My Dissertation

By | June 20, 2006

I’ve decided to make my dissertation available for download. Entitled “The Problem of Induction: An Epistemological and Methodological Response”, I examine and reject most of the extant proposals for “solving” the problem and develop a novel approach to the issue that, I think, works, at least in broad outline.

If I were to rewrite it now, there are some things I would revise. For example, I wouldn’t rely as much on Bayes’ Theorem in Chapters 5 and 6. I still stand by my overall conclusions, though.

For those who aren’t interested in reading a whole dissertation, here’s a 15-page summary.

11 thoughts on “My Dissertation

  1. Derrick Abdul-Hakim

    Thank you, Alan.

    I am currently writing a critique of Karl Popper’s solution to the problem of induction. Your dissertation will most definitely serve as a point of departure.

    Reply
  2. Alan Rhoda

    Hi Derrick,

    I’m glad you find it helpful. For myself, I find it kind of odd that Popper claims to give a “solution” to the problem of induction when what he basically says is “Hume’s right, but so what? We don’t need induction anyway.”

    Reply
  3. David M

    Speaking of Downloads, can your present work in the upcoming Faith and Philosophy be available on other websites. I just want to put it up as a resource for others to check out.

    Reply
  4. Tim

    Alan,

    Thanks for posting this. I’ve also got Millican’s recent dissertation on induction (from his website), so this gives me some good additional reading from a different perspective.

    My initial reaction is that I think it’s a mistake to say, as you do (following Greco), that any adequate account of inference must include an externalist element. For an argument for the rationality of inductive inference that resolutely eschews any hint of externalism, you might want to look at this paper, which is also (in revised form) the final chapter of the book Internalism and Epistemology that Lydia and I have forthcoming from Routledge. The key move is the distinction between two conceptions of the connection to truth necessary for justification: success and rationality — a distinction that, in my opinion, undermines Greco’s contention. I’d be happy to send you some chapters if you’re interested.

    Reply
  5. Alan Rhoda

    Hi Tim,

    Thanks for the comments. I am interested in looking at some of the chapters from your forthcoming book. (I tried the link, BTW, and got nowhere.)

    I think we probably agree more than disagree. The key point I think is what one wants a theory of justification to do. Your distinction between success and rationality parallels a distinction I make in Chapter 3 of my diss. between grounding and responsibility (following M. Williams and R. Fogelin). As long as one’s focusing on justification as responsibility/rationality, externalism’s is not needed to justify induction. But if grounding/success is what you’re after, then I think external considerations have to come into play.

    Regards,
    Alan

    Reply

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