Open theism has been much-discussed in philosophy of religion and theology circles since the 1995 publication of Pinnock, et al.’s The Openness of God. But in many ways I find that the view is still poorly understood. Critics frequently fail to appreciate that there are several importantly different versions of open theism.
First, we need a working definition of open theism. The core thesis of open theism is that the future is now, in some respects, epistemically open for God. Let’s call this the epistemic thesis (ET). In general, the future is epistemically open for God at T with respect to possible future state of affairs X iff for some future time T* neither “X will obtain at T*” nor “X will not obtain at T*” is known by God at T. Whatever is not epistemically open for God at T is epistemically settled for God at T.
In terms of ET, I propose to define as a version of open theism any modification of classical theism to accommodate ET while retaining omnipotence and creation ex nihilo. (The qualifications are intended to exclude process theism.)
Second, to draw the proper distinctions, we need to define one more term. Let us say that the future is alethically open at time T iff with respect to possible future state of affairs X and future time T* neither “X will obtain at T*” nor “X will not obtain at T*” is true at T. Whatever is not alethically open at T is alethically settled at T.
Now, given these definitions, there are four importantly distinct versions of open theism (I’m borrowing here some terminology from my friend and collaborator, Tom Belt):
- Voluntary Nescience: The future is alethically settled but nevertheless epistemically open for God because he has voluntarily chosen not to know truths about future contingents. Dallas Willard espouses this position.
- Involuntary Nescience: The future is alethically settled but nevertheless epistemically open for God because truths about future contingents are in principle unknowable. William Hasker espouses this position.
- Non-Bivalentist Omniscience: The future is alethically open and therefore epistemically open for God because propositions about future contingents are neither true nor false. J. R. Lucas espouses this position.
- Bivalentist Omniscience: The future is alethically open and therefore epistemically open for God because propositions asserting of future contingents that they “will” obtain or that they “will not” obtain are both false. Instead, what is true is that they “might and might not” obtain. Greg Boyd (and yours truly) espouses this position.
A couple observations before I close.
- Positions (3) and (4) are wholly compatible with a traditional definition of omniscience (i.e., essentially knowing all and only truths). Positions (1) and (2) require some revision of omniscience as traditionally defined (viz., being capable of knowing all truths; knowing all truths that can be known).
- Since knowledge entails truth, if the future is alethically open, then the future must be epistemically open for God. Thus, if the future is alethically open, then it those who hold that the future is epistemically settled for God who must either revise the traditional doctrine of omniscience or run into the incoherence of saying that God knows things that ain’t so.
There are, of course, many more important issues to discuss here. But I hope this makes the terrain of the debate a little clearer.
Also posted at Prosblogion.
Alan,
I didn’t know that Dallas Willard was an Open Theist. Do you know where in his works he has stated his position?
Intrigued….
Ross
Hi Ross,
I’m pretty sure he espouses the voluntary nescience position in The Divine Conspiracy, pp. 244-253.
Here’s a link that mentions several other proponents of various versions of open theism.
You seriously have to read Esther Meek’s “Longing to Know”. J.P. Moreland addressed it in his ETS opening remarks in San Antonio. I don’t think he fully understands her view, but I think it needs to be seriously considered by people who espouse correspondent theories in epistemology (which I do not).
Dru
Alan: In general, a proposition P is ‘epistemically open’ for subject S at time T iff nothing that S knows at T suffices to guarantee either that P or that not-P.
Tom: Hi Alan. Hope I’m not a nusance. I just keep looking for clarity. Saying “proposition P is ‘epistemically open'” looks inconsistent with what some open theists argue (like us!). Wouldn’t it be better to equate “openness” with “indeterminacy” which is an attribute of the world and not of propositions (which in effect denies bivalence)? What’s “open” about a proposition if it is at all times either true or false? It looks to me like this could be understood as saying future-tense props describing contingencies are either neither true or false, or are either true or false but unknown to God. In other words, it looks like your explanation of ET assumes one or more but not all four versions of open theism.
I agree that the sine qua non of open theism (what all seem to agree upon) is that the future is to some degree epistemically open for God. This is the epistemic thesis (ET). I just wouldn’t express ET as “propositional openness” (which is what I take “proposition P is epistemically open for subject S” to mean).
It’s the world (not the propositions describing it) that is in some aspects indeterminate with respect to the future. ‘Epistemic openness’ makes sense as saying God’s epistemic states MAP the world’s openness with respect to the future. But there’s nothing propositionally open about this. It’s propositionally determinate, or discrete, (all propositions positing what they do either truthfully or falesly) at any given point in time and every changing. How the propositional landscape will change is where we locate God’s ‘epistemic openness’.
Am I being too careful?
Tom
Interesting point, Tom.
Looking back at my post, you may be right that my characterization of ‘epistemic openness’ (EO) is inadequate. The way I state it: A proposition P is ‘epistemically open’ for subject S at time T iff nothing that S knows at T suffices to guarantee either that P or that not-P. The problem with this is that on our view the future is not epistemically open as I’ve defined it. So my generalized definition of EO is inadequate.
I think what I say immediately thereafter is on target, however: The future is epistemically open for God at T with respect to possible future state of affairs X iff for some future time T* neither “X will obtain at T*” nor “X will not obtain at T*” is known by God at T.
I’ve modified my blog post accordingly.
Hello Alan!
I saw your paper about the philosophical arguments for Open theism, and this was just spot on what I was looking for. I am for the moment writing a biblical study on the topic and I am interested in some philosophical help on my work. My question is therefore: Is it possible to get access to your paper online or in a pdf document?
Best regards Eirik Hordnes from Norway 🙂
And by the way: What do you think about Molinism? Is there any coherence to it; biblical, philosophical and theological?
Hello Eirik,
Two of my papers are may be relevant for you.
The first is “Generic Open Theism and Some Varieties Thereof”, which was published in the journal Religious Studies sometime in 2008.
The second is “The Fivefold Openness of the Future”, which is currently unpublished, but is supposedly going to be a chapter in a book that Bill Hasker is putting together.
If you send me an email I can send you copies of both papers.
Best,
Alan
Regarding Molinism, while I don't think it faces any really tough biblical objections, I do think that it is philosophically and theologically very suspect. I can't go into all the reasons here. I refer you to Robert Adams' article “Molinism and the Problem of Evil” and to the many published discussions of the “grounding objection” by, among others, William Hasker and Linda Zagzebski.
In brief, positions like Molinism that advocate “meticulous providence” (God efficaciously ordains all events) have a tough time with the problem of evil. Moreover, Molinists have a tough time explaining how the “counterfactuals of creaturely freedom” their theory needs can be both (a) true prior to God's creative decree and (b) compatible with creaturely freedom.
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