In 2008 I published a paper called “Generic Open Theism and Some Varieties Thereof” (Religious Studies). My stated goal in that paper was to “facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists” by making precise what “minimal set of commitments any open theist, qua open theist, must affirm.” I thus advocated, and still advocate, for… Read More »
There’s a simple and valid argument for fatalism based on a proposition which most analytic philosophers would accept. The assumption is this There is an actual world, alpha, which contains a complete history. Unlike other merely possible worlds, alpha is the possible world that “obtains”. For the sake of argument I take this assumption for… Read More »
Theists believe that God is not only responsible for creating or bringing about (the initial state) of a world of concrete finite beings but also that God in some sense sustains those beings throughout their existence. But what does divine sustaining amount to? I’d like to identify three possible models of divine sustaining. continuous creation:… Read More »
By ‘Ockhamist semantics’ (‘Ockhamism’ for short) I mean the thesis that what’s true at a time about other times depends entirely on what occurs at those other times. Thus, if a coin is flipped at T and lands heads at T*, then Ockhamism implies that “The coin will land heads at T*” was true at… Read More »
Many discussions of logical fatalism and of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and future contingency turn on the question of whether propositions about future contingents are true in advance. More exactly, they raise questions about whether any ‘will’ or ‘does’ propositions about events which have an intermediate chance of occurring (i.e., a current single-case objective… Read More »
I’ve now finishing my re-reading of Trenton Merricks’ book Truth and Ontology and I’m still quite unconvinced by his contention that what’s true does not depend on what exists in any substantive way. A couple posts ago I noted my main reasons for dissatisfaction with Merricks’ arguments: He loads down truthmaker principles, which affirm a… Read More »
I’m really happy right now because a paper of mine (“Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence”) was just accepted at Religious Studies. In my experience, at least, the turnaround at that journal is phenomenally fast. This is the second paper I’ve submitted there. On both I received an acceptance notice within a week or less. I’ll… Read More »
I’ve recently been rereading Trenton Merrick’s book Truth and Ontology (Oxford, 2007) in which he argues against the substantive dependence of truth on being. Thus, he rejects theses like TM – Every truth has a truthmaker, a parcel of reality the existence of which necessitates, and thereby grounds, that truth. TSB – Truth supervenes on… Read More »
of 200+ living philosophers of religion.
In my two previous posts, I have explained the notion of ‘truth at a time’ and argued that for a (contingent) proposition to be true at T it must supervene upon what exists at T. In short, truth at T requires a truthmaker at T. A question that remains concerns accessibility relations among times. If… Read More »