{"id":985,"date":"2022-10-06T15:42:01","date_gmt":"2022-10-06T20:42:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=985"},"modified":"2022-10-28T08:11:40","modified_gmt":"2022-10-28T13:11:40","slug":"todd-ch-7-against-open-closurism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/10\/todd-ch-7-against-open-closurism\/","title":{"rendered":"Todd (ch.7) \u2013 Against Open-Closurism"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright\" src=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/01\/31REtV0GWL._SX323_BO1204203200_1-1-195x300.jpg\" \/>This is part 8 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd\u2019s recently published book <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Open-Future-Why-Contingents-False\/dp\/0192897918\"><em>The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False<\/em><\/a> (Oxford, 2021). (Previous installments: <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=774\">1<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/03\/todd-ch-2-models-of-the-undetermined-future\/\">2<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/04\/todd-ch-3-against-will-excluded-middle\/\">3<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/05\/todd-ch-4-against-conditional-excluded-middle\/\">4<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/08\/todd-ch-5-omniscience-and-the-open-future\/\">5<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/08\/todd-ch-6-part-1-betting-on-the-open-future\/\">6<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/09\/todd-ch-6-part-2-probability-and-the-open-future\/\">7<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<p>In Chapter 7 Todd and his coauthor, Brian Rabern, tackle a view that they dub &#8220;open-closurism&#8221;. It&#8217;s the view espoused by Richmond Thomason and, most notably and recently, by John MacFarlane according to which (a) <em>will excluded middle<\/em> (WEM) is true, (b) <em>bivalence<\/em> (BV) is false, and (c)\u00a0<em>retro-closure<\/em> (RC) is true.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>open-closurism (OC)<\/strong> = WEM + RC + bivalence fails for future contingent propositions.<\/p>\n<p>This combination has an interesting consequence: <em>semantic relativism<\/em>. Because of WEM and the failure of bivalence it follows that <em>prior<\/em> to the occurrence of a future contingent event (say, rain tomorrow) it is\u00a0<em>not true <\/em>that it <em>will<\/em> rain tomorrow, and it is <em>not true<\/em> that it <em>will not<\/em> rain tomorrow. But because of RC it follows that <em>after<\/em> the occurrence of a future contingent event, it <em>was<\/em> previously <em>true<\/em> that it <em>was going to<\/em> occur. This sets up a seeming contradiction: If we suppose that rain tomorrow is a future contingent and that tomorrow it does rain, then by WEM and non-bivalence it <em>is not true<\/em> today that it rains tomorrow whereas tomorrow by RC it <em>is true<\/em> today that it rains tomorrow. Since it can&#8217;t both be\u00a0<em>true and not true<\/em> today that it rains tomorrow, something has to give. Open-closurists resolve this tension by semantic relativism (SR):<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>semantic relativism (SR)<\/strong> = Propositional truth values need to be relativized not only to <em>times<\/em> (i.e., a &#8220;context of utterance&#8221;), but also to\u00a0<em>perspectives <\/em>(i.e., a &#8220;context of assessment&#8221;).<\/p>\n<p>Combining OC and SR allows one to avoid the apparent contradiction generated by WEM + non-bivalence, on the one hand, and RC, on the other:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Let <em>t<\/em><sub>0<\/sub> be the present moment (the context of utterance) and <em>p<\/em> be a future contingent that may or may not obtain at future time <em>t<\/em><sub>1<\/sub>.<\/li>\n<li>Let F(<em>p<\/em>) be the claim that\u00a0<em>p<\/em>\u00a0<em>will obtain at\u00a0<\/em><em>t<\/em><sub>1<\/sub>.<\/li>\n<li>Suppose that <em>p<\/em> does obtain at\u00a0<em>t<\/em><sub>1<\/sub>.<\/li>\n<li>Then, F(<em>p<\/em>) is <em>neither true nor false<\/em> at\u00a0<em>t<\/em><sub>0<\/sub> from a<em> future-oriented perspective<\/em> (a prior context of assessment) but is also <em>true<\/em>\u00a0at\u00a0<em>t<\/em><sub>0<\/sub> from a\u00a0<em>past-oriented perspective<\/em> (a posterior context of assessment).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This is the model that Todd and Rabern wish to critique in Ch. 7. They say<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Our contention is this: Once we take up this perspective, and ask what [OC] \u2026 predicts about <em>omniscience<\/em>, we&#8217;ll see that the view \u2026 rules out the existence of an omniscient being (under certain plausible assumptions)\u2014or, at least, requires that any indeterministic universe lacked an omniscient being at some point in the past. (p. 149)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>They add that their critique does not presuppose the existence of God; rather, they use God as a &#8220;proxy for certain epistemic ideals&#8221; to ascertain whether OC is compatible with an &#8220;ideal knower&#8221; (p. 149).<\/p>\n<p><strong>I. Clarifying open-closurism<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Todd and Rabern explain open-closurism in terms of the tense-logical operators <strong>P<sub>1<\/sub><\/strong> = &#8220;one day ago&#8221; and <strong>F<sub>1<\/sub><\/strong> = &#8220;one day hence&#8221;. In these terms RC says that every instance of the schema \u03c6 \u2192 <strong>P<sub>1<\/sub>F<sub>1<\/sub><\/strong>\u03c6 is true (p. 151). To reconcile RC with WEM + non-bivalence, open-closurists offer the following picture:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Looking forwards, there is no privileged branch. Accordingly, looking forwards, future contingents \u2026 are not true. However, looking\u00a0<em>backwards<\/em>, \u2026 there is, now, a way things <em>went<\/em> to get us to here; accordingly, \u2026 we\u00a0<em>do<\/em> at that point have, in some sense, a privileged branch of evaluation, viz., the one we took to get back to that point. In short, when we have a simple formula <strong>F<\/strong>\u03c6, with \u03c6 on some but not all branches, then given that there is no privileged branch, the semantic clauses do not deliver a truth. However, when <strong>F<\/strong> is embedded under <strong>P<\/strong>, the semantic theory (in some sense) tells you: go back\u2014but then return from whence you came, and check whether \u03c6. (p. 151)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>OC is thus committed to the idea that certain past states can &#8220;change&#8221; in certain relational respects. <em>Prior<\/em> to \u03c6&#8217;s coming to pass, it was <em>neither true nor false<\/em> that <strong>F<\/strong>\u03c6, but\u00a0<em>after<\/em> \u03c6&#8217;s coming to pass it\u00a0<em>was true<\/em> that <strong>F<\/strong>\u03c6. The antecedent truth value of <strong>F<\/strong>\u03c6 changed from neither-true-nor-false to true in virtue of, and in relation to, \u03c6&#8217;s having come to pass (p. 154).<\/p>\n<p><strong>II. The logic of temporal omniscience<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In order to develop their omniscience objection against OC, Todd and Rabern revisit the distinctions of Todd&#8217;s Ch. 5. I invite readers to review <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/08\/todd-ch-5-omniscience-and-the-open-future\/\">my blog post<\/a> on that chapter for more detail, but Ch. 7 provides a short recap. The main distinction is between two ways of cashing out the notion of <em>omniscience<\/em>:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>omni-accuracy<\/strong>:\u00a0<em>p<\/em>\u00a0iff God <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">believes<\/span>\u00a0<em>p<\/em>. (<em>p<\/em>\u00a0iff\u00a0<strong>Bel<\/strong><em>p<\/em>)<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>omni-correctness<\/strong>: it is true that\u00a0<em>p<\/em>\u00a0iff God\u00a0<span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">believes<\/span>\u00a0that\u00a0<em>p<\/em>\u00a0(i.e., <strong>T<\/strong><em>p<\/em>\u00a0iff\u00a0<strong>Bel<\/strong><em>p<\/em>)<\/p>\n<p>As in my post on Ch.5, I underline &#8220;believes&#8221; and other doxastic attitude terms when they are to be read as implying\u00a0<em>maximal credence<\/em>. To say that God <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">believes<\/span>\u00a0<em>p<\/em> is to say that God believes\u00a0<em>p<\/em>\u00a0<em>with subjective certainty<\/em>. In short, there is no doubt in God&#8217;s mind concerning <em>p<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>In addition to <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">belief<\/span> that <em>p<\/em> (<strong>Bel<\/strong><em>p<\/em>), Todd and Rabern also introduce the attitudes of\u00a0<span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipation<\/span> that\u00a0<em>p<\/em> (<strong>Ant<\/strong><em>p<\/em>) and\u00a0<span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">remembrance<\/span> that\u00a0<em>p<\/em> (<strong>Rem<\/strong><em>p<\/em>). With these three doxastic operators in hand, they contrast omni-accuracy and omni-correctness as follows (p. 156):<\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 300px; margin-left: 40px; border-collapse: collapse;\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"150px\"><strong>omni-accuracy<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"150px\"><strong>omni-correctness<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>\u03c6 &#x2194; <strong>Bel<\/strong>\u03c6<\/td>\n<td><strong>T<\/strong>\u03c6 &#x2194; <strong>Bel<\/strong>\u03c6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>F<\/strong>\u03c6 &#x2194; <strong>Ant<\/strong>\u03c6<\/td>\n<td><strong>TF<\/strong>\u03c6 &#x2194; <strong>Ant<\/strong>\u03c6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>P<\/strong>\u03c6 &#x2194; <strong>Rem<\/strong>\u03c6<\/td>\n<td><strong>TP<\/strong>\u03c6 &#x2194; <strong>Rem<\/strong>\u03c6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>In these terms, retro-closure (\u03c6 \u2192 <strong>PF<\/strong>\u03c6) can be represented as follows:<\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 300px; margin-left: 40px; border-collapse: collapse;\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"150px\"><strong>omni-accuracy<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"150px\"><strong>omni-correctness<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>\u03c6 &#x2194; <strong>Ant<\/strong>(<strong>Rem<\/strong>\u03c6)<\/td>\n<td><strong>T<\/strong>\u03c6 &#x2194; <strong>Ant<\/strong>(<strong>Rem<\/strong>\u03c6)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>For most theists, the distinction between omni-accuracy and omni-correctness doesn&#8217;t matter, because most of us think that God\u00a0<span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">believes<\/span>\u00a0<em>p<\/em> iff\u00a0<em>p<\/em> is true (omni-correctness)\u00a0<em>and<\/em> also that <em>p<\/em> is true iff\u00a0<em>p<\/em>, which together with omni-correctness entails omni-accuracy. But, as was argued in Ch. 5, <em>non-bivalentists<\/em> have a reason to prefer omni-correctness over omni-accuracy, because the latter leads to a bizarre indeterminacy in God&#8217;s mind about what He Himself believes. Todd and Rabern press similar objections against OC: the tension between non-bivalent open-futurism and retro-closure may be suppressed by semantic relativism but it reasserts itself again in full force in the context of <em>non-relativistic<\/em> concepts like <em>omniscience<\/em> that require a unified, total perspective.<\/p>\n<p><strong>III. Open-closurism can&#8217;t make sense of omniscience<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>If the open-closurist endorses omni-accuracy, then it would seem that <em>before<\/em> the occurrence of future contingent event (say, a sea battle), God neither <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipates<\/span> the event (sea battle) nor its complement (no sea battle) and yet <em>after<\/em> the event God&#8217;s prior attitude changes so that He always did <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipate<\/span> things playing out however they did. This change in attitudes seems like an <em>intrinsic<\/em> change in the past, something that nearly everyone thinks impossible (pp. 157\u2013158). (Why think such intrinsic changes are impossible? Because if they were possible, then something that <em>actually happened<\/em> could later become such that it <em>never happened<\/em>. The only way to make sense of that and avoid contradiction is to make a <em>deeply controversial<\/em> appeal to <strong>hypertime<\/strong>.)<\/p>\n<p>Todd and Rabern consider (and reject) a possible reply: &#8220;[P]erhaps we can \u2026 say that the coming to pass of a sea-battle retroactively constitutes the (prior) state of God&#8217;s mind as having been the\u00a0<span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipation<\/span> of a sea-battle&#8221; (p. 159). They don&#8217;t put it this way, but the suggested reply amounts to an endorsement of <strong>content externalism<\/strong> with respect to God&#8217;s <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipations<\/span>. This has recently become a fashionable idea in Thomistic circles through the work of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Free-Will-Gods-Universal-Causality\/dp\/1350203653\">W. Matthews Grant<\/a>, but the whole idea seems incredibly implausible to me. Indeed, I contend that it&#8217;s an implicit <em>denial<\/em> of divine omniscience, for it means that with respect to future contingents <em>not even God<\/em> can know the contents of\u00a0<em>His own thoughts<\/em> until external conditions clarify those thoughts for Him. Whatever plausibility <a href=\"https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/content-externalism\/#ContExte\">content externalism<\/a> may have for <em>finite<\/em> knowers like us, I don&#8217;t see any way to reconcile it with an essentially perfect knower like God.<\/p>\n<p>What if the open-closurist endorses omni-correctness instead of omni-accuracy? On the one hand, he can avoid the conclusion that God&#8217;s antecedent state of mind was either (a) intrinsically indeterminate and thus requiring an intrinsic change in the past when it becomes retroactively determinate, or (b) extrinsically determinate but unknowable by God until the determining event comes about. On the other hand, he falls into another problem, for now it seems that God Himself will have to admit to His own <em>antecedent ignorance<\/em>. Todd and Rabern illustrate this with a couple imagined dialogues on pp. 161\u2013162 and p. 171. I&#8217;ve blended and modified the dialogues to make the point more succinctly:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>US: Do you <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipate<\/span> a sea-battle tomorrow?<br \/>\nGOD: No, I don&#8217;t, because it isn&#8217;t <em>true<\/em> that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow. The future is open.<br \/>\nUS: So there are no\u00a0<em>truths\u00a0<\/em>that escape your gaze and in that sense you are omniscient?<br \/>\nGOD: Correct.<br \/>\n[\u2026\u00a0<em>a day passes, and a sea-battle now rages<\/em>]<br \/>\nUS: God, did you <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipate<\/span> this sea-battle yesterday?<br \/>\nGOD: No, I didn&#8217;t <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipate<\/span> this sea-battle yesterday.<br \/>\nUS: But by retro-closure it was true yesterday that this sea-battle was going to occur today, correct?<br \/>\nGOD: Yes, correct.<br \/>\nUS: But then there was a truth yesterday that escaped your gaze, namely, that there was going to be a sea-battle today.<br \/>\nGOD: That follows.<br \/>\nUS: And did you know yesterday that either there will be a sea-battle today or there will not be a sea-battle today?<br \/>\nGOD: Yes, that follows from WEM.<br \/>\nUS: So you knew yesterday that your present self would regard your past self as <em>not<\/em> omniscient! How then can you have regarded yourself as omniscient yesterday?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Todd and Rabern consider a possible reply: Retro-closure entails that if <em>B<\/em> [= a sea-battle occurs] then <strong>PF<\/strong><em>B<\/em> [a sea-battle was going to occur], but it doesn&#8217;t entail that <strong>PTF<\/strong><em>B<\/em>, i.e., that it was <em>true<\/em> that a sea-battle was going to occur. The problem with this reply, they point out, is that the distinction it makes between <strong>PF<\/strong><em>B<\/em> and <strong>PTF<\/strong><em>B<\/em> implies that it wasn&#8217;t antecedently <em>true<\/em> because it wasn&#8217;t antecedently <em>determined<\/em>, and &#8220;one can accept this view only at the expense of giving up on the fundamental intuitions that motivate Retro-closure in the first place&#8221; (p. 165). The main point here is that RC is supposed to be true <em>regardless<\/em> of whether the events in question are determined since, according to RC, the <em>mere occurrence<\/em> of an event is supposed to entail that it was antecedently going to occur. But if it can only be antecedently <em>true<\/em> that an event is going to occur if it is antecedently determined, then the event&#8217;s mere occurrence does <em>not<\/em> entail that it was <em>true<\/em> that the event is going to occur and so (it would seem) does not entail that the event was going to occur, contrary to RC. In other words, the distinction between <strong>PF<\/strong><em>B<\/em> and <strong>PTF<\/strong><em>B<\/em> seems wholly artificial: How can a sea-battle be going to occur without it being <em>true<\/em> that a sea-battle is going to occur? In the absence of some plausible way of shoring up that distinction, it undermines RC and with it, open-closurism.<\/p>\n<p><strong>IV. Metaphysically loaded semantics and an open theistic comparison<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>No semantics should, all by itself, entail substantive metaphysical conclusions that are tangential to the concerns of semantics proper. As Todd and Rabern put it, &#8220;Just as it is not for the semanticist to say whether the future is causally open, it is likewise not for the semanticist to say whether the universe contains or ever did contain an omniscient being&#8221; (p. 167). The latter point might perhaps be contested by some defenders of the <strong>ontological argument<\/strong>, but the salient point remains: the semantics <em>of the future-tense<\/em> shouldn&#8217;t have these kinds of metaphysical implications. And yet, if Todd and Rabern&#8217;s arguments are correct, then the relativistic semantics of open-closurism seems to entail that there is no omniscient being unless the future is wholly determined. So the semantics is metaphysically loaded in a way that no semantics should be. So it&#8217;s a bad semantics.<\/p>\n<p>I agree with the preceding paragraph. The central problem of open-closurism is that its commitment to semantic relativism rules out the possibility of a\u00a0<em>non-relativistic<\/em> perspective on reality, such as an omniscient God would presumably have to have. It&#8217;s fine to say that truth is relative to times, worlds, reality, etc., so long as none of those are understood in a way that <em>precludes<\/em> an all-encompassing total perspective, a &#8220;God&#8217;s eye&#8221; view of things, or truth <em>simpliciter<\/em>. But the moment you say that truth <em>as such<\/em> is relative to some partial or limited perspective \u00e1 la MacFarlane&#8217;s &#8220;context of assessment&#8221; you run into problems, not only with omniscience, but with self-reference, e.g., is the claim that truth is relative to a context of assessment only true from certain contexts of assessment? Is so, then it&#8217;s self-defeating. If not, then we seem to have recovered an absolute conception of truth in relation to which the tension between RC and WEM + non-bivalence reemerges. Hence, open-closurism doesn&#8217;t solve anything.<\/p>\n<p>Todd and Rabern further explore the problematic metaphysical implications of open-closurism by comparing it with a certain version of\u00a0<strong>open theism<\/strong>, one that might initially\u00a0<em>seem<\/em> to be allied with open-closurism&#8217;s implicit denial of omniscience. This type of open theism affirms that there is a complete, true story of the future\u2014a unique actual future\u2014but says that the parts of that story that concern\u00a0<em>future contingencies<\/em> are simply unknowable, even for God. Both views, in effect, deny omniscience. Both agree that it is\u00a0<em>impossible<\/em> for an otherwise perfect knower like God to <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">anticipate<\/span> future contingent outcomes. But they offer different\u00a0<em>grounds<\/em> for this impossibility (p. 169). The open theists in question are\u00a0<em>semantic Ockhamists<\/em>, and there is no pressure from such a semantics against the possibility of an omniscient being. They deny omniscience instead for broadly <em>metaphysical<\/em> reasons, on the grounds that &#8220;no one has or could have any \u2026 mystical insight&#8221; into the contingent future (p. 170). Open-closurists, in contrast, implicitly deny omniscience precisely <em>for<\/em> semantic reasons, thereby flouting the metaphysical <em>neutrality<\/em> that semantics should have (for issues like that).<\/p>\n<p><strong>V. Rejecting retro-closure<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Todd and Rabern agree with MacFarlane that the idea of an open-ended future and the idea of retro-closure both have intuitive appeal, but they argue as we have seen that the\u00a0<em>conjunction<\/em> of those two ideas is not tenable: &#8220;if Open-future is true, then Retro-closure is not&#8221; (p. 172). In the Appendix to Ch. 7 (pp. 173\u2013180), Todd undertakes to explain how open-futurists &#8220;might credibly\u00a0<em>deny<\/em> Retro-closure&#8221; (p. 173).<\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;m not going to cover this section in detail, mainly because it doesn&#8217;t add much to the discussion of Ch. 6, which I&#8217;ve <a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/08\/todd-ch-6-part-1-betting-on-the-open-future\/\">already blogged on<\/a>. The short of it is this: Instead of agreeing with RC that if a sea-battle occurs then F&lt;A sea battle occurs&gt; <em>was previously true<\/em>, the open-futurist can say that F&lt;A sea battle occurs&gt; was <em>not<\/em> previously true\u2014on account of the fact that it was\u00a0<em>then<\/em> an open-question whether a sea-battle would occur\u2014but that &lt;A sea battle occurs&gt; subsequently <em>became true<\/em>. Todd articulates an open-futurist account of what it means for a prediction to become true in some detail on p. 176. In the last few pages of the Appendix, Todd then applies his account of\u00a0<em>becoming true<\/em> to rebut various arguments that have been offered\u00a0<em>for<\/em> retro-closure. Provided some such account of <em>becoming true <\/em>is coherent, it follows that RC is <em>false<\/em>\u00a0because it is a\u00a0<em>non sequitur<\/em>.\u00a0<em>Pace<\/em>\u00a0RC, it simply does not\u00a0<em>follow<\/em>\u00a0from the occurrence of an event that it was previously true that the event was going to occur.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This is part 8 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd\u2019s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). (Previous installments: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.) In Chapter 7 Todd and his coauthor, Brian Rabern, tackle a view that they dub &#8220;open-closurism&#8221;. It&#8217;s the view espoused by\u2026 <span class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/10\/todd-ch-7-against-open-closurism\/\">Read More &raquo;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[181,179,180],"tags":[11,186,136,183,133,142,135,156],"class_list":["post-985","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-open-closurism","category-retro-closure","category-semantic-relativism","tag-bivalence","tag-brian-rabern","tag-john-macfarlane","tag-open-closurism","tag-patrick-todd","tag-retro-closure","tag-richmond-thomason","tag-will-excluded-middle-wem"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/985","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=985"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/985\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1023,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/985\/revisions\/1023"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=985"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=985"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=985"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}