My Take on Kant’s Antinomy of Time

In the previous post I presented a pair of conflicting arguments by philosopher Immanuel Kant, who presents them to show, among other things, that limit questions like the beginning of time are cannot be theoretically resolved by beings like ourselves. Here’s my take on those two arguments.

The first argument, recall, was this:

Part I: Time Has a Beginning
1. If there is no beginning of time, then at any given moment an actually infinite series of successive states would have elapsed. (premise)
2. But it is impossible for an actually infinite series of successive states to elapse. (premise)
3. Hence, there must be a beginning of time. (from 1 & 2)

I take this argument to be sound if the tensed, dynamic, or ‘A’ theory of time is correct. Given the tenseless, static, or ‘B’ theory of time, however, premise (1) is false, since there is no objective elapsing of successive states. Premise (2) seems a truism to me, and the argument seems to be a valid instance of modus tollens (denying the consequent), so for me it all comes down to premise (1). And since I am inclined to accept an ‘A’ theory of time, I think the argument is a sound one.

What, then, about the second argument, which purports to show that time cannot have had a beginning? Since I accept the first argument, I expect to find a flaw in the second argument. That argument, recall, was this:

Part II: Time Has No Beginning
4. It is impossible for anything to begin without an elapse of time. (premise)
5. Hence, if time began, then there would have to be a time before time. (from 4)
6. But it is impossible for there to be a time before time. (premise)
7. Hence, it is impossible for there to be a beginning of time. (from 5 & 6)

Premises (4) and (6) seem to be a truisms, and since (5) and (7) are supposed to be deducible ultimately from (4) and (6), if there’s a flaw in the argument it has to be in the logic. The inference from (5) and (6) to (7), however, is obviously valid. So it must be in the inference from (4) to (5) that the argument goes wrong. Indeed, that’s where I think the problem lies. You see, (4) is ambiguous between

(4*) It is impossible for anything to begin without there having already been an elapse of time.

and

(4**) It is impossible for anything to begin without there being an elapse of time.

(5) follows from (4*), but (4*), I submit, is false. Why? Well, suppose that there is a necessarily existing being (God) who created the universe ex nihilo. As necessarily existing, God is necessarily eternal, and so, it would seem, need not change at all. If not for the act of creating, then, God would be completely unchanging and therefore timeless. The act of creation brings about a change as follows:

Just God (no time because no before and after)

Just God —> God + creation
(before) (after)

In this scenario, God’s very act of creating effects a change from “Just God” to “God + creation”, and so brings about (or, rather, just is) an elapse of time. Hence, (4**) is true in this case. But (4*) is not. Apart from the act of creating on God’s part there is no “before” or “after”, instead there is “Just God”.

(4**) is, I think, true. Every beginning is characterized by a before-after sequence of states which just is an elapse of time. But (5) doesn’t follow from (4**) as it does from (4*). In the scenario I just described there is a beginning to time that does not involve a previous elapse of time, and so it does not imply a time before time.