Whenever someone says that something is relative–whether it be morality, truth, velocity, the color of emeralds, or what have you–you should always ask the question, “relative to what?” There are as many ways for something to be relative as there as ways to answer that question.
For example, some people think that morality (by which I mean a set of principles that determines what is right and wrong) is relative to cultures. Let’s call this ‘cultural moral relativism’. Others think morality is relative to individuals. Let’s call this ‘individual moral relativism’. In addition to these there are a host of other logically possible variants. For example, one might hold that morality is relative to the seasons of the year (‘seasonal moral relativism’) or to a particular geographical region (‘geographical moral relativism’) or to the square root of the current date on the Gregorian calendar (‘calendrical root moral relativism’) or to any criterion that yields different results in different contexts.
In general, whether S has property P is relative to criterion C if and only if (a) possibly, some S satisfy C and thus have property P, and (b) possibly, some S fail to satisfy C and thus fail to have property P. Conversely, whether S has P is not relative to C if and only if (c) necessarily, all S satisfy C and thus have P, or (d) necessarily, no S satisfy C and thus do not have P.
According to cultural moral relativism, some action is morally permissible in culture X if and only if that action is sanctioned by X’s moral standards. S is the action in question. P is the property of being morally permissible in X. And C is the property of being sanctioned by X’s moral standards.
Notice that we’ve expressed cultural moral relativism in terms of moral permissibility in X. But we can also express cultural moral relativism in terms of moral permissibility without reference to X. Thus, according to cultural moral relativism, some action is morally permissible simpliciter if and only if that action is performed in a culture the moral standards of which sanction the action. S is the action in question. P is the property of being morally permissible. And C is the property of being performed in a culture the moral standards of which sanction the action.
These two expressions of cultural moral relativism say the same thing. But the latter posits a criterion of moral permissibility, namely, the property of being performed in a culture the moral standards of which sanction the action, that is not culturally relative. In other words, cultural moral relativism affirms, as a non-relative truth, that all people morally ought to act in accordance with the moral standards of their culture. Since this is a culturally absolute moral principle, cultural moral relativism can be true if and only if some moral principles are not culturally relative.This means that cultural moral relativism is false as a global thesis about morality. If there are any moral principles at all, then at least one must not be culturally relative. The same holds mutatis mutandis for all other moral relativisms.
Hi Dr. Rhoda,
I followed your link from christianlogic. You might remember me because you thought I was condescending in a reply I wrote one of your post in the logic forum of Christianlogic. I assure you I did not intend anything condescending at all. The fact is I misread your post and was at fault there. You were nice enough forgive my tone, reply and set things straight. I enjoyed reading your blog, especially about moral realitivism. I was taught from the beginning that the point of morality is that it should apply universally. You remind me of One of my favorite philosophy professors Dr. Robert Hoffman who argued that moral realitivism runs into problems if we take other cultures into account. If a culture (that I will call it “R” now) that claims act x is permissible and another culture (that i will call the “Q”) that claims act x is impermissible. An independant observer would conclude that act x is both morally right and wrong simultaneously. This can not do and makes no sense to tell an independent observer that the same act is both right and wrong. What would be the point of having morals at all if that were true. I hope to read your blogs often as you write them. Thanks.
Hi logicalroy,
Nice to renew your acquaintance. I like your example about the independent observer. It reminds me of a related difficulty with cultural relativism. I’ll call it the “Bully Problem”.
Suppose we have two distinct cultures, A and B, each with their own distinctly different moral codes. Suppose further that culture A’s moral code says it’s OK to beat up and enslave other cultures. If cultural relativism is true, then what is culture B to say when A invades? If they say “What you’re doing is wrong?” culture A will just respond that that’s just culture’s B’s moral position, which carries no weight with respect to culture A.
In short, if you try to put it into practice, you’ll soon discover that moral relativism is completely ineffective at resolving moral conflicts.
Thanks for the input.
The article raises some interesting points; however, I do not see where it proves that all moral relativisms are self-refuting.
As I see it, a concept is self-refuting when it leads to contradiction, i. e. A and non-A can be inferred from it using correct rules of inference. Nowhere in the article it was shown that such property can be ascribed to all moral relativisms.
Concerning the supposed ineffectiveness of moral relativism in resolving moral conflicts, maybe you are right that moral relativism is ineffective; but it is not something we should be surprised about, as moral relativism is more of a descriptive than a normative theory (I am, however, aware of the fact that for the purposes of your article, you are dealing with the more normative kind of moral relativism).
On the other hand, I do not think that moral universalism is much better off in resolving moral conflicts. Let us suppose the situation in your example came about and culture A would apply moral universalism into practice. In that case its members would probably say to the invading members of B something like: „According to universal morales, what you are doing is morally wrong.“ What effect would such an utterance have? Members of B, I believe, would anyway claim that they do not accept the so-called „universal“ morales and that according to the morales of their culture, they are acting morally. In other words, they would behave exactly as if moral relativism was true (you see, this is precisely why moral relativism is a good descriptive theory).
If cultural relativism is false, how we are to get to know the „objective“ principles of morality?