Drange’s third argument (see here) claims that divine immutability, the idea that God is incapable of change in any sense, is incompatible with divine omniscience, the idea that God knows all and only truths. He argues as follows: The Immutability-vs.-Omniscience Argument If God exists, then he is immutable. If God exists, then he omniscient. An… Read More »
There’s an interesting discussion over at Bill Vallicella’s blog about the interaction between faith and reason and the importance of that to the vitality of Western culture. A comment by David Tye is especially illuminating: Athens as traditionally understood could have a conversation with Jerusalem because both Athens and Jerusalem agreed there was something to… Read More »
I teach a course on Critical Thinking each semester and we’re now getting into some formal logic – just scratching the surface, really. But each time I notice that some students catch on very quickly and just accept the principles as I lay them out; others catch on quickly but immediately want to challenge the… Read More »
Since I’m doing a series on incompatible property arguments against God’s existence, I thought it’d be appropo to link to a short discussion between two philosophers – one a theist, the other an atheist – on this issue.
The next several arguments that Drange presents (see here) turn on the idea of divine immutability, that God is incapable of change in any sense, and attempt to draw out a contradiction with other divine attributes. Here’s the first: The Immutability-vs.-Creation Argument If God exists, then he is immutable. If God exists, then he is… Read More »
Haven’t posted much in awhile, but I thought I would do a short series of posts on a group of “incompatible properties” arguments against theism delineated by Theodore Drange. He presents the arguments here. Basically, incompatible properties arguments against theism try to show that theism is false because the concept of God is in some… Read More »
In previous blog posts I’ve discussed two opposing tense logics: (a) Ockhamist and (b) Peircean. Ockhamist tense logic takes as its characteristic axiom the claim that (O) â–¡(∀p)(∀t)(∀u: u
In an earlier post, I explained the difference between the ‘Peircean’ and ‘Ockhamist’ systems of tense logic. Simply put, the Ockhamist construes the future tense-operator “will” to mean merely “happens subsequently to the time of the utterance”. Thus, if someone says of a completely indeterministic coin before it is tossed “it will land heads” and… Read More »
One form of the infamous Liar Paradox asks us to consider a person uttering the phrase “I am lying right now” and to determine if they are or are not lying. The paradox is supposed to emerge once one notices that if the person is lying then it follows that they are not lying, and… Read More »
Sorry, folks, about being absent from my blog for so long. I’m currently under a crunch-time of sorts regarding several different projects. Blogging for me is a spare-time thing, not an obsession, so when things get too hectic I have to take a break. And with this year’s philosophy job search fast approaching, posting will… Read More »