Faithful readers,
My wife and I are leaving tomorrow morning for a week in Maui to celebrate our third anniversary. So no more blogging until I get back.
Alan
PS: I’ve decided to try turning off comment moderation. So your comments will now appear immediately after you post them.
Some thoughts about Presentism.
1. Presumably most people would agree that (a) things that used to exist, but no longer exist, do not exist now. (b) things that exist now, exist now (c) things that will exist, but do not yet exist, do not exist now. Thus the only things that exist, exist now. (Or are we saying that things which no longer exist, do in fact still exist? Or that things which do not yet exist, exist?). If we call agree this, what is special presentism? Or rather, what alternative could there be? Does any anti-presentist hold that things which do not exist any more, do in fact exist, even though they don’t any longer?
2, Following a dialogue with the Maverick, it occurred to me that, given my view that a world in which only present tense facts are true is wholly different from a world in which past tense facts are also true, so that as well as it being true, now, that I live in London, it is also a separate fact about me, now, that I used to live in Bristol, does that offer a solution to your problem about what makes the past true? On this view a world which has a past is different from an otherwise identical world which has been created afresh from nothing. For of the latter it is not true that my counterpart lived in Bristol. He may think he did, because he has freshly implanted memories. He may find evidence apparently showing his world is billions of years old. But of no avail. No past tense facts are true in his world. But in our world, all these past tense facts are true. Or at least we suppose so. So the two worlds are different. Now.
PS have a good holiday. Or should I say, since you will (future tense) be reading this after you have got back (future perfect), hope you had a good holiday.
Ochum: Presumably most people would agree that (a) things that used to exist, but no longer exist, do not exist now. (b) things that exist now, exist now (c) things that will exist, but do not yet exist, do not exist now. Thus the only things that exist, exist now.
Tom: Looks like the definition of presentism.
Ochum: If we [c]all agree this, what is special presentism?
Tom: Not all agree to this. But those who do are presentists.
Ochum: what alternative could there be?
Tom: Block universe, for example, and all expressions of the B-theory of time.
Ochum: Does any anti-presentist hold that things which do not exist any more, do in fact exist, even though they don’t any longer?
Tom: There are non-presentists who hold that Socrates âexistsâ and is ârealâ but just not at âourâ present. He exists at another time.
Ochum: Following a dialogue with the Maverick, it occurred to me that, given my view that a world in which only present tense facts are true is wholly different from a world in which past tense facts are also true, so that as well as it being true, now, that I live in London, it is also a separate fact about me, now, that I used to live in BristolâŚ
Tom: I agree that âOchum lived in Bristolâ is now true. But you said past facts are not true. So what do you take âOchum lived [past tense] in Bristolâ to be, a present fact? Looks to me that much of the disagreement over this is semantic.
Ochum: On this view a world which has a past is different from an otherwise identical world which has been created afresh from nothing.
Tom: I think presentists would agree that these would not be identical, or tautological, worlds.
Ochum: For of the latter it is not true that my counterpart lived in Bristol. He may think he did, because he has freshly implanted memories. He may find evidence apparently showing his world is billions of years old. But of no avail. No past tense facts are true in his world. But in our world all these past tense facts are true.
Tom: Above you say âgiven my view that a world in which only present tense facts are true is wholly different from a world in which past tense facts are also true.â So there you donât believe âpast tense facts are true.â But here you say they are true. Iâm confused. How are you defining âpast-tense faceâ and âpresent-tense factâ? And do you or donât you believe theyâre true?
Tom
So if my license is no longer valid, it is still valid? Surely the meaning of ‘A is no longer B’ is that A used to be B, but isn’t B. Thus, something that no longer exists, did exist, but doesn’t (now). That’s what ‘no longer’ means.
What do you say it means?
I was just trying to get clear on your view. You make the following statements: “only present tense facts are true” and “all past tense facts are true.” That looks like a contradiction to me. I’m guessing you had different things in mind though. I’m just trying to understand what precisely is your view.
Tom
Ochum: So if my license is no longer valid, it is still valid?
Tom: Obviously not.
Ochum: something that no longer exists, did exist, but doesn’t (now). That’s what ‘no longer’ means.
Tom: I don’t dispute this, but then I wasn’t asking you about this.
Tom
My view is not that only present tense facts are true. Do read carefully! I said my view is that a world in which only the present tense facts are true, is, wholly different from a world in which the same present tense facts are true, but also there are past tense facts.
Note I am not saying that things which no longer exist, exist. What I am saying is that the fact that certain things used to exist, but don’t, distinguishes our world from a world created afresh, but with memories and paleological evidence.
Ochum: I said my view is that a world in which only the present tense facts are true, is, wholly different from a world in which the same present tense facts are true, but also there are past tense facts.
Tom: Well, it couldnât be âwhollyâ different if the same present-tense facts are true in both worlds. But itâs definitely somewhat different.
Ochum: Note I am not saying that things which no longer exist, exist. What I am saying is that the fact that certain things used to exist, but don’t, distinguishes our world from a world created afresh, but with memories and paleological evidence.
Tom: As a presentist Iâd completely agree.
Tom
Ochum: Note I am not saying that things which no longer exist, exist. What I am saying is that the fact that certain things used to exist, but don’t, distinguishes our world from a world created afresh, but with memories and paleological evidence.
Tom: By the way, Ochum, do you think perhaps that this undermines the case for presentism?
Tom
Ocham and Tom,
Interesting discussion. I have just one brief comment on something Ocham said, namely, “a world in which only present tense facts are true is wholly different from a world in which past tense facts are also true.”
Every past-tense fact implies a present-tense fact. (Note: I’m using “fact” here to mean a true proposition rather than a state of affairs.) Thus, “It was the case that p” implies “It is the case that it was the case that p”. Accordingly, “a world in which only present tense facts are true” is a world in which no past tense facts are true, which is a world with no past. The only point at which that could be true for any temporal world, it seems, would be at the very first moment of time in that world. Every successive moment would be one in which some things are past and thus in which some past-tense facts are true (unless we are prepared to say that what it true about the past can change).
Welcome back Alan.
>> Tom: By the way, Ochum, do you think perhaps that this undermines the case for presentism?
That’s an interesting question. What motivates the anti-presentist is perhaps the worry that worlds A and B are essentially the same. i.e. the fact, in world A, that there ‘were’ things, is not a fact at all.
This worries the anti-presentist so much, that he invents a sort of present tense world in which all the past tense facts are still facts, now.
This reminds me of a point that Hume often makes. He says that certain philosophical positions are in bad faith, as it were. They are an emotional response to to something their proponents feel they have to deny, which consists in re-asserting the very thing they wanted to be deny.
I.e. the anti-presentist is deeply worried by the idea that the past may not be real. So he invents a present to hold the past.
But this is in bad faith. By inventing this mythical present, he is denying the real source of the worry after all. He recognises that Socrates no longer exists. But he is so worried by that, he invents a mythical present that can hold Socrates. But then he is denying what really worried him all along, i.e. denying the very fact that prompted him to take the philosophical position in the first place.
Very Sartrean
I’ve found the ‘Bad Faith’ passage from Hume I was thinking of. He says (Treatise Book I part iv Section 3).
“They have sufficient force of genius to free them from the vulgar error, that there is a natural and perceivable connection betwixt the several sensible qualities and actions of matter, but not sufficient to keep them from ever seeking for this connection in matter or causes. Had they fallen upon the just conclusion, they would have returned back to the situation of the vulgar, and would have regarded all these disquisitions with indolence and indifference. At present they seem to be in a very lamentable condition, and such as the poets have given us but a faint notion of in their descriptions of the punishments of Sisyphus and Tantalus. For what can be imagined more tormenting than to seek with eagerness what for ever flies us, and seek for it in a place where it is impossible it can every exist?”
Actually there is another place where he makes the same point better, but enough for now. Time to mow the lawn.
Ochum-
Are you a presentist?
Tom
Hello Tom â I’m sorry I only just spotted your question. In reply, I’m really not sure what a presentist is. As I said before, I hold the following, logically deducible principles.
1. Anything that no longer exists, does not exist. (this logically follows from the definition of ‘no longer’).
2. Anything that does not yet exist, does not exist. (this logically follows from the definition of ‘not yet).
3. Anything that exists, exists. (Also a logical truth).
4. Anything that might exist, but which doesn’t exist, doesn’t exist. (A logical truth again).
Is this presentism? If so, an anti-presentists is someone who holds that one or more of the propositions above is false.
Isn’t a thread announcing a trip to Maui a great place to discuss this? ;o)
It all looks like presentism to me, Ochum. I’m not sure how you’re using “might” in no. 4. All you really need is 1-3 boiled down to one claim: The only time at which anything may be said to exist is the present. Or even more simply: Only present reality is real. A thing obtains or not only at the present moment. A non-presentist is someone who denies this.
So you’re a presentist. Welcome aboard. The fun now begins with semantics, because if one assumes (as I do) that our semantics (how we talk about and describe the world) should follow our ontology (what sort of world we believe the world is, what the nature of reality is, A- or B-Series of time, indeterminacy, cause-effect, freedom, etc.). And if you adopt a correspondence theory of truth (that our langauge is true if it corresponds to reality), then the two main semantical problems confronting presentism appear:
(1) What grounds the truth-value of present claims about the past?
(2) What grounds the truth-value of present claims about the future?
If ‘reality’ grounds the truth-value of propositions (i.e., our language), and if present reality is the only reality that exists (that’s presentism), then either:
(a) present claims about the past and the future are neither true nor false, or
(b) present claims about the past and the future are are true or false by corresponding (or not) to some present reality.
What d’ya think?
Tom
I’m sorry, but you seemed to have missed my point entirely. My point was that the 4 propositions above are logical truths. Everyone who understands what they mean, see that they must be true. For example:
1. Anything that no longer exists, does not exist.
Now you might ask what I mean by the expression ‘no longer’. I explain, I mean that if something once existed, but no longer exists, means that it does not exist now. By contrast, if I merely say that something (say the Eiffel Tower) existed in the nineteenth century, I do not imply that it does not exist now.
OK, now you understand what I mean by “no longer”. The sentence 1. above is then true by definition. If you understand what ‘no longer’ means, you understand that anything that no longer exists, does not exist now.
If that makes one a presentist, then everyone who understands the sentence is a presentist.
Ochuk: I’m sorry, but you seemed to have missed my point entirely. My point was that the 4 propositions above are logical truths.
Tom: Iâm totally tracking with you, Ochuk. But thereâs something about this youâre missing.
One can grant the truth of your first point, for example, and not be a presentist (as you assume). One can agree that âanything that no longer exists, does not existâ is definitionally consistent (i.e., if anything existed and then ceased to exist, it would be true that it does not exist). But not everyone will agree that things that exist at some times (say, times earlier than our now) and not at other times (say, our now) do not exist at all.
Youâre assuming that the truth of your first point entails the logically necessity that the present is the only time at which a thing may be said to exist. This would make presentism a logically necessary position, which it is not. Some philosophers of time claim Socrates DOES exist, just not at our present moment. So Socrates doesnât qualify under your definition of something that âonce existed but no longer exists.â
These philosophers will agree with your first point definitionally but simply disagree that anything that ever exists qualifies under its description. If, for example, you posit a set of âthings that once existed but which no longer existâ you would claim the set is chock full of things. They would claim itâs empty. They would agree that youâve coherently defined the set and theyâd agree that anything that qualifies under its definition is a member of the set. But they just donât have a worldview that yields any members for it. Thatâs how they agree with your definition without being presentists.
The point is that your âanything that no longer exists does not now exist,â is logical in the sense of being coherent or self-consistent, not in the sense of proving there are any objects that once exist but which no longer exist. It is not logically necessary that things that exist at times earlier than our ânowâ do not exist at all because they don’t ânowâ exist. I don’t agree with the block universe view of B-Series view of time, but I don’t know that it’s logically impossible.
Tom
Ocham-
I apologize for screwing up your name! Just noticed it. I’ve been calling you Ochuk. That’s another blogger I’m familiar with. I just confused you two. Very sorry!
Tom
As it’s not my real name, it doesn’t really matter.
Anyway, I’m not sure I have any beef with the anti-Presentist. If he (or she) agrees that if Socrates no longer exists, logic compels us to say that Socrates does not exist, then fine.
The anti-presentist is merely saying that Socrates does in fact exist. I don’t have a view on that position.