One of Ian’s comments on an earlier post of mine got me thinking about the distinction between theoretical elimination and theoretical reduction. This is a familiar distinction in the philosophy of mind, but it comes up in lots of different contexts.
In general, eliminativism (E) and reductionism (R) are reactions to a thesis (T) to the effect that “Things of kind X exist”, where X is a description of the kind in question. Both E and R are denials of T, but they differ in an important respect. The eliminativist not only denies the existence of X-type things, but also rejects the propriety of talking as if X-type things existed. The reductionist, on the other hand, continues to affirm the propriety of talking as if the thesis were true while denying that there are any X-type things in the sense countenanced by the thesis. She accomplishes this by identifying a non-T substitute as the “real” referent of X. Here are some examples:
- Thesis: God (understood in a broadly classical sense) exists.
- Eliminativist: Such a being does not exist, nor should we say “God exists” because it cannot be affirmed without perpetuating falsehood and confusion.
- Reductionist: God as understood in the broadly classical sense does not exist, but “God exists” can properly be said because the descriptor “God” really refers to something else (e.g., the Cosmos, energy, the idea of a broadly classical God, etc.).
- Thesis: Cartesian souls exist – mental terms (e.g., “beliefs”, “desires”, etc.) refer to states that are strictly nonphysical.
- Eliminativist: There are no Cartesian souls or nonphysical states. We should not continue to talk as if there were mental states.
- Reductionist: There are no Cartesian souls, but it is okay to continue talking of mental states – we just have to realize that mental states are really just physical states.
The observation I want to make is that the eliminativist and reductionism agree on matters of substance. They concur that the thesis is false. Where they disagree is on matters of language. They disagree about the ethics of terminology, the propriety of speaking in certain ways. The eliminativist prefers to use language in much the same sense as the proponent of the thesis does. Hence, along with his denial of the thesis the eliminativist rejects the language used to formulate the thesis as false and misleading. The reductionist, on the other hand, doesn’t want to let proponents of the thesis define how the key terms are to be used, and so she substitutes her own definitions. This allows her to preserve the verbal formula used in the affirmation of the thesis while gutting it of what she sees as objectionable commitments.
The debate between eliminativists and reductionists would seem to turn on prevailing or established usage. For example, with respect to the meaning of “God”, the reductionist substitutes have little or no claim to capture the force of that word as it has actually been used in the Western theological tradition. This is just atheism in denial, not a redefinition of “theism” that is still worthy of the name. In contrast, the theoretical reduction of “heat” from traditional understandings of it as a manifestation of an element (fire) or a type of fluid (caloric fluid) to “average kinetic energy” marked a useful theoretical advance. The justification for continuing to use the word “heat” while changing its meaning lies in the broad commonality of the observational data that the respective theories were invoked to explain.
To some extent, whether a position should be called ‘eliminativist’ or ‘reductionist’ may be a matter of perspective. For example, in my ongoing dialogue with Ian, I affirm as an A-theorist that there are tensed facts. Ian, a B-theorist, also affirms the existence of tensed facts, but he defines them in accordance with his metaphysics. So he claims to be a reductionist and not an eliminativist with respect to tensed facts. From my perspective, however, Ian’s “tensed facts” are trivial and uninteresting and the real metaphysical issue is whether there are tensed facts in the A-theorist’s sense. So what he calls reductionism, I call eliminativism in denial.
I have to confess that I have never heard reductionism about X expressed as denial of the existence of X, even by someone with no philosophical training. I’ve heard of analytic identifications and intertheoretic deductions via bridge laws, but your formulation is completely novel to me.
Even informally, when I hear people saying things like “Yahweh ‘really’ means ‘the cosmos'”, I’ve never heard anyone so described as a reductionist. Do you have any citations for these usages?
Thanks for the comments, hiero5ant.
To be precise, I didn’t equate reductionism about X with the denial of X but with the denial of X as understood by the proponents of the thesis together with an affirmation of the propriety of saying, along with proponents of the thesis, that “X exists”.
So reductionism, as I characterize it, is to be understood in relation to an ontologically committing thesis that not only affirms “X exists” but that also involves a definite conceptualization of what it is for something to be X.
For example, when the dualist speaks of “mental states”, she conceives of these as being non-physical. The reductionist rejects the existence of mental states so understood, but continues to speak of “mental states” while conceiving of them differently, as essentially physical. Same terminology, different content.
Given what I’ve said, from a mind-body physicalist’s perspective the dualist may be thought of as a ‘reductionist’. The dualist might be said to ‘reduce’ certain physical states to non-physical states.
So to some extent it’s a matter of perspective determined by what we take the relevant thesis to be. On the other hand, it is more in accord with established usage to describe some views (e.g., physicalism) as ‘reductionist’ rather than others. This is often in accord with desire of the proponents of such views to be seen as offering a ‘simpler’, more parsimonious (hence ‘reduced’) account.
As for citations, I don’t have any to offer you, but that’s no reason for thinking that my analysis misses the mark.
“To be precise, I didn’t equate reductionism about X with the denial of X but with the denial of X as understood by the proponents of the thesis together with an affirmation of the propriety of saying, along with proponents of the thesis, that “X exists”.
So reductionism, as I characterize it, is to be understood in relation to an ontologically committing thesis that not only affirms “X exists” but that also involves a definite conceptualization of what it is for something to be X.
I just have to reiterate that this conception is bizarre and utterly alien to any usage with which I am familiar. You’re saying that pointing out what someone thought was a cabernet is actually a merlot is “reductionist” because of its relation to “a definite conceptualization of what it is for something to be X.”
“For example, when the dualist speaks of “mental states”, she conceives of these as being non-physical. The reductionist rejects the existence of mental states so understood, but continues to speak of “mental states” while conceiving of them differently, as essentially physical. Same terminology, different content.
I’m quite sure that “reduction” means something a little more detailed and specific than “different conception”. Your terminology does not align with any of these standard conceptions
Given what I’ve said, from a mind-body physicalist’s perspective the dualist may be thought of as a ‘reductionist’. The dualist might be said to ‘reduce’ certain physical states to non-physical states.
I’m going to have to rest my case. If mind-body dualism (of all things!) is reductionist, then everything is reductionist.
“As for citations, I don’t have any to offer you, but that’s no reason for thinking that my analysis misses the mark. “
Why not formulate your analysis in a way consistent with established usage? As it stands, it honestly looks to me like you’re trying to saddle reductive physicalism etc. with the pejorative label of eliminativism by means of a very trivial equivocation.
I’m a bit sympathetic with hiero5ant’s comments, but I won’t press all of the issues raised here. What I do want to say, though, is that it is wrong to see the Antireductionist(AR) /Reductionist (R) /Eliminativist (E) debates as being over a single question. The way you’ve described it, the debate is really over whether the antireductionist is correct and if not what we should say then. But that seems just wrong. It’s really a set of questions and not really a single issue at all. The two questions at the center of the debates are “Does something exist that’s a K?” and “What’s the nature of being a K?”. On the former question, AR and R are in complete agreement and disagree with E. On the latter, AR and E are in agreement that being a K is not what R says it is. A reductionist is in no sense “an eliminativist in disguise” – this sort of unfair accusation would only make sense if one was already assuming that AR and E are correct in their assessment of the second question but without argument that would be begging the question against R. R, then, on R’s own lights, is not redefining “K”, changing its meaning or suggesting some new way of using the word but uncovering the meaning it had all along. Along these lines, it is simply question begging to call a reductionist about tensed facts an eliminativist in disguise. The debate between tensed theorists and reductionists like myself is not directly over what exists (both agree tensed facts exist) but only over what they are like (are they irreducible or not?). Sure, we could recast this as a debate over existence but it would not be over the existence of tensed facts – it would be a debate over the existence of irreducibly tensed facts (tensers saying yea and detensers nay) or reducibly tensed facts (detensers such as myself saying yea and most tensers saying nay).
Let me add that “from a mind-body physicalist’s perspective the dualist may be thought of as a ‘reductionist’. The dualist might be said to ‘reduce’ certain physical states to non-physical states.” seems to me false. The physicalist wants to say that each mental state is identical to some physical state or other and that (here’s the asymmetry of reduction) the physical description is the more fundamental one metaphysically – the physicalist wants to say that, at bottom, all mental states are physical. The dualist, on the other hand, is definitely not saying that the mental states are identical in the first place, so the dualist is not reducing any physical states to mental states – the dualist is not in any sense saying that certain physical states are at bottom mental. The thesis that comes closest to saying this is something more akin to idealism, not dualism.
As a final note, I’m not sure what is meant by saying that reducibly tensed facts are “trivial and uninteresting ” unless that’s assuming I take some specific reduction that might make that plausible along with the further assumption that this reduction is simply false. One thing you might mean is that reducibly tensed facts can only be represented by formally tautologous representations which serve little, if any, direct use in our theoretical or practical reasoning. But I would, of course, deny this. If such facts do exist, they can be represented by tensed representations which are not formally tautologous at all and can be indeed quite interesting. On the other hand, you might mean that it is possible to represent such facts in such an uninteresting way. But the mere possibility of such does not preclude also representing them in more exciting ways and I do believe we do represent them in such ways. So in either case, I see no reason to think that tensed facts, if irreducible, are in any “interesting” 🙂 sense trivial or uninteresting.
Belated reply to Heiro5ant,
Two points.
(1) The sort of reduction that you seem to have in mind is what I would call “theoretical reduction” (e.g., showing that one theory is deducible from another, perhaps as a limiting case). What I have in mind is something more like “metaphysical reduction”. Does anything appropriately described as a “mental state” exist? “No” says the eliminativist. “Yes” say the antieliminativists. Given that something appropriately described as a “mental state” exists, it is really what the non-reductionists think it to be or not? “Yes” says the non-reductionist; “no” says the reductionist.
(2) My intentions in this post are non-polemical. I’m not trying to “saddle” any position with a perjorative label. As I’ve tried to point out, a major part of these debates has to do with which labels are appropriate. It is hard to find a neutral characterization of the respective position because terminological disputes are, to a significant extent, wrapped up in these debates.
Affirmations to build your self esteem really do work, but you have be willing to do the work and be patient. Just keep trying, you can change your life for the good if you do.
Self Esteem Affirmations
Eliminativism and Reductionism < -- that's what i was looking for
Thesis Dissertation