{"id":490,"date":"2015-02-11T01:34:51","date_gmt":"2015-02-11T06:34:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=490"},"modified":"2026-03-13T10:21:03","modified_gmt":"2026-03-13T15:21:03","slug":"truthmaking-and-correspondence-two-sides-of-the-same-coin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2015\/02\/truthmaking-and-correspondence-two-sides-of-the-same-coin\/","title":{"rendered":"Truthmaking and Correspondence \u2013 Two Sides of the Same Coin"},"content":{"rendered":"

What is the relation of truthmaker theory<\/strong> to the correspondence theory<\/strong> of truth?<\/p>\n

In a paper<\/a> by William Lane Craig and David Hunt that I’ve just finished responding to in a series of posts (1<\/a>, 2<\/a>, 3<\/a>, 4<\/a>, and 5<\/a>), they assert that<\/p>\n

It is \u2026 no part of the correspondence theory of truth that true propositions need to be grounded in reality. That is the theory of truth-makers, a controversial addendum to correspondence theory that has been defended by a minority of recent philosophers. (p. 66)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In other words, they claim that one can consistently be a correspondence theorist without being a truthmaker theorist.<\/p>\n

Other philosophers see the matter differently. In the last post of that series I quote Marian David’s\u00a0Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em>\u00a0(SEP<\/em>)\u00a0article on the correspondence theory of truth<\/a>, in which he says that<\/p>\n

truthmaker theory may be presented as a competitor to the correspondence theory or as a version of the correspondence theory. This depends considerably on how narrowly or broadly one construes \u201ccorrespondence theory\u201d, i.e., on terminological issues. Some advocates would agree with Dummett (1959, p. 14) who said that, although \u201cwe have nowadays abandoned the correspondence theory of truth\u201d, it nevertheless \u201cexpresses one important feature of the concept of truth\u2026: that a statement is true only if there is something in the world in virtue of which it is true\u201d. Other advocates would follow Armstrong who tends to present his truthmaker theory as a liberal form of correspondence theory.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In other words, matters on this issue aren’t as clear and settled as Craig and Hunt seem to think.<\/p>\n

In what follows I’m going to argue that Craig and Hunt are\u00a0completely wrong<\/em> about this. Correspondence theory (CT) and truthmaker theory (TM) necessarily go hand-in-hand. They are, in fact, two sides of the same coin.<\/p>\n

Methodological preliminaries<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

As David’s SEP<\/em> article\u00a0indicates, there is probably no such thing as\u00a0the<\/em> correspondence theory or\u00a0the\u00a0<\/em>truthmaker theory. At least, there is no unique referent for these expressions if we focus on\u00a0fully developed versions of each<\/em>. The reason, of course, is because fully developed versions of CT and TM are\u00a0going to have to say something substantive<\/em> about what the\u00a0relata<\/em> of the correspondence and truthmaking relations are and what it means for such things to correspond<\/em> and to make true<\/em> in the relevant senses.<\/p>\n

But suppose we focus instead on the\u00a0minimal core<\/em>\u00a0of such theories? We can then identify\u00a0the<\/em> correspondence theory with what all fully developed correspondence theories have as their common essence. Likewise, we can identify\u00a0the<\/em> truthmaker theory with what all fully developed truthmaker theories have as their common essence. This, at any rate, is how I shall attempt to proceed.<\/p>\n

What is the correspondence theory?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Striped to its bare essence, the correspondence theory (CT) says that the property\u00a0being\u00a0<\/em>true<\/em>\u00a0is a kind of\u00a0relation<\/em> between (a) things of which\u00a0truth<\/em> can properly be predicated\u2014we’ll follow the common practice of calling them\u00a0truthbearers<\/em><\/strong>\u2014and (b) things which, because they appropriately\u00a0correspond<\/em> to the truthbearers, are sufficient for rendering or making<\/em> truthbearers true. We’ll follow the common practice of calling the latter things truthmakers<\/em><\/strong>. In these terms we can say that according to CT, the truth of a truthbearer consists in its correspondence to a truthmaker.<\/p>\n

What is the truthmaker theory?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Stripped to its bare essence, the truthmaker theory (TM) says that\u00a0truths need there to be<\/span> something sufficient to make them true<\/em>. Some versions of TM restrict this to say that only\u00a0some<\/em> truths need truthmakers, whereas other versions affirm that\u00a0all<\/em> truths need truthmakers. The latter thesis is known as\u00a0truthmaker maximalism<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Truthmaker maximalism is controversial because there are some categories of truths (e.g., negative existentials, universal generalizations, truths about the past, etc.) for which many philosophers believe it is not possible, or at least not easy, to say what plausible truthmakers could be. And since we’re allegedly more convinced that the truths in question are true than than such truths could have truthmakers, so, it is argued, truthmaker maximalism must go.<\/p>\n

I believe that objections to truthmaker maximalism are grossly overrated. (I won’t go into detail here since I’ve addressed these sorts of objections in a previous post<\/a>.) Moreover, if, as the bare-bones correspondence theory posits, the truth of a truthbearer consists in its corresponding to a truthmaker, then to give\u00a0up truthmaker maximalism is, ipso facto, to give up CT. It’s to say, contrary to CT, that it’s not<\/em> the case that all truth consists in a relation of correspondence between truthbearers and truthmakers. It’s to say that some truths can be true without corresponding to anything. But CT is pretty intuitive and giving it up seems like a high price to pay. Moreover, there’s no pressing need<\/em> to pay that price. All TM says is that for whatever truths one cares to countenance, one must posit an ontology rich enough to make, that is, to explain<\/em><\/strong> or\u00a0ground<\/em> <\/strong>those truths. If you find yourself with truths for which you can’t identify plausible truthmakers, then that’s a sign that your ontology\u2014your theory about what sorts of things exist\u2014is deficient.<\/p>\n

There are other objections to TM that are independent of truthmaker maximalism. (I discuss such objections\u00a0here<\/a> and here<\/a>.) But to the extent they succeed they do so by weighing TM down with extraneous requirements that go beyond its bare essence.<\/p>\n

When restricted to their bare essences, CT entails truthmaker maximalism, and therefore entails TM.<\/p>\n

How should we understand the relation between CT and TM?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

I believe there is very good reason to affirm both CT and TM. But there is a nontrivial question about how their relation should be understood. David, in his\u00a0SEP<\/em> article, states the difficulty this way:<\/p>\n

Talk of truthmaking and truthmakers goes well with the basic idea underlying the correspondence theory; hence, it might seem natural to describe, e.g., a traditional fact-based correspondence theory as maintaining that the truthmakers are facts and that truthmaking is correspondence. However, the assumption that the correspondence relation can be regarded as a species (or precisification) of the truthmaking relation is dubious. Correspondence appears to be a\u00a0symmetric<\/em> relation (if x<\/em> corresponds to y<\/em>, then y<\/em> corresponds to x<\/em>), whereas it is usually taken for granted that truthmaking is an asymmetric<\/em> relation, or at least not a symmetric one. It is hard to see how a symmetric relation could be a species (or precisification) of an asymmetric or non-symmetric relation.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

What David\u00a0points out here is that\u00a0truthmaking<\/em> and\u00a0correspondence<\/em> are different relations because they have incompatible relational properties. Correspondence is a symmetric relation, whereas truthmaking is non-symmetric. (More exactly, truthmaking is anti-symmetric<\/em>. A relation R between a<\/em> and b<\/em> is anti-symmetric just in case if\u00a0a<\/em>Rb<\/em> then it is not the case that\u00a0b<\/em>Ra<\/em>, except possibly in the case where\u00a0a<\/em>=b<\/em>.)<\/p>\n

But if we can’t simply\u00a0identify<\/em> truthmaking with correspondence, how then are they related?<\/p>\n

I believe the answer is quite simple. What both relations have in common is that they have truthbearers and truthmakers as their relata. I characterize\u00a0these as follows:<\/p>\n