I’ve recently been reading a book critical of open theism by the late Ben Arbour. In later chapters he contends that open future open theism presupposes presentism as the ontology of time and claims, without any supporting argument other than footnotes to an essay by Tom Crisp, that presentism is metaphysically contingent. That is, Arbour claims that the ontology of time could have been (and perhaps is) non-presentistic. Curious as to what arguments might be offered for this claim, I looked up Crisp’s essay in the Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. What arguments does he offer in support of the metaphysical contingency of presentism? None. At several places Crisp notes that “most presentists think of presentism as necessarily true if true” (p. 235 n. 30) and then he simply registers his disagreement. Suffice to say, as a card-carrying presentist who believes, like most presentists, that it is metaphysically necessary, I didn’t find this particularly convincing.
This got me to thinking, however, why should anyone suppose that presentism is metaphysically necessary? In particular, are there any reasons I could give that might resonate with a hard-core perfect being theologian like Arbour? After some reflection, I think the answer is yes. I’ll begin by defining some terms and then lay out my argument. My contention, in a nutshell, is that
monotheism + essential divine omniscience + initial divine freedom entails presentism.
1. Defining key terms
1.a. Monotheism
monotheism =def. There is exactly one personal being (G0d) who is the sole ultimate foundation of reality.
As I explain in my previous post, this has several implications: (1) if we were to take a complete inventory of reality, then everything on the list would either be God or something that is ultimately wholly sourced in God; (2) there is an initial explanatory moment in which nothing exists but God and God alone; (3) because God is the sole foundation, all metaphysical possibility is grounded in God; hence, anything essential to God is metaphysically necessary. Finally, to say that God is “personal” is to say (at least) that God has both a mind and a will. Hence, God can conceptualize possibilities and make choices.
1.b. Divine omniscience
essential divine omniscience =def. God is essentially immediately and fully acquainted with all of reality and therefore essentially has a complete and accurate mental representation of reality.
If all of reality is either God or ultimately wholly sourced in God, then it is plausible that God is essentially omniscient. This is especially so if one holds, as Arbour emphatically does, to perfect being theology, accordingly to which God essentially has, to the maximum degree, every perfection that it is categorically better for something to have than not to have.
1.c. Initial divine freedom
initial divine freedom =def. At some moment in the divine life, God is free to choose from among competing, open options.
More exactly, at the initial explanatory moment implied by monotheism in which there is God and God alone, God has perfect knowledge of Himself and everything He is capable of (by essential divine omniscience). Thus, if God’s essential nature is such as to afford Him competing, open options, then there is at least an initial moment in the divine life where God faces a partition of options {O1, O2, …, On, etc.}. For example, {create, not create}. Or perhaps {create world type A, create world type B, …, not create}. At any such moment God can choose any one of those options to the exclusion of the rest. By monotheism God is under no a priori constraints external to Himself. Hence, God must be free with respect to those options. Now, the vast majority of monotheists, I presume Arbour included, believe that at the very least God was initially free to create or not create. Importantly, however, because those options constitute a partition, a jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive collection of options, they represent a forced choice on God’s part. God cannot not choose whether to create or not since to not choose to create at a moment where it’s all up to God (i.e., God’s not waiting on any future developments) is, in effect, to choose not to create.
1.d. Presentism
presentism =def. Reality is dynamic (i.e., things change), and fundamentally so, and no part of reality exists at a temporal distance from any other part. Hence, all that exists exists at the same temporal moment, i.e., now.
The first part of this, namely, that reality is fundamentally dynamic, rules out an utterly static or timeless reality. Reality is fundamentally temporal. Indeed, if presentism is metaphysically necessary as most presentists suppose, then the temporal nature of reality must be fundamental. The second part of this rules out all non-presentist ontologies of time. Thus, the eternalist, growing block, shrinking block, and moving spotlight models of time all posit that time is “spread out” such that there are things and events that co-exist at a temporal distance from each other. Presentism denies this. It holds that all of reality is temporally concentrated at a single moment, the present, which can be referenced as the universal and absolute now. And since reality is dynamic, this present moment is continually becoming a different, new moment, one that replaces what came before. Past moments no longer exist, but present reality preserves a complete memory of their having-been. Future moments do not yet exist, but present reality anticipates in degrees their coming-to-be.
2. The argument
So much for preliminaries. Here’s my argument for necessary presentism.
Briefly stated, monotheism makes God (and nothing else) fundamental. Essential omniscience makes God’s perspective on reality exhaustive and objective. Initial divine freedom introduces forced choice, and therefore intrinsic change, into God. This change makes God’s exhaustive and objective perspective essentially temporal. Hence, God’s all-encompassing perspective defines an objective, universal, temporal, now. By essential omniscience every subsequent change in reality (if any) must correspond to a matching change in God’s all-encompassing perspective on reality. And since there can be only one all-encompassing perspective at a time, there can only exist one objective temporal moment at a time. Hence, presentism.
More elaborately (I’m sure this reasoning can be tightened and tidied up):
- At the first explanatory moment, there is God and God alone. (monotheism)
- Hence, all of reality is concentrated at the first explanatory moment. (1)
- At the first explanatory moment, God is immediately and fully acquainted with all of reality. (essential divine omniscience)
- Hence, at the first explanatory moment, God’s perspective on reality defines a unified, absolute ‘now’. (3) [Note: It has not yet been shown that this is a temporal ‘now’. For all I’ve said so far, this could merely be the nunc stans or “static now” of divine timelessness.]
- Hence, at the first explanatory moment, all of reality exists at a unified, absolute ‘now’. (2, 4)
- At the first explanatory moment, God is free to create or not create. This choice is forced because the options are mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, and up to God and God alone. (initial divine freedom)
- Every choice essentially involves an intrinsic change in the chooser, from a not-having-yet-decided state of considering the options with none as yet having been ‘chosen’ to a having-decided state in which one option is ‘chosen’ to the exclusion of the rest.
- Hence, God’s choice to create or not create essentially involves a forced intrinsic change in God. (6, 7)
- Intrinsic changes are necessarily temporal. [In any such change the ‘before’ and ‘after’ states are mutually incompatible, so they cannot co-exist at the same moment. Hence, they can only obtain in succession.]
- Hence, a forced intrinsic change in God entails that reality (i.e., God and God alone) is fundamentally dynamic or temporal. (8, 9) [Note: This is the first component of presentism.]
- Moreover, because it’s an intrinsic change in God and God alone, all of reality remains concentrated at a single temporal moment that God perceives as a unified, absolute ‘now’. (4, 10) [Note: This excludes the timeless ‘now’ possibility noted at step 4.]
- Subsequent intrinsic changes anywhere in reality will necessarily introduce new temporal moments (9) in God’s life. [Due to God’s essential omniscience, any intrinsic change in reality must yield a corresponding intrinsic change in God’s mental representation of reality.]
- Each temporal moment in God’s life defines a new, unified, absolute, ‘now’. (essential divine omniscience)
- Hence, from God’s omniscient perspective, reality is dynamic and fundamentally so, and no part of reality can exist at a temporal distance from God’s unified, absolute ‘now’. (12, 13)
- God’s perspective on reality is the objective perspective. (essential divine omniscience)
- Hence, God’s unified, absolute ‘now’ is the unified, absolute ‘now’. (14, 15)
- Hence, reality is dynamic and fundamentally so, and no part of reality can exist at a temporal distance from any other part. All that exists exists at the same temporal moment, i.e., now. (10, 14, 16)
- Hence, presentism is metaphysically necessary. (17)