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, which I am inclined to accept, <The present king of France is bald> does have a definite sense (and is false). More generally, singular propositions involving definite descriptions don’t acquire their sense in the same way that singular propositions about named individuals do. In the former case reference is routed through the\u00a0general<\/em> description of a\u00a0role that only allows one occupant. As a general description it doesn’t single out\u00a0a fully specified<\/em> individual like naming does, and that’s why at different points in time, “the present king of France” could have referred to Louis I, Louis II, Louis III, etc.<\/p>\n

If we set singular propositions involving definite descriptions aside and focus on those involving named individuals, and if we make explicit that by “non-actual individuals” we mean individuals that do not and never have existed, then Adams’ thesis becomes<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. There are no singular propositions about named individuals that do not and never have existed.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The truth-in \/ truth-at distinction<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

    Consider now this singular proposition:<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. <Robert Adams has never existed><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Since Adams is an actual individual, there is no problem with affirming the existence of this proposition. Moreover, we can say confidently that (2) is false<\/em>. It is false\u00a0simpliciter<\/em> and false in\u00a0that logically possible “world story” (Adams’ preferred term for possible world) which correctly describes the actual world. Let’s call this world story\u00a0Alpha<\/em>.<\/p>\n

      But still there must be a sense in which propositions like (2)\u00a0could have been true<\/em> since, after all, Adams is not a necessarily existent being (as he himself would admit). What if history had been different such that Adams was never conceived? In that case, a different world story, call it Beta<\/em>, would have correctly described the actual world.<\/p>\n

      But according to (1), in Beta<\/i>,\u00a0(2) wouldn’t even exist and so couldn’t be either true or false. Does (1) imply, then, that there are no logically possible world stories in which (2) is true? And, if so, how is that consistent with the contingency of Adams’ existence?<\/p>\n

      Adams responds to questions like this by distinguishing between\u00a0truth-in<\/strong> and\u00a0truth-at<\/strong>. In terms of this distinction, (2) is\u00a0true-at-Beta<\/em>, but it is not true-in-Beta<\/em>. A proposition is true-in<\/span>-a-world (or in a given domain) just in case it would be true simpliciter<\/em> were that world actual.<\/strong>\u00a0And since truth simpliciter<\/em> requires that a truthbearer exist and correspond to a truthmaker (as I explained in my previous post<\/a>), it follows that a proposition is true-in-a-world if and only if, if that world were actual, the proposition would both exist and correctly describe the world.\u00a0Thus, if\u00a0Beta<\/em> were the actual world and not\u00a0Alpha<\/em>, then (2) would\u00a0not<\/em> be true-in-Beta<\/em> because (given (1)) it would not exist in\u00a0Beta<\/em>. But it would, says Adams, be true-at<\/span>-Beta<\/em>. Any proposition that is true-in-a-world is also true-at-that-world, but the converse does not hold for\u00a0a proposition is true-at<\/span>-a-world (or at a given domain) just in case it correctly describes that world, whether or not the proposition would exist<\/em> if that world were actual<\/strong>. Since (2) correctly describes Beta<\/i>, it is true-at-Beta<\/em>. But it is not true-in-Beta<\/em> and it would not be true\u00a0simpliciter<\/em> if\u00a0Beta<\/em> were actual.<\/p>\n

      The notion of truth-at-a-world gives us a way of talking<\/em> about non-actual possibilities in a manner consistent with actualism without begging ontological questions (like presupposing that there are abstract ‘individual essences’ or haecceities for all possible individuals). In the case of (2) and\u00a0Beta<\/em>, it allows us to use semantic resources from Alpha<\/i> (where ‘Robert Adams’ is a referring expression) to describe worlds, like\u00a0Beta<\/em>, where some of those semantic resources may be\u00a0unavailable.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      This post continues a series on issues related to\u00a0truth. In previous posts I have looked at (a) the correspondence theory of truth and its relation to truthmaking, (b) disquotation principles, and (c) the conflict between correspondence and disquotation principles, to the detriment of the latter. In this post I want to look at a distinction\u2026 Read More »<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[65,64,32],"tags":[68,69,51,67,66],"class_list":["post-483","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-actualism","category-possible-worlds","category-truth","tag-actualism","tag-robert-adams","tag-truth","tag-truth-at","tag-truth-in"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/483","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=483"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/483\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":547,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/483\/revisions\/547"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=483"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=483"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=483"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}