Open Theism and Divine Freedom

In a recent book entitled Can God Be Free?, William Rowe argues that the answer to the titular question is no, and he develops this into an argument for atheism. Here’s a simplified version of his basic argument:

[T]here is a serious argument to the effect that no such being as God could exist if for every creatable world there is a better creatable world. This argument depends on the following principle:

If an omniscient being creates a world when it could have created a better world then it is possible that there be a being morally better than it.

From this principle and the assumption that for any creatable world there is a better creatable world, it follows that an all-powerful, omniscient creator of a world is a being than which a better being is possible. But the theistic God is by nature an unsurpassable being, a being than which a better being is not possible. Therefore, so the argument goes, if there is no best world, the exalted God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam does not exist. (pp. 4-5)

The key assumptions of this argument are these:

1. God is an essentially unsurpassable being, that is, he is a being than which a better being is not possible.
2. If a being performs one action when it could have performed a better action instead, then it is possible that there be a being better than it.
3. For every world that God could create, there is a better world that God could have created instead, and doing so would constitute a better action on God’s part.

Rowe contends that these three claims form a mutually inconsistent set. Since he accepts (2) and (3), he concludes that (1) is false: there is no essentially unsurpassable being. Hence, there is no God.

A theist can resist this argument by rejecting either (2) or (3) instead of (1).

1. creates a world when it could have created a better world then it is possible that there be a being better than it.
2. If God is omnipotent, then there is a creatable world better than this world.

More formally, the argument looks like this:

1. According to theism, God is a being than which a better being is not possible; as such, God is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly morally good.
2. If an omniscient being creates a world when it could have created a better world then it is possible that there be a being better than it.
3. If God is omnipotent, then there is a creatable world better than this world.
4. Therefore, God could not have created this world. (1, 2, 3)
5. If theism is true, then there cannot be a world that God does not create.
6. Therefore, if theism is true, then this world was created by God and this world was not created by God. (4, 5)
7. Therefore, theism is false.

1. For any creatable world there is a better creatable world.
2. Therefore, if God exists, then he cannot create a world. (1, 2, 3)
3. If theism is true, then there cannot be a world that God does not create.
4. There is a world.
5. Therefore, if theism is true, then God created this world. (5, 6)
6. Therefore, if theism is true, then God created this world and God did not create this world. (4, 7)
7. Therefore, theism is false. (8)

Premises (2) and (3) are the most controversial premises here, and Rowe defends them skillfully throughout the book. In what follows, I’m going to concede (2) for the sake of argument and focus on (3).

There are three ways in which premise (3) might be false:

• There is a unique best creatable world.
• There are several best creatable worlds.
• There is no objective evaluative ranking among creatable worlds.

The first option is very dubious if we assume, as Rowe does, that all possible worlds are creatable worlds. It seems rather obvious that this

Su

1. There necessarily exists an essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially perfectly good being (i.e., God).
2. Necessarily, as an essentially perfectly good being, God always does the best that he can.
3. Necessarily, as an essentially omnipotent being, God can create any possible world.
4. Necessarily, God does not create a possible world if he can create a better one. (2, 3)
5. Necessarily, God is free if and only if there is more than one possible world that God can create.
6. Either (a) there is a single best possible world, (b) there are several maximally good possible worlds, or (c) for every possible world there is a better one.
7. If (a), then God is not free. He must create the best of all possible worlds. (4, 5, 6)
8. If (c), then God is not free. He cannot create any possible world. (4, 5, 6)
9. If (b), then God is free. (4, 5, 6)
11. Necessarily, as a maximally powerful being, God can always do better than

Just a short post.