{"id":990,"date":"2022-09-28T13:12:46","date_gmt":"2022-09-28T18:12:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/?p=990"},"modified":"2022-09-29T09:25:37","modified_gmt":"2022-09-29T14:25:37","slug":"how-not-to-hunt-open-theism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/alanrhoda.net\/wordpress\/2022\/09\/how-not-to-hunt-open-theism\/","title":{"rendered":"How Not to Hunt Open Theism"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is a reply to a recent critique<\/a> of open theism by philosopher David Hunt on a YouTube channel called The Analytic Christian<\/a>. The video interview was mainly focused on an essay Hunt wrote titled “What Does God Know? The Problems of Open Theism”. It was published in 2009 as part of an edited collection, Contending with Christianity’s Critics<\/a><\/em>, which I reference hereafter as CCC. (Incidentally, Hunt is very clear in the essay that despite the title of the book, he does\u00a0not<\/em> endorse the claim that open theists are not Christians (CCC p. 266).)<\/p>\n

I’m responding to Hunt in part because near the end of the video he replies to an argument I offered for<\/em> open theism<\/a> on the same channel 7 months previously. I was hoping he would give me a serious challenge, but unfortunately he doesn’t fully engage with my argument because (1) he didn’t watch the video wherein I presented the argument, and (2) the slide from my video that he comments on does not fully convey the nature of the new information<\/em> given by the resolution of future contingencies. As a result, Hunt’s reply misses the central point of my argument.<\/p>\n

In addition, there are several inaccuracies in Hunt’s critique, both in the video interview and in CCC, that are worth pointing out because appreciating such nuances is necessary for raising the level of discussion<\/em> concerning open theism. Hunt’s work is by no means shoddy\u2014he’s an accomplished and skilled philosopher\u2014but he hasn’t thought through\u00a0some of the issues as carefully as might be desired. My comments mainly<\/em> focus on the video, to which I provide timestamps throughout, but here and there I will reference the published paper as well.<\/p>\n

I. (1:52)<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Question: What is open theism?<\/p>\n

Hunt’s answers (with my comments):<\/p>\n

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    1. It’s an offshoot of Arminianism (1:57<\/strong>). (Yes and no. This is true of most modern Christian open theists, but it is not true of open theism per se<\/em>. There were open theists before the Reformation, and thus before Arminius. In addition, there are Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox open theists. And there are non-Christian, e.g., Jewish, open theists.)<\/li>\n
    2. At least some of the future is not predetermined but contingent (2:07<\/strong>). (Correct. All open theists would accept this.)<\/li>\n
    3. At least some of those future contingencies concern human actions (2:16<\/strong>). (Generally correct, but not a strict entailment of open theism. In theory one could be an open theist purely for reasons having to do with physical indeterminism, independently of human actions.)<\/li>\n
    4. Open theists operate with a\u00a0libertarian\u00a0<\/em>conception of human freedom that is incompatible with determinism (2:29<\/strong>). (Generally correct, but not a strict entailment. See comment on I.3.)<\/li>\n
    5. Open theists hold that at least some human actions exhibit libertarian free will (2:40<\/strong>). (Generally correct, but not a strict entailment. See comment on I.3)<\/li>\n
    6. Open theists deny that God knows the contingent future (3:05<\/strong>). (Incorrect. Most open theists believe God does<\/em> know the contingent future, but He knows it as contingent<\/em>. That is, God knows the future as open-ended insofar as and precisely because it is<\/em> open-ended. This is in contrast to the mainstream view that God somehow knows the contingent future as though it were fully settled <\/em>even though, causally speaking, it isn’t.)<\/li>\n
    7. The God of open theism knows “less” than the God of classical theism (3:10<\/strong>). (Emphatic no! This is a straw man. Most open theists believe God’s knowledge of reality is exhaustive<\/em>. We disagree with what Hunt calls “classical theism” over the content<\/em> of God’s omniscience, not its extent. Compare the dialectical situation with that between a Molinist and an anti-Molinist (say, one who thinks the grounding objection<\/a> is decisive). Would it be right for the Molinist to boast that his God knows more<\/em> than the anti-Molinist’s because his God has middle knowledge? No! That would be question-begging. The anti-Molinist doesn’t think middle knowledge could even possibly exist, so to him it’s like boasting that God “knows” something that isn’t even there<\/em> to be an object of knowledge. From the anti-Molinist’s perspective, such pseudo-knowledge is a defect<\/em> that detracts<\/em> from God’s omniscience, for it means that God falsely “knows” things that just ain’t so, like your crazy neighbor who “knows” that aliens are watching him. For another comparison, this is like saying “My God is more<\/em> powerful than your God because my God can make 1+1=17 and also make an 11-sided triangle.” Yeah, right.)<\/li>\n
    8. Open theists sometimes call their view “dynamic omniscience” (3:19<\/strong>). (Correct. Open theist John Sanders coined the term “dynamic omniscience” as an alternative label for open theism, one that puts more emphasis on the changing content of God’s omniscience. It should by noted, though, that dynamic omniscience is not<\/em> synonymous with open theism. Process theists and ancient figures like Cicero and Alexander of Aphrodisias affirm dynamic omniscience but aren’t open theists because they aren’t theists<\/em> in the relevant sense.)<\/li>\n
    9. On dynamic omniscience the content of God’s knowledge “grows” over time (3:28<\/strong>). (Incorrect. The content changes<\/em> over time as future contingencies become resolved, but it does not\u00a0grow<\/em> or\u00a0increase\u00a0<\/em>over time. The change is from a “maybe” to an “is”, from one truth to another truth<\/em>. It is not the addition of “more” truths than there were before. See comment on I.7.)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      II. (4:01)<\/strong> \u2014 Question: What’s the classical view of God’s omniscience?<\/p>\n

      Wrong question. Most open theists don’t have a different understanding of\u00a0omniscience<\/em>; rather, they have a different understanding of the\u00a0content<\/em> of God’s omniscience, i.e., of what<\/em> a God who knows all truths and all of reality thereby knows.<\/p>\n

      Hunt’s answers (with my comments):<\/p>\n

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        1. Classical theists can differ on a lot (4:05<\/strong>). (True, but Hunt is using the term “classical theist” in a very<\/em> broad sense to mean, roughly, any theist who isn’t an open theist. He should make this clear stipulation because the term “classical theism” is standardly used for a m<\/em>uch<\/em> stricter conception of God, one according to which God is absolutely simple, timeless, wholly impassible, purely actual, etc. Even Hunt’s own “Arminianism” would not count as a form of “classical theism” on that conception.)<\/li>\n
        2. “Classical” theists differ on whether God knows from “within” time or “outside” of time (4:15<\/strong>). (True, but this is an uncritical use of inside\/outside language and it begs important metaphysical questions. In effect, it spatializes<\/em> time, conceptualizing it as a container of sorts, one that God could be either “in” or “out” of. By and large, theists who affirm a temporal<\/em> conception of God should resist the inside\/outside framing of the issue.)<\/li>\n
        3. “Classical” theists agree that God knows the “entire” future including any future contingents (4:51<\/strong>). (So do most open theists. There’s a subtle issue here about what it is for something to be a future contingent<\/em>. Suppose it is a future contingent whether Hunt eats a BLT tomorrow. If God knows that Hunt might<\/em> eat a BLT tomorrow, does God know a future contingent? I would say so. God knows that future contingent as contingent<\/em>. In similar fashion, I would say that God knows all<\/em> future contingents. Now obviously that’s not what Hunt<\/em> means by “future contingents”. Like many philosophers of religion he just assumes<\/em> that future contingents must<\/em> be understood exclusively in terms of what either will<\/em> or will not<\/em> happen. But this way of framing the concept tends to prejudice<\/em> the debate against open theism.)<\/li>\n
        4. “Classical” theists agree that God’s knowledge is exhaustive of past, present, and future (5:03<\/strong>). (So do most open theists. The debate concerns the nature of the future<\/em>. For Hunt’s “classical” theist, “the future” refers to a complete linear<\/em> extension of the actual past and present. For most open theists, “the future” refers to a branching<\/em> array of possibilities.)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          Notice that in answering this question Hunt has not said anything in points 1\u20134 that clearly<\/em> demarcates his “classical” theism from open theism.<\/p>\n

          III. (5:19)<\/strong> \u2013 Question: Would a non-open theist say that God “gains knowledge” over time simply because what time it is now<\/em> changes?<\/p>\n

          This question presupposes a dynamic (i.e., A-theory) of time. On such a conception God’s knowledge would have to continually change<\/em> so as to track reality. Moreover, it would have to change in the same<\/em> sort of way that most open theists believe God’s knowledge changes to track reality. For open theists, however, it’s not just the now<\/em> that changes but also the modal<\/em> configuration of the future, as branching possibilities are resolved into settled actualities.<\/p>\n

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            1. “If you’re a classical theist you’ll hold to God is in time” (5:59<\/strong>). (Um, no. Many if not most self-professed classical theists would take strong<\/em> exception to that!)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              IV. (7:06)<\/strong> \u2013 Question: What are three ways that open theists have tried to respond to the charge that God knows “less”?<\/p>\n

              The question comes more or less straight out of CCC (p. 268), but it’s poorly framed for reasons I gave in I.7 above.<\/p>\n

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                1. Open theist Greg Boyd responds that God knows more<\/em> on open theism because God knows all possible futures, but the “classical” God knows all possible futures too (7:15<\/strong>). (Hunt’s response is correct. There’s no meaningful sense in which God knows\u00a0more<\/em> or\u00a0less<\/em> on either view. Open and “classical” theists differ over the\u00a0content<\/em> of God’s knowledge, not the\u00a0extent<\/em> of God’s knowledge.)<\/li>\n
                2. Most open theists agree that God on their view knows “less” and argue that this doesn’t count against God’s perfection (7:50<\/strong>). (Emphatic no with respect to God knowing “less”! See my comments on I.7 above. Hunt is correct, though, that open theists reject the idea that their views compromise God’s perfection.)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  This brings us to Hunt’s first slide, which describes three types of open theism:<\/p>\n

                  <\/p>\n

                  Hunt spends the next 10 minutes or so explaining the slide. Before discussing some of what he says in that context, I want to make some preliminary remarks about the slide itself.<\/p>\n