I’d like to take this idea out for a test drive. If actuality is the ontological delimiter of possibility (ODOP), what follows? Offhand, it conflicts with the idea that possibility is ontologically prior to actuality, an idea that might seem attractive given that the actual world is generally thought to be one of a vast… Read More »
The question may seem an odd one. If read as asking “Do there exist any objects that do not exist?” the answer is obviously No because the question presupposes a contradiction. But there is another way of reading the question that can be gotten at if we reflect on the relation between actuals, possibles that… Read More »
It is often claimed nowadays that “science”, by definition, can only invoke “natural” causes as explanations, where “natural” causes are restricted to entities or laws that will presumably find inclusion in a completed form of physics or to things that are either ontologically reducible to or strongly supervenient on such entities and laws. In short,… Read More »
I read Douglas Adams’ Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy series a few years ago. I found it hilariously funny overall, but by the time I got all the way to the end of the so-called “5-volume trilogy” it had become quite clear to me that Adams’ worldview is fundamentally nihilistic. In other words, existence is… Read More »
Sage thoughts from the Maverick Philosopher: Jesse Ventura: “Religion is for the weak!” Religionist: “No it’s not!” Such knee-jerk opposition avails nothing. Ventura is in fact right. What Ventura doesn’t appreciate, however, is that we are all weak. The correct response to Jesse the Body is not one of diametrical opposition but one of ju-jitsu-like… Read More »
Anyone who reads much philosophy will encounter a lot of Latin phrases. Leaving formal and informal fallacies out of it, the following are some of the most common. I have translated for the uninitiated. a fortiori – all the more so; e.g., if you can refute a more general or more plausible version of a… Read More »
In yesterday’s post I gave some background on the Intelligent Design (ID) debate and noted that an increasingly popular move by the mainstream scientific establishment has been to stipulate that “science” requires methodological naturalism. In other words, the claim is that properly “scientific” explanations can only make reference to ‘natural’ laws and entities, the kinds… Read More »
In the wake of a recent Pennsylvania court case there has been a lot of discussion about the scientific status (or lack thereof) of “Intelligent Design” (ID), an intellectual movement initially spearheaded by the works of Phillip Johnson and then picked up by Michael Behe, William Dembski, and a growing chorus of scientists, philosophers, and… Read More »
On a tip from hammsbear, I took a look at Peter Ludlow’s article, “Do T-Theories Display Senses”. Here are some of my thoughts on that article. Tarksi’s T-schema (“p” is true iff p) is often used to spell out the truth conditions for sentences. Thus, “snow is white” is true iff snow is white. (‘iff’… Read More »
I’m still reading Smith’s book (Language and Time), and I’ve noticed that Smith, along with everyone he’s critiqued thus far, makes an assumption about the truth conditions of sentence tokens that, frankly, seems false to me. First, let me explain what a sentence token is. Consider the sentence “It is raining” uttered on two separate… Read More »