Cosmic Fine-Tuning vs. Many Universes

By | February 21, 2008

In class today I described the cosmic fine-tuning version of the design argument and the standard “many universes” counter-hypothesis. I also described how each side can appeal to Ockham’s Razor (don’t complicate explanatory hypotheses more than necessary) as a tie-breaker. The problem with such appeals, I said, is that Ockham’s Razor can be wielded in different ways to different effect, leaving the outcome in this case somewhat ambiguous.

Kurt raised the issue of intelligibility – do we really have enough of a grip on the idea of God, or of a transcendent Designer, for it to be a meaningful hypothesis? That’s a legitimate worry, one that a theist can only meet by articulating the idea of God in terms that we do have some grip on. Presumably we do have some understanding of notions like having power, being a person, goodness, being knowledgeable and wise, etc. for the theist to get started. Can the theist go far enough with this to meet the concern? I’ll leave that for you to decide or work out on your own.

I’d like to close with a worry that I have about the Many Universes Hypothesis (MUH). The concern is that this amounts to an illegitimate multiplication of our probabilistic resources. Why illegitimate? Because it’s ad hoc. I don’t see that we have any independent reasons, apart from the desire to avoid positing a cosmic Designer, for thinking that these universes exist. By hypothesis, these universes are causally isolated from our own, so there couldn’t in principle be any empirical evidence for their existence. The most we can say is that, for all we know, they could exist. But I can say that much about pretty much anything, and that’s why I think there’s got to be independent justification of some kind for taking it seriously in this case. For example, if I come across a collected edition of Shakespeare’s writings I would explain it in terms of design. Alternatively, however, I could hypothesize it as the result of a whole lot of monkeys banging on word processors for a very long time. Now, if I had some independent reason for thinking that there actually were so many monkeys with access to functional word processors over such a long time, I might take that hypothesis seriously. But I have no such reasons, so I dismiss it out of hand.

The questions I’d like to pose, then, are these: Are there any independent reasons for thinking that MUH is true? And if not, then why is MUH worth taking seriously whereas the monkey hypothesis is not?

Finally, I would like to observe that the adhocness charge doesn’t count equally against theism because we have (or so it seems) several independent reasons for thinking that a being like God exists (cosmological arguments, religious experience, etc.).

5 thoughts on “Cosmic Fine-Tuning vs. Many Universes

  1. EricSchwartz

    I have a few reasons why multiple universe hypothesis may work. My thoughts are as follows. MUH may be very convenient to use against the cosmological argument, and it may seem ad hoc in this scenario, but if we were to take MUH by it self, is it really ad hoc? I do not think it necessarily has to be. For example, think of the last time you had a dream that seemed so real, but then you woke up. Can you tell me where you were in that dream? I cannot. Is it possible that you were in another universe, but not in a physical manner. I would like to say yes. Also, some physicists have theorized about black holes. It has been questions wether they could possibly be a pathway into alternate universes, because still to this day, no one has solid evidence of exactly what happens to matter once it hits the point of no return. These may be speculative, but I think these thoughts at least raise the idea that the MUH has atleast some credibility.

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  2. Shannon Duncan

    hmm… interesting question. I am inclined to believe that there is a possibility of multiple universes that isn’t completely ad hoc. Just by relying on our scientific advances, we know that our relation (here on Earth) to the vastness of space is quite huge. Why couldn’t there be multiple universes? Also, why not believe that some form of life is going to eventually emerge in whatever environment there is. Why do we want to believe that human life on Earth is that “special?” As for the monkey hypothesis- I think that any comparison involving entities we know about are going to be skewed. In this case, I think we can come up with A LOT of different possibilities before we start believing monkeys are miraculously banging on typewriters and generating Shakespeare. But as for entities we don’t know about… such as universes… the best I can say is, why not?

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  3. Alan Rhoda

    Eric and Shannon,

    Thanks for your comments. Let me make clear that I’m not dismissing the “possibility” that there might be multiple universes. (Heck, even a theist could hold that God creates multiple universes.) What I’m objecting to is the thought that a “mere” possibility, as far as we know, constitutes a defeater for the fine-tuning argument. If it did, then parallel considerations could easily be used to construct a defeater for any inductive argument whatsoever, which is preposterous. That’s why I think we need something more than “It’s possible that MUH is true.” We need some reason for thinking that it has a non-negligible probability of being true on purely naturalistic grounds.

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  4. Brad Schwartz

    I’m not positive but I think you want an explanation that’s there has to be more then a random possibility MUH or at least more then possibilities to be accepted as a counter of the teleological argument. If this is the case, then one popular view of the universe is an eternal inflation. The eternal inflation is one of the most widely accepted big bang models of astronomers and physicists. That is because the prediction of using non-stop inflation as a model of the universe has been successful in the discovery of flatness, homogeneity, and scale-invariance. Eternal Inflation goes hand and hand with MUH and is best described in this passage by Steve Nadis

    (Eternal inflation creates a different kind of universe than the simple sphere we once envisioned. Think of Swiss cheese instead. Each hole represents a bubble universe; the cheese represents the space between the bubbles and is expanding faster than the speed of light. Not only do the bubbles get farther and farther apart, new bubbles keep forming withn the cheese – the result of new Big Bangs popping off in a never-ending chain reaction. Eternal inflation doesn’t just produce an oversized hunkof cheese; it produces a multiverse.)

    If you grant that the big bang is highly likely or the most believable explanation of the universe, then the next step would be to determine the most likely big bang model which is usually the eternal inflation. Which evidence points to that both seem the most likely due to tests and research. Then the MUH is no longer pure randomness but a strong theory for our universe and big bang model.

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  5. Alan Rhoda

    Brad,

    That’s the sort of thing I’m looking for, namely, some account of how MUH might serve other, independent theoretical purposes besides merely avoiding the design inference.

    I have a couple further thoughts regarding the ‘eternal inflation’ idea: (1) Does it predict that the physical constants and laws of nature vary from bubble to bubble? (2) This scenario seems to involve a universe-generator with its own stable laws of operation.

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