Now that Fall semester grades have been turned in I have a little time to do some blogging before things get really busy with (1) Christmas (12/25), (2) my wife and I bringing home our newborn adopted baby girl (12/26), and (3) my trotting off to the Eastern APA for job interviews (12/27-30).
I’d like to talk about spatial tenses. That’s right, spatial tenses. Because we normally associate the word “tense” with time, associating it with space may seem odd, but in fact there’s nothing incoherent about it.
Consider the following:
Past tense: Yesterday, I ate a burrito.
Present tense: Right now I am sitting at my laptop.
Future tense: There will be a sea battle tomorrow.
In each case, the tense of the claim functions like a compass needle. It gives us a conceptual orientation by telling us what direction to go from the present moment to arrive at a specified event. The past tense tells us to work backwards from the present, at what is ‘earlier than’. The future tense tells us to project forward from the present, at what is ‘later than’. And the present tense tells us to consider how things are now, at what is ‘simultaneous with’ the present.
The essence of a tense, then, is that it provides directional orientation from a privileged reference point. In the case of time, this reference point is the ‘now’ or the ‘present’. So-called tenseless claims contain no such point. For example, to say “There is [tenseless] a sea battle on 12/20/2007″ I have to forget where I am in relation to 12/20/2007. If I allow myself access to information about whether that date is earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with ‘now’, then I’ve illicitly smuggled tense in through the back door.
To recognize spatial tenses all we need is a privileged reference point and a way of orienting things in space in relation to that reference point. Aristotelian physics includes just that. According to him, there is a privileged spatial reference point – the center of the universe – and a way or orienting things in relation to that center. Things can move ‘toward’ the center, ‘away from’ the center, or ‘go around’ the center. This shows that the notion of spatial tenses is not incoherent. Still, many people would doubt whether it is a useful notion post-Copernicus.
After all, it doesn’t seem that there is any objective spatial reference point that we can identify and refer to. Perhaps there is an objective ‘center of the universe’, but even if that’s so, do we have any way of identifying where is it? In the case of time we can identify the present by self-reflective introspection. But even there a question arises whether the present so identified is the present or merely a present? On the one hand, A-theorists believe that tense (in the temporal sense) is an objective feature of reality. According to them, there is an objective ‘now’ that we directly apprehend in the self-reflective immediacy of our own consciousness. Hence, we are in touch with the present. On the other hand, B-theorists deny the objective reality of tense. According to them, our use of tensed language merely reflects our subjective or egocentric perspective. For them, we cannot refer to the present, but only to a present.
In support of their position, B-theorists like to press an analogy between temporal and spatial tenses. In the first place, it seems that spatial words like ‘here’ and ‘there’ are merely subjective or egocentric. I say “Here I am” and you respond “Oh, there you are!” it seems clear that ‘here’ and ‘there’ merely serve to locate things in relation to the speaker. In the second place, it seems that ‘here’ and ‘there’ function exactly like the temporal words ‘now’ and ‘then’. Hence, asks the B-theorist, why think that ‘now’ picks out the objective present when ‘here’ only picks out the speaker’s location? Why not construe both terms in a subjective or egocentric way, such that ‘now’ simply means ‘simultaneous with [this speech act, the time of this utterance, etc.]’?
Those are fair questions. It seems that the A-theorist has to either (1) identify an objective spatial reference point (but what?) or (2) insist on a brute difference between spatial and temporal tenses, with the former being merely egocentric and the latter not. The plausibility of (2) may be argued by pointing to differences in how we can orient ourselves in space and time. Space has three dimensions, which allows me to change position in relation to other things, to go elsewhere. This means that where I am is to some extent up to me. In addition, I can interact with other beings at other places (“Hey you, over there”). All this confirms the egocentric nature of ‘here’ and ‘there’. But time is different. I can’t move around in time and go elsewhen, at least not until someone invents a functional time machine. When I am is not at all up to me. Nor can I interact with other beings at other times. I can only do so now. Of course, if a time machine could be invented – and that’s a very big if – these disanalogies between space and time would collapse. But until then, it seems that the now constrains us as it would if it were objective, whereas the here does not.
Why does the so-called tenseless ascription not use a ‘privileged reference point’? Tomorrow is 2007 years from a certain reference point. Why is that reference point not privileged?
Happy Christmas, Alan, and to all your readers.
God bless you and your wife for adopting!!! I can think of few things more beautiful, if any. And you have my prayers for your job search.
Peace
Hello Ockham,
Thanks for the Christmas wishes. I hope your new year is off to a good start.
Regarding your question, I should have been more clear on what it takes for a reference point to be “privileged” in the relevant sense.
The use of tense requires an (implicitly) indexical ‘now’ as a reference point, an indexical that cannot be replaced with a definite description salva significatione. Thus, in the tensed (*) “It is now raining” the ‘now’ picks out the moment of utterance. Let’s call that moment “Tuesday”. Now compare (*) with the tenseless (#) “It rains on Tuesday”. These do not have the same meaning because (#) does not tell us whether the relevant Tuesday is past, present, or future. This difference is obscured if we read (#) as “It rains on Tuesday (=now)”, but that’s smuggling tense in the back door.
Thanks, Shane. I really appreciate your prayers.
May God bless you too.
Congratulations on your new baby. I am sure she will be spoiled in no time flat.
It seems to me that the phenomena you mention don’t support enough of a difference between space and time to ground the appropriate ontological difference between here and now. All they seem to support is the idea that causation mainly runs in a single direction along a single dimension rather than the three other dimensions we happen to have. Make that single dimension time and the other three space and you get just the phenomena you speak of. It’s the arrow of time, not ontological tense. As far as “Nor can I interact with other beings at other times,” goes, that’s not really true. All interaction is over a spatiotemporal distance. The farther away someone is from me spatially, the farther away temporally will be the receipt of whatever signal I send them. Interaction isn’t simultaneous – your always getting signals from people in the past and sending them out into the future.
Hi Ian,
Appreciate your comments. I’ll grant that the differences I mention aren’t conclusive, but I think they do suffice to weaken the force of B-theorist’s argument for treating ‘now’ in the same way as ‘here’.
The arrow of time and ontological tense may not be separable. Indeed, for A-theorists they’re pretty much the same thing, for on such views it’s the nature of the objective ‘now’ that grounds the arrow of time.
As for interaction, you’ve got a good point there. But one aspect of my contrast is unaffected by it, namely, that I can freely go elsewhere but can’t freely go elsewhen. Time seems to constrain us much more tightly than space does, a fact which makes it harder (though not impossible, or there wouldn’t be any B-theorists) to resist the impression that the ‘now’ is objective.
I forgot to respond here: “I think they do suffice to weaken the force of B-theorist’s argument for treating ‘now’ in the same way as ‘here’.”
I don’t see how.
“The arrow of time and ontological tense may not be separable. Indeed, for A-theorists they’re pretty much the same thing, for on such views it’s the nature of the objective ‘now’ that grounds the arrow of time.”
I don’t see how ontological tense, on its own, can help ground the arrow of time. In addition to just saying that some things are present, past or future simpliciter you need an account of why certain processes are asymmetric with respect to the past-future direction through time. Perhaps an account of the grounding of tensed sentences could do the work here. But tenseless theorists are in an equivalent position of having to explain the arrow of time – in addition to just saying that some things are earlier, simultaneous, or later, you need an account of why certain processes are asymmetric with respect to the earlier-later direction through time. And analogous with the tensed theorist, perhaps an account of what makes one thing earlier or later than another will do this. But in both cases its these further accounts of either A-determinations or B-determinations that’s going to do the work – not simply stipulating the determinations themselves. So I see no relevant difference between the positions – both need an account.
“But one aspect of my contrast is unaffected by it, namely, that I can freely go elsewhere but can’t freely go elsewhen. Time seems to constrain us much more tightly than space does, a fact which makes it harder (though not impossible, or there wouldn’t be any B-theorists) to resist the impression that the ‘now’ is objective.”
Not really – you get those phenomena merely from the arrow of time plus the fact that time has one dimension and space three. And that’s perfectly compatible with a tenseless theory (most would be happy to say all of this) – I see no difficulty here.