I’m currently reading Quentin Smith’s book Language and Time, in chapter 1 of which he has a nice argument against a certain kind of skepticism (pp. 14-18). His argument runs as follows.
Is it ever reasonable for you to believe something just because it seems true to you and, so far as you are aware, there are no good empirical, logical, or other relevant reasons to disbelieve it? Well, suppose there is a skeptic who says No, seeming is never sufficient grounds for believing. Such a skeptic proposes:
(1) Even if it seems to S that p and S has no reasons (empirical, logical, or other) to disbelieve p, S is not justified in believing p.
Now, asks Smith, what could possibly justify a belief in (1)? Suppose we grant the skeptic that there are no empirical, logical, or other reasons to disbelieve in (1). Obviously, the skeptic cannot justify (1) on the grounds that it seems right to him, since (1) disallows that move. So the skeptic needs to give positive empirical, logical, or other reasons to show that (1) is true. Call these reasons R.
Now, what justification could there be for thinking that R supports (1)? Again, given (1) it can’t be that R seems to support (1). So we need further reasons, R’, for believing that R supports (1). But now why should we think that R’ supports the claim that R supports (1). Again, given (1) it can’t be that R’ seems to support that claim. So that claim has to be justified by appeal to still further reasons, R”, and so on. An infinite regress ensues. And the regress is vicious since, as a finite mind, the skeptic “cannot comprehend an infinite number of steps in a chain of alleged justifications” (p. 17). Even if he could, says Smith, the skeptic would still not be justified in believing (1) because he would have no justification for believing that the infinite chain justifies (1). A skeptic who appeals to a principle like (1) is, therefore, hoist on his own petard. If (1) is true, then no one (including the skeptic), could be justified in believing it to be true.
The moral of the story: (1) is false. It’s seeming to S that p is, in the absence of S’s possession of reasons for believing the contrary, sufficient to justify S’s believing that p.
Hey, that book’s on my wish list.
I found QS’s web site via Ludlow’s:
http://www.qsmithwmu.com/
Good articles on time there.
Nice blog, professor.
Hi hammsbear,
Yeah, Smith has an interesting site. I’m not too keen on his artwork (though it’s far better than anything I could do), but he’s definitely a first-rate philosopher.
I got lost in this argument. I understand (1) and how the skeptic cannot justify (1) on the grounds it seems right to him. Then he says that the reasons to believe (1) will be called R. But then he says, “what justification could there be for thinking that R supports p?”
But ‘p’ is within (1) and R are the reasons to believe (1) not p which is contained in (1). See what I’m saying?
Shouldn’t he have said, “Now, what justification could there be for thinking that R supports (1)?”
I understand the infinite regress and have some ideas on that but that’s another issue. I’m just confused by him referring R to p when it appears R supports (1) and not p. In fact (1) is about how we can’t believe p and so R supporting (1) doesn’t support p.
You think he just made a type and that everywhere he says “R supports p”, he really means “R supports (1)”?
Your question’s a good one, hammsbear, and it’s my bad. In the process of putting Smith’s argument in my own terms, I got some of the symbols crossed. I’m going to edit the post to fix the problem. Thanks for the sharp eye.