An Evaluation of Thomistic Metaphysics – Part 2.1 – Act & Potency

My evaluation of Thomistic metaphysics begins where Feser does in his recent book Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, namely, with the theory of act and potency.* His chapter on this topic is 57 pages long, so I’ll need to break the topic down into parts. I’m going to parallel Feser’s section numbering to structure my discussion.… Read More »

An Evaluation of Thomistic Metaphysics – Part 1 – Intro

This post begins a series on Thomistic Metaphysics. In this introductory post I explain my motivations in undertaking this series. (1) Better understanding I went to graduate school at Fordham University. It’s run by the Jesuits, a Roman Catholic monastic order. And since Thomas Aquinas is in many respects “The Philosopher” of the Roman Catholic… Read More »

Truth-in, Truth-at, and Just Plain Truth

This post continues a series on issues related to truth. In previous posts I have looked at (a) the correspondence theory of truth and its relation to truthmaking, (b) disquotation principles, and (c) the conflict between correspondence and disquotation principles, to the detriment of the latter. In this post I want to look at a distinction… Read More »

Correspondence vs. Disquotation

In my previous two posts I have discussed the correspondence theory of truth and disquotation principles. In this post I’m going to use the former to argue against the latter. More specifically, I’m going to argue that the “if and only if” of the disquotation principles should be merely an “only if”. In other words, instead… Read More »

Truth and Disquotation Principles

In my previous post I talked about the correspondence theory of truth and its relation to truthmaker theory. I’m going to follow it up with a series of posts on various issues concerning truth and ontology that I’ve been mulling over off-and-on over the past several years. The current post concerns disquotation principles. I distinguish between sentential… Read More »

Truthmaking and Correspondence – Two Sides of the Same Coin

What is the relation of truthmaker theory to the correspondence theory of truth? In a paper by William Lane Craig and David Hunt that I’ve just finished responding to in a series of posts (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), they assert that It is … no part of the correspondence theory of truth that… Read More »

Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 5 – the metaphysical argument)

This is the fifth installment in a series of posts responding to a 2013 paper by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H) entitled “Perils of the Open Road”. In the paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006 paper (hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled “Open Theism, Omniscience, and… Read More »

Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 4 – the semantic argument)

This is the fourth installment in a series of posts in which I respond to a recent 2013 paper entitled “Perils of the Open Road” authored by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H). In their paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006 paper (hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled “Open… Read More »

Open Theism and Impassibility in Feeling

Among open theists there has been a running in-house debate between what I will call the “passibilist” and “impassibilist” camps. T. C. Moore has lately been leading the charge on behalf of the passibilists, while Tom Belt and Dwayne Polk have been leading the charge for the impassibilists. (As noted below, by “passibilism” and “impassibilism”… Read More »

On Propositions that Can Never Become True

Alex Pruss recently posted an interesting new objection to alethic openness at his blog. His argument is not that long, so for convenience I’ll reproduce it here. According to open future views, the proposition that in 2015 a fair and indeterministic coin lands heads has some probability but is not true. However, that proposition is… Read More »