As a follow-up to my previous post, I’d like to say a bit about how truth at a time and truth at a world relate to truth simpliciter. Unlike ‘truth at a world’ and ‘truth at a time’, truth simpliciter is not evaluated from the perspective of any given time or world, but absolutely. In… Read More »
In my previous post I made the following claim without argument: “for a proposition to be true now, what it represents as being the case must correspond to … what is the case now.” I’m now going to give that argument. Every argument for any categorical conclusion requires some categorical assumptions which are not defended… Read More »
The future is ‘alethically’ open at time T with respect to possible state of affairs X and future time T* > T if and only if neither “X will obtain at T*” nor “X will not obtain at T*” is true at T. I believe that the future is alethically open with respect to future… Read More »
I’ve been reflecting a bit about the following analogy proposed by Enigman: Given someone who knows that she can move freely anywhere within an infinitely dimensional space, does she know that she has complete freedom of motion? The problem is that such a space is isomorphic to a hyperspace containing such a space as a… Read More »
Vlastimil Vohánka send me an email recently asking for my thoughts on the following reconstruction of an argument recently proposed by Quentin Smith. 1. Necessarily, global moral realism is true (everything, or rather, every physical entity, has a positive amount of value). Premise2. Necessarily, aggregative value theory is true (each physical location has a finite… Read More »
As I note in a comment on my previous post, I have a strong intuition that there should be some sort of systematic connection between assertibility-conditions and truth-conditions. The source of that intuition, I think, stems from the Principle of Charity, which states that, so long as it is contextually plausible to do so, one… Read More »
Thesis: Whatever anyone must believe in order rationally to assert a proposition p is part of the meaning of p. Obvious case: One cannot rationally assert p unless one believes that p. If the thesis is right, then it provides a test for whether a given proposition q is part of the meaning of p.… Read More »
I’v just read an interesting paper on Enigman’s website entitled “Omniscience and the Odyssey Theodicy”. At one point in the paper, he employs Patrick Grim’s well-known Cantorian argument against omniscience to argue for open theism over against an essentially epistemically static (EES) deity (my term, not his). The argument is intriguing. According to set theory,… Read More »
This is an insightful interview with author and sociologist Tom Wolfe. He discusses a variety of topics including political correctness, coed dorms, and feminism. The general theme is that many people and institutions today are too concerned with ephemeral goods like social status, and for the sake of them sacrifice timeless goods like courage, temperance,… Read More »
In philosophical discussions, and especially in philosophy of religion, the term “incompatibilism” comes up in wide variety of contexts. I’ve discerned five different types of incompatibilism. Moral incompatibilism: The thesis that human moral responsibility is incompatible with thoroughgoing causal determinism. Ontic incompatibilism: The thesis that foreexistence is incompatible with future contingency. More precisely, the thesis… Read More »