OK, here’s a version of the cosmological argument to think about:
- The universe is a contingent thing (i.e., it cannot account for its own existence).
- Contingent things need an ultimate explanation for their existence.
- Whatever stands in need of a certain type of explanation cannot be ultimately explained by something that itself stands in need of the same type of explanation.
- Therefore, the universe cannot be ultimately explained by anything contingent. (1,2,3)
- Therefore, there must be a noncontingent (i.e., necessary) thing that is the ultimate explanation of the existence of the universe. (1,2,4)
Premise 3 seems to be true by definition of ‘ultimate’. That leaves premises 1 and 2.
In defense of 1 we might point to the Big Bang theory, which suggests that the universe came into being about 13.7 billion years ago.
In defense of 2 we might suggest that if something requires an explanation and the explainer in turn requires the same sort of explanation, then all we’ve done is push the question back a step, which, arguably, is not very satisfying.
For example, suppose for the moment that the question “What holds the Earth up?” is a question worth taking seriously. Obviously, it will not do to answer “The Earth rests on the back of a giant turtle” because we can meaningfully ask the same question of the turtle (“What holds the turtle up?”). If we continue in the same vein, we generate an infinite regress (“It’s turtles all the way down”), unless we can find some way to terminate the sequence with a being that needs no support (“Turtle #25 is resting on The Bottom”). This seems to be an appropriate ultimate stopping point because it doesn’t make much sense to ask “What holds The Bottom up?”
Now, change the question to “Why does the universe exist?” If we answer by appealing to another contingent thing, say, a previous universe, they we merely push matters back a step, for we can ask the same question of that universe, and so on. That may seem unsatisfying. But if we answer by appealing to a necessary or non-contingent being, then the same question cannot be sensibly repeated. “Why does a necessary being exist?” is a dumb question – it’s necessary, after all.
I’ll have to agree with this reasoning. Yet I will point out that it does not make a statement that God exists, just that a necessary being exists. But this brings us one step closer to the question of wether or not God exists, instead of taking us one step back. Now, with this arguement, we can for the most part say that a necessary being exists in order for the universe and/or reality to exist. Wether or not this being can be considered God is another matter, but this arguement brings us closer to wether or not God exists.
I do agree with the rationality of the cosmological arguments we have encountered… we seek to look for explanations (or utilize the PSR) and if we want to avoid a regress then what other conclusion can be reached besides a necessary being of SOME sort? I think that anything beyond that (and the ontological argument) is speculative… or rather rests on what qualities we would like a necessary being to possess.
Are there any arguments that seek to support the conclusion that a certain feature (like omniscience)is in itself necessary?
Shannon,
In response to your question, the answer is yes. This is all very controversial, of course, but if we accept the idea that abstract objects (like propositions) exist necessarily (and a great many philosophers do accept this), and if we hold as many do that abstract objects are essentially derivative from concrete objects, then there must be at least one necessarily existing concrete object that is the source or ground of abstract objects. A plausible way to accomplish this is to suppose that this necessarily existing concrete object is an Infinite Mind and that abstract objects are its thoughts.
Now, if this line of thought is correct, then we need a necessarily existing Mind that, in virtue of containing all abstract objects, has knowledge of all possibilities. We haven’t quite gotten to full omniscience yet, but I hope you can see where this is going.
By “being” I get the impression of something with human characteristics, i.e. God. Is this always the case, or could a necessary “being” be something else without a mind? Am I misinterpreting?
Jack,
I was using “being” and “thing” interchangeably to range over possible individual existents: a rock, a tree, a dog, a human, God, etc. In that sense, a “being” need not have a mind, nor is it at all obvious, I think, why a “necessary being” would have to have a mind.