My recent post on the problem of evil stirred up quite a bit of discussion. One issue that I brushed over in my post, but which came up repeatedly in the comments, was that theism is no better than atheistic materialism at explaining how there can be objective moral standards due to the infamous “Euthyphro Dilemma” (ED).
Before getting to ED, however, let me state more explicitly why I think materialism has a problem grounding objective morality. It has to do with the peculiar nature of foundational moral principles (FMP’s). (1) FMP’s are necessary truths. (2) FMP’s are substantive truths that describe general ideals. (3) The ground of these truths is not plausibly identified with anything physical.
Consider (1). Could there be a possible world in which it was morally permissible to torture babies to death for fun? If there is no such possible world, then the rule is necessary. Suppose for the moment that there is such a world. The only way in which it could be morally permissible to torture a baby to death for fun would be if that moral rule was trumped by a more fundamental moral rule. Now consider that rule: Is there any possible world in which exceptions to it are morally justified? If so, then they are justified by a still more fundamental moral rule. And so on. If we follow the analysis out, we’ll eventually arrive at FMP’s that are binding in all possible situations without exception. These FMP’s must, therefore, be necessary truths.
Consider (2). Even though FMP’s are necessary truths, they are not trivial tautologies like “A horse is a horse” (Of course! Of course!) or “If triangles have three sides then triangles have three sides”. Instead, they are substantive truths because they pertain to how things categorically ought to be. In other words, they reflect ultimate, objective ideals. To assert a true FMP is to say that there exists a moral standard that is unequivocally and intrinsically good. By (1), this standard exists in all possible worlds.
Now, consider (3). As far as we can tell the physical world is not necessary. If the physical world is not necessary, then the intrinsically good standards grounding FMP’s cannot be physical, nor can they supervene on the physical or be dependent on the physical in any essential way. Nor is the physical world in any obvious way a normative ideal. The only aspects of the physical world that it is even remotely plausible to think of as necessary are general and pervasive (space, time, causality, energy, gravitational fields, etc.). And none of those seems to be anything like a normative ideal.
As a result of (1)-(3), it seems quite clear to me that materialism has no obvious answer to the question of where objective moral standards come from. Theism, on the other hand, does seem to have a ready-made answer. For theists believe that God is a necessary being who intrinsically and essentially exemplifies to the highest degree all pure perfections. If such a being exists, then we have a necessarily existing, unequivocally good Ideal.
“Not so fast,” the atheist chimes in. What about the Euthyphro Dilemma (ED)? Doesn’t this show that God is of no use when it comes to grounding morality? If so, then aren’t the materialist and the theist in the same boat as far as this issue is concerned?
Well, let’s consider the matter. The so-called “Euthyphro Dilemma” derives from Plato’s early dialogue, Euthyphro, in which Plato depicts a conversation between Socrates, then on his way to trial for impiety (two of the charges against him were denying the gods of the city and introducing new gods), and Euthyphro, a professional religious expert who considers himself an expert on matters pertaining to piety. Never one to pass up an opportunity to engage in philosophical dialogue, Socrates questions Euthyphro about the nature of piety. One of the proposals that Euthyphro makes is that piety is “what all the gods love”. This, then, prompts Socrates to ask whether the gods love pious things because they are pious, or whether pious things are pious because the gods love them. The question is easily adapted to the theistic proposal on the grounding of morality:
(ED) Is God moral because he wills what is moral, or are moral things moral because God wills them?
ED asks for clarification on the relation between God and ultimate moral standards, and it poses a dilemma. If the theist takes the first option, then it looks like the ultimate ground of morality must lie outside of God. But then it seems that one could just bypass theism as far as the grounding of morality is concerned. If, however, the theist takes the second option, then morality looks to be arbitrarily dependent on God’s will. And isn’t that inconsistent with the necessary and thus non-arbitrary nature of morality as described above under (1)? Either way, then, it seems like theism does not provide a ground for morality.
There is a standard theistic answer to this dilemma, however. Notice that both halves of the question presuppose that either God or moral ideals must be explanatorily prior to the other. This is an assumption that theists reject. They believe that God intrinsically and essentially exemplifies all pure perfections to the highest possible degree. In other words, theists hold that God by nature is the ultimate moral ideal. As one biblical author puts it, God is love (1 John 4). (Indeed, love is arguably God’s chief attribute; his other main attributes being corollaries of that one.) In any case, by rejecting the assumption that either God or moral ideals must be explanatorily prior to the other the theist effectively neutralizes the Euthyphro Dilemma.
I should make one more point before closing. Suppose we ask what makes God good? To ask that is to suppose that there is something distinct from God (a property, say) that makes him good. This the theist should deny. God is not good because he exemplifies something distinct from himself; rather, God is the Good, goodness itself in its concrete fullness. (Note: ‘goodness’ here does not denote an abstract entity.) If it be charged that this makes the concept of ‘goodness’ vacuous or unacceptably mysterious, I would point out that in order to pose the metaphysical question “What is the ground of moral goodness?” in the first place we must already have a pretheoretical understanding of what ‘goodness’ means, however vague and imperfect that understanding may be. To suppose, then, that the theistic answer somehow renders the notion of ‘goodness’ vacuous is to confuse the metaphysical question with an epistemic one (viz., “How do we know that our pretheoretical understanding of moral goodness is accurate?”).
Dr Rhoda,
How do you respond to the skeptic who questions the axiom that morality can be, or need be, objectively grounded in the first place?
Perhaps the sense that this is so is only indicative of the strength of our evolved moral intuition.
Hi Malcolm,
Good question. I would answer it by appealing to general truthmaker considerations. Independently of any specific issues about morality, there is a widespread and deep seated intuition that many people have (including, I believe, most philosophers) that truth supervenes on being. This seems to be the intuition that drives the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, for example, it’s hard to see how it could be objectively true that, say, “I am sitting in my office right now” unless reality is indeed such that I am sitting in my office. Mutatis mutandis for other truths.
Now, to my mind, to admit that morality is objective, is to admit that there are objective moral truths. If truths in general require truthmakers, then so do moral truths.
There are those who argue for exceptions to the truthmaker principle, but I know of no one who argues that moral truths, simply qua moral, constitute an exception. It is much more common to reject moral objectivism (and the commitment to moral truths), than it is to accept moral objectivism and deny that such truths have any metaphysical grounding.
Hi Alan,
Thanks for your thoughtful response, which answers the question for the case of belief in moral objectivity.
How, though, would you respond to those who are entirely untroubled by the rejection of moral objectivism? Many feel that our evolved moral intuitions – which have explicable adaptive reasons for being what they are – are all that there is (which is not to say that we mightn’t refine them as needed, as has plainly happened over recent centuries).
Mr. Pollack,
I am afraid that I am being a bit presumptuous by interjecting myself into this discussion, but your question is one that fascinates me. I have been toying with your question in my mind for some time now. But I have been stuck on one particular problem: I cannot conceive of an imaginary rational (i.e he tries not to hold contradictory beliefs) person who believes in moral relativism, much a real rational person.
For example, let us imagine that there is a Man who believes that having multiple wives is good thing in one situation and a bad thing in another. Let us say that he believes that it is a good thing where war has changed the balance between males and females. Let us say that he thinks that it is a bad thing where the balance between males and females is equal. Let us say that this man is rational (using the definition above). So let us say that he unifies his contradictory positions by saying that multiple wives are good in the one situation because it promotes social stability and bad in the other because it harms social stability.
Is this man a moral relativist? Some people would say yes. But I would say no because the man is entirely consistent in what he values. He always values social stability; it is just the means of archiving that value that change. To my mind, what you value=your morals.
Let us take an even more extreme case. Let us say that there is a totally selfish man. Let us say he makes moral judgments based entirely on what please himself. Is this man relativistic? Again, I would say no. He is entirely consistent in what he values.
It seems to me Mr. Pollack, that your very question presumes an objective morality. For you say “Many feel that our evolved moral intuitions – which have explicable adaptive reasons for being what they are – are all that there is (which is not to say that we mightn’t refine them as needed, as has plainly happened over recent centuries)” your are implying a constant set of values. For otherwise your use of the word “needed” would have no meaning.
Hi, chieftain,
For example, let us imagine that there is a Man who believes that having multiple wives is good thing in one situation and a bad thing in another. Let us say that he believes that it is a good thing where war has changed the balance between males and females.
That’s not really a description of moral relativism, but rather of moral situationalism. The Man may hold that it is objectively moral to have multiple wives in one situation, and objectively immoral in another. Everybody does this sort of thing. I think it’s morally acceptable to swing an axe when there’s a tree in front of me, but immoral to swing an axe when there’s a person in front of me, for instance.
Moral relativism would say that while Man A might think it’s moral to have multiple wives in situation S, and Man B might think that it’s immoral to have multiple wives in that same situation S, neither is actually correct, and there is no objective fact of the matter about whether it’s right or wrong. Or another way of putting it is that moral relativism holds that morality is an illusion, and that in reality there are only preferences and will to power.
For the person who accepts that, the response is that morality, like truth and norms of rational thought, is normative, and known through our intuitions. So any rationale or account someone gives to show that morality is relative (in the sense just given) applies with equal weight to truth and the norms of rationality, so that if they accept their rationale for one, they are obligated to apply and accept it for the others. For the person who actually accepts that and takes it seriously (like, say, Nietzsche), there’s nothing you can do for them, except wait for them to go insane.
Deuce,
That was a nicer response then I expected for a comment that was poorly written. I wrote that thing when I was dead tired and I have been regretting it all day.
But I would like to point out that you basically said the same thing that I was trying to get at. Only I was not content with simply trying to say it, I also wanted to shift the terms of the debate. Between being tired and being overly ambitious, I had something of a train wreck.
The reason I wanted to shift the terms of the debate was that I thought that Mr. Rhoda set himself up in a weak position. I don’t think he should have said that the problem of evil was a problem for everyone. I think that phrasing the problem that way just leads to a debate over semantics.
I would argue that it is better to say that the problem of authority is a problem for everyone.
After all, the only reason that Christians have the so called problem with evil is that they make authoritative statements about God. They sayâŠ
(a) God is the source of everything.
(b) God is good and nothing bad comes from him.
(c) Some things God utterly rejects as being evil.
It is child’s play to find logical inconsistencies in the above statements. But any rational argument that tries to define things and make predictions from those definitions will fall prey to same problems that afflict Christians. Gödel proved that mathematically.
Thus, Atheists are only giving Christians a stick to beat them with when they say that a Christian’s beliefs about God should be rejected because of logical inconsistency. All one has to do is set up their authoritative statements against each other and you find the same kinds of problems (from a purely logical standpoint anyway) as those that afflict the Christians.
I don’t think that this is too much different from what Mr. Rhoda was trying to say. But it saves running down all those rabbit trails if you avoid using the word evil and focus on the problem of authoritative statements instead.
I doubt I am making any more sense then I did last night so I will stop digging my hole any deeper. I really can’t write well on philosophical matters in under 30 pages and I certainly can’t do it after a good day’s work.
Chieftain,
No, I do not presume an objective morality; in fact I am extremely doubtful that such a basis exists, other than the objective adaptive advantage that our evolved moral intuitions may confer.
Perhaps my use of the word “needed” was inapt. It might have been better to have said:
“Many feel that our evolved moral intuitions – which have explicable adaptive reasons for being what they are – are all that there is (which is not to say that we mightn’t refine them as our cultural framework itself evolves, as has plainly happened over recent centuries).”
Deuce, I think you offer a good description of what moral relativism means. But even if there is no objective bedrock upon which moral systems may stand, and even though – despite the fact that researchers have found that all cultures share a great many moral intuitions – others may live by different moral standards, that in no way means that we must abandon our own sense of what is right. Such choices are entirely up to us, and I think it is time for us to begin to accept responsibility for our own moral decisions, rather than insisting that they must be given to us from on high.
Mr. Pollack,
I understood that you thought that the words “objective morality” did not apply to you. What I did question is whether that was in fact the case.
True, you don’t believe in a god. But you still judge other people and are willing to prosecute other people for evil acts are you not? Or would you give Hitler a pass because his ideas of how to advance the species were different from your own. Would you really say that both you and Hitler are moral in your own way?
Your very statement that “I think it is time for us to begin to accept responsibility for our own moral decisions, rather than insisting that they must be given to us from on high” presumes a value standard that we should all be judged by.
To take this argument out of the realm of an “objective morality,” let us say that there is philosopher who argues convincingly that there is no such thing as an objective reality. Let us say that this same philosopher argues that your idea of what reality is like cannot possible be true. How can the philosopher argue that you are wrong if he also argues that there is nothing objective about reality?
Every person who argues for moral relativism that I have ever encountered has a similar type of problem. They simultaneously argue that there is no objective morality and that you are wrong to judge people by a morality that you dare to presume is objective.
If there is no objective morality, how can it be wrong to judge someone in whatever manner you please?
Mr. Pollack,
“No, I do not presume an objective morality; in fact I am extremely doubtful that such a basis exists, other than the objective adaptive advantage that our evolved moral intuitions may confer.”
So then you don’t use the problem of evil argument or think it’s a good weapon in the atheologian’s hand?
~PM
Chieftain,
It is one thing to say that I am willing to judge according to the moral standard that I think is correct, and quite another to insist that said standard must somehow be grounded in eternal, objective bedrock. I most certainly would not give Hitler a pass; I think, like most other people, that what he did was utterly abominable. That’s good enough for me. I don’t need absolute objectivity to judge the nasty behavior of others; my subjective sense of right and wrong is ample. You may have a different view of what is and isn’t moral, of course; that’s just the way the world is, and while I can’t prove that yours is wrong and mine is right, that still doesn’t mean I have to give up my own moral code.
Paul,
The problem-of-evil argument still has some force for the atheist, because even if morality is not to be grounded in absolute objectivity, that doesn’t mean that there isn’t much in the world that still seems evil and awful by our own subjective and innate sense of morality. Regardless of whether torturing babies is objectively evil, it still feels wrong to us, and it certainly seems odd that any God would permit it.
The problem-of-evil argument still gives theists fits because for them, of course, they have to squre it with some objective model of morality. But for the atheist, even if it falls short of a rigorous and compelling philosophical proof, it’s still another reason not to bother with belief in God at all.
Malcolm,
So the problem of evil argument for atheists who are not moral realists is that God’s existence is problematic because of our subjective opinions? So, the atheist problem of evil argument shouldn’t give theists cause for worry, then?
For the theist, it’s not a problem if they accept what Michael Martin might refer to as “extended theism.
At any rate, I don’t know why a *subjective* reason would allow for the atheist not to bother with the *obejctive* existence of something. My son doesn’t like vegatables, but I don’t think that should be “another reason not to bother with belief in [vegatables] at all.”
~PM
Hi Paul,
Yes, for an atheist who doesn’t see the need for an objective grounding of morality, the problem-of-evil argument against the existence of God would be something like:
“I find it hard to see why, if there is a God, He would permit the innocent to suffer so, and to allow so many wicked people to do so many awful things.”
While it may be that there are those who manage to justify, to their own satisfaction, such cruel behavior, it still runs counter to my own moral intuitions, and serves, for me – regardless of whether or not there is any “objective” basis for those intuitions, beyond their explicable adaptive value – as another reason to doubt the existence of God: not with the force of proof of God’s nonexistence, but reasons for doubt don’t require such force. It is hardly necessary for me to mount a compelling philosophical proof that torturing babies is objectively evil in all possible worlds, etc., in order to to be informed by my own moral sense, and to live a life that is moral according to that intuition.
The evidence for the existence of vegetables is of a different order altogether, as there are many compelling reasons to accept that they have an objective existence – they are ordinary objects that can be photographed, weighed, eaten, and so forth. The alleged objective foundation of morality is, by comparison, a vaporous abstraction.
If you’re interested, I offered a different approach to reconciling ED with theism a while back.
Hi Malcolm,
I don’t see how your argument from evil gives you “reasons for doubt” unless you think that *this* argument, by parity, also provides you with “reasons to doubt” the existence of God. The argument the existence of God would be something like this:
{Assumption: God’s favorite color is red and Mallcolm’s is blue}
“I find it hard to see why, if there is a God, he would like the color red and all so many things to be red-colored.”
Second, to say that I justify “cruel behavior” is begging the question. The cruelity, or lack thereof, of God’s behavior is in dispute.
A successful POE argument must be an internal critique, or else you beg the question. A successful POE argument must also take the existence of evil seriously, not like a matter of subjective likes and dislikes. If you drop the existence of real evil but want to claim that the theist has a problem of evil given that he believes evil is real, I find no reason to accept this claim. Given the totality of my worldview, there are no gratuitous evils. Michael Martin calls this “extended theism.”
And so I’ll still have to conclude that your position renders you without the use of a POE argument. Unless, of course, you think God’s liking red over blue is likewise a reason to doubt his existence?
Paul,
I think you are missing the point here. I’m not attempting to mount a knockdown argument against the existence of God based on the existence of evil in the world. I agree that if morality is not philosophically objective – meaning that we might have different views about what is evil and what isn’t – then there is no way that such an argument can be universally compelling. Anyone might just look around and say “What evil? I don’t see any evil around here.”
My point is that for those who look around them and do consider much of what they see to be evil (in their own subjective opinion), and given also that we consider evil to be, by definition, abhorrent, then it is perfectly reasonable for such a person – regardless of truth or falsity of evil’s alleged objectivity – to doubt the existence of (or at least to consider unworthy of worship) a God that would permit such things.
And the empirical fact of the matter is that most of us do look around and see much that is evil, because nearly all humans do indeed share a general moral intuition. You may say that cruelty is what is “in dispute”, but really, most people will agree on what is cruel and what isn’t, because of that shared moral heritage. Some may not, but that has no bearing on the force the POE exerts on those who do. That fact that God permits things that are repugnant to me is sufficient to weaken my own confidence in God’s alleged existence. If that argument is insufficient to convince everyone, with the force of a philosophical proof, well, that’s just the way things are in the real world.
I see the point you are trying to make with the color argument, but the analogy is imperfect, in an important way. What color God may prefer is a very different matter, because we attach no normative assertions to color preference, in sharp contrast to the way we regard doing good vs. doing evil.
>>…there is something distinct from God (a property, say) that makes him good. This the theist should deny.
I disagree. For example, consider the Psalmistâs declaration that “The Lord is gracious and compassionate, slow to anger and abounding in kindness. The Lord is good to all, and His mercy is upon all His works” (Psalm 145:8-9). In order for the praise expressed here to be intelligible, graciousness, compassion, goodness, and mercy must have some meaning besides for “that which God is.”
I’m far more comfortable maintaining that God perfectly embodies goodness, rather than saying God is goodness per se.
Hi Malcolm,
I don’t think you’re trying to offer a knock down argument, but I think you may be missing my point. Giving up any objective basis for morality, i.e., opting for moral anti-realism, leaves you unable to mount an external critique from the PoE against God (or, Christian theism). Rather, if you still intend to use a PoE argument, it must be an internal one. But I’ve never seen a successful internal argument from evil against Christian theism, except, perhaps, Arminianism.
Anyway, back to my point:
Mushrooms are “repugnant to me” and so should I argue that “this gives me a good reason to doubt God’s existence? Why would he make such horrid tasting things! Doesn’t he know how much I abhor mushrooms?”
Now, you attempt to avoid the reductio (and the triviality of your PoE) by claiming that “we attach” normative assertions to morality but not to color preference (or, mushroom preference!).
First, it is not the case that everyone attaches normativity to their ethical claims. Indeed, normativity itself is hotly disputed. Indeed(!), norms seem to be problematic in a physicalist worldview. And, why given the subjectivity of morality ought I do the things you think moral? But I digress.
At any rate, the norms attached are subjectively attached. And so why could someone not do this with the shrooms? Indeed, we do this all the time (i.e., attach normative claims to things).
We often subjectively evaluate things: “Orange looks good on you.” “Mushrooms are gross.” “That table looks better over here than over there.” “Vanilla ice cream is the best.” etc.
And so why can’t people who hate orange, mushrooms, tables under windows, and vanilla ice cream, all use this as “reasons” to doubt the existence of God? What if you “abhor,” and find “repugnant,” the smell and taste and texture of mushrooms. Indeed, you hate it so much that to have to eat it at a dinner party almost causes you to gag. Should I walk away from that party and “doubt God’s existence?”
And, who are you to say that your subjective dislike of child rape is a better subjective reason to doubt God’s existence than my subjective dislike of mushrooms?
Finally, you say that you do look around and see much evil. But why is it evil? Just because you’ve subjectively chosen to call it such. Could we, on your worldview, have evolved to love little children? Would then sex between adults be morally evil? Or, does society determine what we subjectively call evil? Could society in the future call child molestation not evil? Would you then use sex between consenting adults as a “reason to doubt God’s existence?”
No, I’m afraid that giving up any objective basis for morality you must likewise give up any external PoE. I mean, maybe God subjectively likes to do all those “evil” things. From his perspective what he does is not evil. From yours, he is. I mean, are there things other countries do that you consider morally wrong but they do not? Are you prejudice against other cultures for what they subjectively desire to do? If not, why treat God different? Some people think homosexuality is wrong, some do not. Is anyone right according to you? No. So, how’s it different with God?
I think you just need to opt for internal critiques against God. That God does things you don’t subjectively like isn’t a reason to doubt his existence. If so, Maybe I’ll doubt Neroâs existence. He was “evil” and did all sorts of atrocious things (though in his case we could easily show the evil was gratuitous). I could deny his existence, claim historians made him up. Claim that ancient people made him up. Claim that he’s a psychological projection. And the list goes on. Therefore, since Nero did things we don’t subjectively like, does this mean that we could “doubt his existence,” and be rational in doing so?
Hi Paul,
Taking a step back, letâs review what it is, exactly, that we are disagreeing about. My original comments were in support of the view, pace Dr. Rhoda, that one need not believe in an objective basis for morals in order to live a morally informed life. Iâm not sure where you stand on that point, but my view is that we live according to a set of moral intuitions and skills that are both built-in and learned, and that the metaphysical fact of the matter regarding the ultimate basis of morality – which is, given that we and others are continue to argue about it with no resolution, still an open question, and may always be â need have no bearing on how we live our lives.
But the question that you seem more concerned with is what bearing the truth or falsity of moral realism may have on the âproblem of evilâ argument, and on whether that argument makes it reasonable for anyone, particularly atheists, to doubt the existence of God.
I suggested that an atheist, contemplating this issue, might quite simply say: âI find it hard to see why, if there is a God, he would permit the innocent to suffer so, and would allow so many wicked people to do so many awful things.â There is nothing in this that depends on the unknowable âfact of the matterâ regarding the objective truth of moral realism; although it is, for the atheist (or the agnostic), an âexternal critiqueâ, it is exactly the same question that a theist might ask. Regardless of the ultimate source of our moral intuitions, we have them nonetheless, and they are what inform our actions, our judgments, and our doubts. Both the atheist and the theist alike, contemplating Godâs relation to the world, may be equally troubled by the prevalence of that which they regard as abhorrently evil; it doesnât matter at all to me whether I abhor torturing children because I have simply evolved to feel that way, or because it is intrinsically abhorrent in some extended metaphysical way â the result is the same, namely that it is difficult for me to imagine how a Divine Creator who is allegedly perfect in goodness and mercy would allow such suffering.
You wrote:
âGiving up any objective basis for morality, i.e., opting for moral anti-realism, leaves you unable to mount an external critique from the PoE against God (or, Christian theism).â
You offer as an example that one might find mushrooms as repugnant as evil, and if so, one might use that, too, as a basis for doubting Godâs existence. Because mushrooms are only subjectively distasteful, you argue, we might as well use them as the basis for our doubts about God as any subjective misgivings we may have about torturing children.
You ask:
â⊠who are you to say that your subjective dislike of child rape is a better subjective reason to doubt God’s existence than my subjective dislike of mushrooms?â
The answer, of course, is that Iâm not saying that my dislike of child rape is necessarily a better reason to doubt Godâs existence, for you.
As far as I am concerned, I rather routinely expect that there will be things that will be unpleasant to eat, and I wouldnât really hold their existence against God. My moral sense, on the other hand â wherever it comes from – impels me to find the notion of raping children intensely repugnant. If God is supposed to be perfectly good, all-powerful, and perfectly merciful, then for anyone who encounters such evil in the world, it is hard to understand why he would allow it, and an alternative model â one in which there simply is no God â might begin to seem a more parsimonious account.
But if you, on the other hand, believe that Godâs perfect goodness should manifest itself in such a way that bad-tasting foods are a reason to doubt his existence, or to consider him unworthy of worship (you might even, for all I know, mount an argument that our sense of the flavors of foods must have an objective basis, and call your position âgustatory realismâ), then I suppose youâre welcome to take that position.
In other words, as I said before, given that I think that morality is not objectively grounded, I realize that you or anyone else might not share my views of what is moral or what isnât. This doesn’t mean, however, that we must abandon our own moral intuitions. If I see you torturing children, I am not going to bother about whether you think it’s morally justifiable or not. I think it isn’t, and I’m going to stop you. You may consider my interference unjust; that’s just too bad. We live in a world of such conflict precisely because morality is not objective.
You wrote:
âFinally, you say that you do look around and see much evil. But why is it evil? Just because you’ve subjectively chosen to call it such. Could we, on your worldview, have evolved to love little children? Would then sex between adults be morally evil? Or, does society determine what we subjectively call evil? Could society in the future call child molestation not evil? Would you then use sex between consenting adults as a “reason to doubt God’s existence?”
No, I’m afraid that giving up any objective basis for morality you must likewise give up any external PoE. I mean, maybe God subjectively likes to do all those “evil” things. From his perspective what he does is not evil. From yours, he is. I mean, are there things other countries do that you consider morally wrong but they do not? Are you prejudice against other cultures for what they subjectively desire to do? If not, why treat God different? Some people think homosexuality is wrong, some do not. Is anyone right according to you? No. So, how’s it different with God?â
You are entirely misunderstanding the point here. I see evil, and I call it evil, because it arouses in me an intuitive moral revulsion. Thatâs all. The same happens in all of us, although some of us may imagine that the intuition is based in some metaphysically objective foundation, God for example. It may indeed be so, and it may not; I think not, but the intuition is equally strong in either case.
You ask if we might we have evolved to love (I assume you mean sexually) little children? As a purely logical possibility, I suppose so, but it is hard to see how such behavior would have been selected for. Had it been so, though, then I suppose our moral intuitions might indeed have been different.
You ask if society determines what we call evil. Of course it does; we see it happening all the time. Two hundred years ago, the subjugation of other humans as slaves was regarded as morally unobjectionable; now it is considered unambiguously evil. And if we are thinking of looking to Scripture as a moral compass, there is much in the Bible that would get you in a good deal of trouble today. Stoned an adulteress lately?
If morality is based in objective, eternal standards, why is it so mutable? Why do we disagree about so much of it, as we do with the other cultures you allude to? If morality must flow, objectively, from God, then why does it vary so locally, both in time and place?
You suggested also that âmaybe now Iâll doubt Neroâs existence.â You are welcome to, of course, but this example has no bearing whatsoever on the question at hand, simply because nobody is suggesting that Nero is the source of our moral intuition, or is the all-powerful Creator of the world, with a responsibility for its contents.
Finally, there was this:
âFirst, it is not the case that everyone attaches normativity to their ethical claims. Indeed, normativity itself is hotly disputed. Indeed(!), norms seem to be problematic in a physicalist worldview. And, why given the subjectivity of morality ought I do the things you think moral? But I digress.â
Well, itâs rather a stretch to imagine that ethics is free of normative assertions, when ethics concerns itself entirely with what should guide us as we try to choose between right and wrong. Take the âoughtsâ out of ethics, and you havenât much left.
So why, you ask, given the subjectivity of morality, ought you do the things I think moral? For you, perhaps no reason at all, obviously. (As I said, people do indeed disagree about right and wrong, which is a good reason to doubt that morality is objective.) For me, itâs really quite simple. The reason that I think you ought to do them is that I think they are the right thing to do.
Paul,
One last thing that I see I passed over above. You asked:
“Are you prejudice[d] against other cultures for what they subjectively desire to do? If not, why treat God different? Some people think homosexuality is wrong, some do not. Is anyone right according to you? No. So, how’s it different with God?â
You don’t seem to understand my position at all. As I’ve said, the possibility that moral realism may be false does not mean that I am under any compulsion to abandon my own moral intuitions. Am I “prejudiced against other cultures for what they subjectively decide to do?” You bet I am. For example, I consider cultures that treat women as chattel, mutilate their genitals, and deny them education, to be worthy of the deepest contempt. By my lights, such behavior is morally wrong. As you say, “so how’s it different with God?” Well, quite right, it isn’t; just as permitting such behavior prejudices me against another culture, so would it prejudice me against God. There is one important distinction to be made, though: other cultures are just other people, as was Nero. We know them unambiguously to exist, and we also ascribe to them no supernatural properties or powers. God is in another category, however: he is claimed to be an invisible, all-powerful agent, who Created all that there is, and from whom all goodness is imagined to flow. The idea that such a being would permit such horrors in the world, however, seems inconsistent with what he is claimed to be, and quite reasonably prejudices me against believing in or worshipping him, especially when there are other explanatory models to embrace.
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Hi Malcolm,
As I take a step back with you I note that you expressed agnosticism regarding “where I stand” on the point that, allegedly, Dr. Rhoda made – which was, “that one need believe in an objective basis for morals in order to live a morally informed life.” You held the contrary: “that one need not believe in an objective basis for morals in order to live a morally informed life.”
I suppose I could give you my brief answer here:
1) I doubt Dr. Rhoda is of the opinion (though he may correct me if I presume too much!) that a person S needs to believe in an objective basis for morality in order for S to be moral. I have the suspicion that Dr. Rhoda would hold to something like what Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov said, “Without God (or, an objective basis for morality) everything is permitted.”
2) And (1) provides insight into my position. I believe that there are moral atheists and immoral theists (and vice versa!). I believe that one can believe that in morality, “anything goes,” and this person can be a fine, upstanding moral citizen. So, you can be moral. But without an objective standard you cannot condemn or praise other’s (im)moral actions in any interesting way. At best, it’s rather like condemning someone for not liking chocolate ice cream.
Now, as far as our discussion goes, you’re quite right that I have questioned whether you have a problem of evil argument (a staple in the atheist’s diet of devouring theists). To be more precise, I have specifically said that your position of moral subjectivism means that you must give up any external critique of Christianity. I have admitted that all is not lost for the atheologian, you still have the option of mounting an internal critique. But, and I find support in Michael Martin, I can’t see an internal critique penetrating the defenses of Christian theism (at least my version of it! Needles to say, the Calvinist tradition does have a fine pedigree going back for quite some time, and so it’s not an ad hoc position).
Now you seem to disagree here (for some odd reason!). You want us to believe that you can mount an external critique. Thus you claim,
“I suggested that an atheist, contemplating this issue, might quite simply say: âI find it hard to see why, if there is a God, he would permit the innocent to suffer so, and would allow so many wicked people to do so many awful things … [this] is, for the atheist (or the agnostic), an âexternal critiqueâ…”
But as ethicist (and non-theist) Russ Shaefer-Landau has pointed out,
“We don’t need objective morality to level an internal critique… [b]ut don’t we ever wants to criticize the ultimate commitments themselves? For this we need an external critique. …If these [ultimate commitments] can ever be misguided – not just according to me, or my culture, but misguided period – then (so long as there are any correct moral standards at all) there must be some objective morality that reveals error.” (Landeau, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil, Oxford, p.16-17)
And so I’m afraid that you might not fully understand what an external critique is, Mr. Pollack. It’s not just that you’re simply critiquing a position without assuming the truth, for arguments sake, of said positions premises. It’s that you’re saying that a position is wrong based upon some objective standard. But you don’t have one. So, as “they” say, “You can’t beat something with nothing.” Apparently, though, you think you can beat an objective ontic claim with subjective opinion. I think not, let’s see why below:
Now, let’s be clear on what my claim is. I’m not saying that you can’t object to God’s existence. You can do (almost) anything you like here in America. What I’m saying is that your objection is either trivial or irrational. You seem to think that your subjective opinion is actually a rational reason to doubt the existence of God.
Now, I offered a reductio which I was sure you’d see, but you swallowed it! I had claimed that your objection could have the same status as a reason to doubt God’s existence for someone as this claim:
C1: That an all-good God would permit the existence of gross tasting mushrooms is reason for me to doubt his existence.
I see almost zero difference between that and your claim that:
C2: That an all-good God would allow the existence of people who do gross things to children is reason to doubt his existence.
Now, you appear to agree that (C1) could have the same status for someone as your claim, (C2), has for you. Says you,
“But if you, on the other hand, believe that Godâs perfect goodness should manifest itself in such a way that bad-tasting foods are a reason to doubt his existence, or to consider him unworthy of worship (you might even, for all I know, mount an argument that our sense of the flavors of foods must have an objective basis, and call your position âgustatory realismâ), then I suppose youâre welcome to take that position.”
Again, to be clear, it’s not that I’m claiming that “you’re [not] welcome to take [the] position” that “gross acting people” provide you a reason to doubt God’s existence. Rather, my position is that though this may be some kind of reason (and I use that term loosely!) to doubt God’s existence, it’s not a rational one. And for it I draw support from what I think is prima facie obvious: (C1) is not a rational reason to doubt God’s existence. The argument runs thus: If (C1) is not a rational reason to doubt God’s existence, then neither is (C2), (C1) is not a rational reason to doubt God’s existence, therefore (C2) isn’t one either.
We can also point out that your claim is trivial. You claim that “[I am] entirely misunderstanding the point here.” Why? it is because you “see evil, and [you] call it evil, because it arouses in me an intuitive moral revulsion. Thatâs all.” And since there is no objective standard, no claim is objectively better than any other claims. And so “child molestation” may “arouse moral revulsion in you.” But, it could be the case that for someone not to “love” children in the above way (indeed, not “loving them” may be a sign of one’s hatred for them), “arouses moral revulsion” in another person. And so we have another claim:
C3: That an all-good God would not make more people “lovers of children,” and stop the heinous persecution of people like me, gives me reason to doubt his existence.
What would have to say here? “Then I suppose youâre welcome to take that position.” But (C2) and (C3) are contradictory. So, it appears that contradictory claims can both be “reasons” (rational?) to doubt God’s existence! Of course, you can deny that your reason to doubt God’s existence is rational. Fine. I’m only interested in fielding rational objections to the faith. After all, if one takes this out, then I suppose I could tell you that I disbelieve in macro-evolution because the notion of “survival of the fittest,” isn’t my cup ‘o tea. I doubt that would get published. Least of all because it is totally uninteresting to the truth of the matter.
For the remainder of the post I’ll just copy and paste some of your objections and claims. I’ll interact with them as well:
MP: “You ask if society determines what we call evil. Of course it does; we see it happening all the time. Two hundred years ago, the subjugation of other humans as slaves was regarded as morally unobjectionable; now it is considered unambiguously evil. And if we are thinking of looking to Scripture as a moral compass, there is much in the Bible that would get you in a good deal of trouble today. Stoned an adulteress lately?”
PM: It seems like you switch between moral relativism and moral subjectivism. Like you claim that “society” is what determines right and wrong, as well as claiming that “you” determine what is right and wrong.
At any rate, if society determines what is wrong, moral reform would seem impossible. Moral error would be unintelligible or uninteresting as well.
And, the fact that societies have given different answers to moral questions, and conventionally said X is evil, or X is good, does not mean that there is not an objective standard. Realists do not deny conventional morality. We just insist on the existence of a non-conventional morality which serves as the standard for assessing the merits of various conventional moralities.
Lastly, I have not stoned an adulteress today. For one, only the civil magistrate had that power. Thus to critique regular Christians as being inconsistent is off the mark. And, though I may get “in trouble” today does not make the practice back then wrong on your position. At best, all you mean is, “I (we) disagree with that.” People who like chocolate ice cream are not wrong for doing so.
MP: “If morality is based in objective, eternal standards, why is it so mutable? Why do we disagree about so much of it, as we do with the other cultures you allude to? If morality must flow, objectively, from God, then why does it vary so locally, both in time and place?”
PM: Again, different answers do not prove that there is no correct answer. In fact, people disagree about many things in philosophy, logic, mathematics, &c., this does not mean that there is not objective basis to answer the questions.
Ironically, it is the moral subjectivist who has the problem with moral disagreement. What is there to disagree about? Take the claim that “abortion is immoral.” Now, since I’d like to think the best of you, I’ll assume that you think abortion is immoral. đ We will then look at Theresa, who thinks abortion morally acceptable. On your position, your subjectivism boils down to the position that:
–Malcolm agrees that abortion is immoral
–Theresa agrees that abortion is moral.
Now, as long as the above report true feelings, then neither of you are wrong. In an uninteresting way, for Theresa to say that Malcolm is wrong, is just to recognize the truism that Malcolm disagrees with Theresa. Neither of you can be mistaken, though. And to the extent that you’re both telling the truth, you’re both infallible. Thus moral disagreement presupposes the falsity of moral subjectivism and cultural relativism!
Again, I’ll cite Shafer-Landau,
“Right off the bat, we can see that moral skepticism is a doctrine of moral equivalence. If there are no right answers to ethical questions (nihilism), or what right answers there are are given by personal opinion (subjectivism), then any moral view is just as (im)plausible as any other. If relativists are right, then the basic views of all societies are morally on par with one another. On all skeptical theories, the basic moral views of any person, or society, are no better that those of any other.” (ibid, p.18)
You also ask how on my view there can be moral disagreement morality “flows from God.” I don’t know about it “flowing” from God, but despite the metaphor, the Christian position includes the doctrine of sin. Man seeks to avoid God and God’s law, thus he attempts to formulate his own law. Add that God made humans in his image, which makes them creative, and you get all sorts of wild ethical theories.
MP: “You suggested also that âmaybe now Iâll doubt Neroâs existence.â You are welcome to, of course, but this example has no bearing whatsoever on the question at hand, simply because nobody is suggesting that Nero is the source of our moral intuition, or is the all-powerful Creator of the world, with a responsibility for its contents.”
PM: (First, notice that my initials are the reverse of yours!) I think you fail to see the reductio. If subjective dislikes about _______, could be used to deny the objective existence of ______, then I don’t see how your position denies the rationality of my doubting Nero’s existence. Of course you can admit that on your view your PoE doesn’t give you any rational reason to “doubt God’s existence.” I fail to see how God being the “source” of our moral intuition (whatever that means) and God being “responsible” for the contents 9whatever that means) of the world means that: subjective dislikes about _______, could be used to deny the objective existence of ______. Since Nero isn’t the source of morality, and responsible for the contents of the world, does that someone mean that I can’t deny his existence because he did thinks I find morally repugnant? Indeed, if God allows evil, why is that a problem? Just because you subjectively think so? Well, I subjectively think that one doesn’t have to be the “source” of morality for me to not like what he does and so doubt his objective existence. Why is your position my rational than the Nero-doubter?
MP: “Well, itâs rather a stretch to imagine that ethics is free of normative assertions, when ethics concerns itself entirely with what should guide us as we try to choose between right and wrong. Take the âoughtsâ out of ethics, and you havenât much left.”
PM: It’s not a stretch when one holds a worldview where everything is capable of being described in the language of science.
MP: So why, you ask, given the subjectivity of morality, ought you do the things I think moral? For you, perhaps no reason at all, obviously. (As I said, people do indeed disagree about right and wrong, which is a good reason to doubt that morality is objective.) For me, itâs really quite simple. The reason that I think you ought to do them is that I think they are the right thing to do.
PM: But in actuality, they are not the “right” thing to do. You see, the voodoo priest thinks that human sacrifice is the “right” thing to do.
How do we determine who is right?
Malcolm: Human sacrifice is immoral.
Voodoo priest: Human sacrifice is moral.
As pointed out above, if you’re not a moral nihilist but a moral subjectivist, then both of these claims, if the claimers are uttering the truth, are true. Neither is in moral error. If you are both speaking the truth, then we have a contradiction. But from a contradiction we can prove anything:
1. A & ~A
2. A
3. A v B
4. ~A
5. :.B
Let A = Human sacrifice is immoral.
Let B = Christianity is true.
Hence Malcolm’s position allows for the truth of Christianity!
Now, Malcolm may say, “No no, it is just true for them, but not for me.” But this is just another way of saying that a person believes it. So, why ought I do what Malcolm believes is moral? His answer: “Because I believe it is moral.”
My question: “But why ought I do what Malcolm believes is moral?”
His answer: âBecause I believe it is moral.â
See the problem?
best,
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Hi Paul,
Well, I’m beginning to think we are not going to make further progress here. You seem bent on trying to press me into making several claims that I’m not making; in particular you seem to think that I am trying to hold onto the right to criticize other people’s morality on some objective basis (what you call condemning or praising the behavior of others in an “interesting” way) while denying that morality has such a basis in the first place. But I think you are simply unable to grasp that this is exactly what I am NOT trying to do. I freely admit that in the absence of objective moral “facts” there is no reason why my moral critique of anyone else’s actions should have any compulsive force upon them. I will ask, however, how, if there are such facts, we are able to examine them, question them, evaluate them, or get at them in any way other than through our moral intuitions, which is what we all rely on anyway. I will continue, of course, to follow my own moral compass, but I am not under the illusion that it is rooted in some objective metaphysical foundation, and you have offered us no reason to believe that it is.
As for the problem of evil, regardless of the subjectivity of my own intuitions about what is evil and what isn’t, you are ignoring the fact that much of what goes on in the world simply seems contradictory to the cllaims that are made for the nature of God. It is quite transparently simple to see how a person, wondering whether or not to believe in God – and who imagines that if there is a God, that he is supposed to be a fount of mercy and justice (the common definitions of which include such concepts as sparing the innocent form suffering, etc.) – to then look around the room and see the innocent suffering right and left. You return again and again to your mushroom metaphor, but never acknowledge that conventional descriptions of God say nothing whatsoever about edible funguses, but quite a lot about love, justice and mercy. Let me spell it out once again:
A) It is proposed that there may be a Supreme Being who is responsible for the Creation and maintenance of this world.
B) Such a being may or may not exist, but if he does, he is all-powerful, and nothing that happens may happen without his consent.
C) This Being, should he exist, is loving, protective of the innocent, just, and merciful.
D) In the actual world, the innocent suffer horribly, and often. Justice is rare, as is mercy.
E) Therefore, it seems that either this Being is not as described (and thus, perhaps, unworthy of worship), or…
F) …perhaps the most parsimonious account of all: he simply does not exist.
Nowhere, however, in the usual accounts of God is it suggested that he promises that all mushrooms will be delicious. Likewise, nowhere in accounts of Nero is it suggested that he is an invisible, all-powerful Creator and Maintainer of All That Is. You attempt to trivialize these objections by making remarks like “Indeed, if God allows evil, why is that a problem?”, but in fact, it is of course a central problem, because God is specifically alleged to have the properties of perfect mercy, justice, and so forth. The problem is that the alleged nature of God conflicts with what we see in the world, namely the suffering of the innocent. If you wish to modify “God” so as not to be committed to the protection of the innocent, etc., then you do manage to avoid this objection, but at a rather dear cost.
You continue rather doggedly to miss my point with your example of the voodoo priest. He claims human sacrifice is moral; I say I think it isn’t, and then you ask “How do we determine who is right?”
But the point is, as I freely admit – as in fact follows tautologically from the falsity of moral objectivism – that neither of us is “right” in the sense you are looking for. So how, then, shall you determine who is “right”? Well, you check you own conscience, just as we all do. You seem to think you are offering up reductios, but unlike you, I don’t see the conclusions as absurd. You also repeat your question about why you ought to do what I think is moral – merely pointing out again that you don’t see why you ought to do what I think is moral, and then saying, rather archly, “See the problem?” But once again, you seem to be thinking I am trying to claim something I am not, namely that my moral opinions will have any binding force over you. Why do I think you should do what I think is moral? Because I think it’s moral. But why should you think you should do what I think is moral? No reason at all. I never said there was. You will, of course, do what you think is moral. If I see any voodoo priests whetting their knives on my block, I’m going to intervene. They may think this an immoral act on my part, but that’s just too bad. Who’s right? Well, it depends who you ask. There may well just be no “fact of the matter”. I can live with that; my own moral sense, which is what we all depend on anyway, tells me what I’m doing is right. You may disagree.
And you are quite right: if there are no moral facts, then to a disinterested third party, “the basic moral views of any person, or society, are no better that those of any other.” But to the person or society themselves, these moral intuitions have just as much persuasive force as they would if they were grounded in external facts, especially as we have no way of knowing whether they are or they aren’t.
Paul,
A few more remarks, in response to other objections of yours:
You wrote:
“It seems like you switch between moral relativism and moral subjectivism. Like you claim that “society” is what determines right and wrong, as well as claiming that “you” determine what is right and wrong.
No, no, no. Please try to work less vigorously at nit-picking sophistry, and try to grasp the broader idea here. Our moral sensibilities, although they have their origins in our evolutionary history, are also subject to cultural and memetic revision. We aren’t slaves to our genes; as human beings, we engage in continuous cultural innovation, and our moral systems change over time. The gradual abolition of slavery throughout the world is a good example. For each of us, our moral views are inescapably influenced by the era and culture in which we are embedded.
When I point out that the existence of objective moral standards is called into question by the great variety of moral systems among different cultures, you respond:
“And, the fact that societies have given different answers to moral questions, and conventionally said X is evil, or X is good, does not mean that there is not an objective standard. Realists do not deny conventional morality. We just insist on the existence of a non-conventional morality which serves as the standard for assessing the merits of various conventional moralities. …
In fact, people disagree about many things in philosophy, logic, mathematics, &c., this does not mean that there is not objective basis to answer the questions.”
Very convenient – there are objective moral standards, but they don’t carry enough weight actually to have much influence over people’s sense of right and wrong. Let me ask: what evidence can you offer that such objective “facts” even exist at all? And if they do, how can we get a look at them? If we are considering an action, and want to know whether it is “objectively” moral, how can we find out? You speak of there being a “right” answer to moral questions. If I disagree with you about the rightness of an answer, to what reference may we appeal? What demonstration can you make to the skeptic who thinks that the entire notion of moral absolutes is a wishful fantasy, a delusional attempt to provide Godlike authority to one’s own moral intuitions? Argument along the lines of “there must be moral absolutes, or else the whole foundation of our moral system has nothing upon which to stand” won’t do, because nowhere are we guaranteed that our moral system will have such a foundation.
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Hello Malcolm,
I note that again you accuse me of misunderstanding your position. I donât think so. But, I do think you have terribly misunderstood my arguments above. I wanted to be careful before I accused you of that, until I could make it explicit. For some reason, the constant accusation that someone has âmisunderstoodâ you, without anything to back it up, seems a bit hollow. Seems like a cheap way to score some debate points. I hope to show below how youâve entirely misunderstood the context of my arguments. In fact, youâve misunderstood them so bad that I think you may not have read everything Iâve written, or bothered to give it that much attention. At any rate, I do not think youâve purposefully misunderstood what Iâve been arguing. Well, fine speech, can I put my money where my mouth is? Letâs see:
Previously I wrote: âNow, as far as our discussion goes, you’re quite right that I have questioned whether you have a problem of evil argument (a staple in the atheist’s diet of devouring theists). To be more precise, I have specifically said that your position of moral subjectivism means that you must give up any external critique of Christianity. I have admitted that all is not lost for the atheologian, you still have the option of mounting an internal critique. But, and I find support in Michael Martin, I can’t see an internal critique penetrating the defenses of Christian theism (what he calls âextended theismâ), specifically my version of it! Needles to say, the Calvinist tradition does have a fine pedigree going back for quite some time, and so it’s not an ad hoc position.â
So, the context of the discussion is that your giving up objective standards of morality reduces you to not being able to mount an external critique against Christian theism from the PoE. Notice that my position is this:
1) Malcolm cannot mount an external critique against Christian theism from the PoE if he gives up objective morality.
And
2) All is not lost, Malcolm may still offer an internal critique against Christian theism from the PoE, even if he gives up objective morality.
And
3) Malcolmâs âreasonsâ for âdoubting Godâs existenceâ that stem from his moral subjectivism are either trivial or non-rational (possibly irrational) âreasonsâ to âdoubt Godâs existence.
I think Iâve been sufficiently clear that (1), (2), and (3), is what Iâm arguing here.
And so how have you misunderstood me? Well, for example, when you say,
âYou seem bent on trying to press me into making several claims that I’m not making; in particular you seem to think that I am trying to hold onto the right to criticize other people’s morality on some objective basis (what you call condemning or praising the behavior of others in an “interesting” way) while denying that morality has such a basis in the first place. But I think you are simply unable to grasp that this is exactly what I am NOT trying to do.
Right. Thatâs what I think your position is. Hereâs where youâre off on my position. You claim that there is no objective basis for morality. You then say that the existence of âevilâ gives you âreasonâ to doubt Godâs objective existence. I say youâre welcome to not believe in God for any ole reason you want. Heck, if you want to âdoubt Godâs existenceâ from the claim that âice cream cones donât have bones,â be my guest. Iâm simply interested in peopleâs rational reasons for âdoubting Godâs existence.â And so what is your position? Ethical subjectivism. As I pointed out above, for you, to say that âX is immoralâ translates to the psychological fact that âMalcolm dislikes X.â Unfortunately, this turns moral statements into non-moral statements. The claim that âX is moralâ (as said by Malcolm) translates in the claim that âMalcolm likes X,â and this makes no normative claim. And so what does Malcolmâs position look like as applied to a âreason for doubting Godâs existence.â Letâs see:
4) God allows some âevilâ thing, T, to happen.
This translates to:
5) I do not like God allowing T.
And so any external critique Malcolm could give for doubting Godâs existence would boil down to:
6) I doubt Godâs existence because he allows things Malcolm dislikes.
Are (5) and (6) rational reasons to deny Godâs existence? I say no. For support, I invoke the prima facie irrationality of doubting the objective existence of God based on a claim like this:
7) I doubt Godâs existence because he allows mushrooms to exist, and I dislike mushrooms.
On Malcolmâs view, if (6) is a rational reason to doubt Godâs existence for him, then so is (7) a rational reason to doubt Godâs existence for person S, a mushroom disliker, or S*, green pea soup disliker. But, (7) is not a rational reason for S (or S*) to doubt Godâs existence. Therefore, (6) is not a rational reason to doubt Godâs existence.
Moreover, when Malcolm says,
8) I think a pedophilia is a morally unacceptable lifestyle.
He is saying,
9) I disapprove of the pedophile lifestyle.
Now, since God allows pedophiles to exist and to carry out their immoral (subjectively distasteful?) lifestyles, this is a âreasonâ for Malcolm to âdoubt Godâs existence.â And so his âreasonâ to doubt Godâs existence is,
10) I dislike that God allows pedophiles to practice their lifestyle.
And hence (10) is a âreason to doubt Godâs existence,â for Malcolm. But is it a rational reason? I think Iâve shown that it is not above. But notice something else. If Malcolmâs position is true, then when a pedophile (who is convinced the what he is doing is love, and he has just âevolvedâ that way, and so shouldnât be criticized for how he was born) says that,
11) I think the pedophile lifestyle is morally acceptable.
He is saying,
12) I approve of the pedophile lifestyle.
Now this pedophile finds out that Christianity teaches that God will judge pedophiles, and what they do is morally repugnant in the eyes of God, the pedophile thinks this is an âevilâ on Godâs part. Hence the pedophileâs position is,
13) I dislike that God disallows pedophiles to practice their life style.
And so this could be a reason to doubt Godâs existence. As Mr. Pollack says above (with a bit of reshuffling on my part): â”But if you, on the other hand, believe that Godâs perfect goodness should manifest itself in such a way that [people should get to love who they were born to love], [should count as] a reason to doubt his existence, or to consider him unworthy of worship [âŠ], then I suppose youâre welcome to take that position.â
And therefore, both (10) and (13) can count as reasons for someone to rationally(?) doubt Godâs existence on Malcolmâs view. I think this is absurd, on the face of it. Now, if Malcolm wants to admit that his PoE is not a rational reason to doubt Godâs existence, then I donât really have problems with his position. Indeed, I welcome it. All it shows is that people donât have rational reasons for their denying Godâs existence.
Notice also that Malcolmâs position renders claims like (8) and (11) both true. Malcolm cannot say that (11) is in error, in any interesting way. When Malcolm says that â(11) is in error,â all he means is that âI disagree with (11).â But this is a trivial truism. After all, (11) disagrees with (8). To the extend that (8) and (11) report true feelings of people, then are not wrong. And so Iâve noted that when Malcolm âcriticizesâ anotherâs moral position, all heâs saying is that he doesnât agree with it. But he cannot say it is false. And therefore I donât think Iâve misunderstood him at all. Thus his accusation here is unfounded. And so Malcolm does not have an external critique. His critique, externally, simply boils down to the claim that he doesnât like what God does. Thatâs not a critique but a report of Malcolmâs psychological disposition. Not âlikingâ X does not give you a rational reason for denying the âexistenceâ of X. And this is Malcolmâs position analyzed. No, as I pointed out about external and internal critiques: “We don’t need objective morality to level an internal critique… [b]ut don’t we ever wants to criticize the ultimate commitments themselves? For this we need an external critique. …If these [ultimate commitments] can ever be misguided – not just according to me, or my culture, but misguided period – then (so long as there are any correct moral standards at all) there must be some objective morality that reveals error.” (Landeau, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil, Oxford, p.16-17) You see, on Malcolmâsâ position, externally, he must not say that God is wrong for allowing pedophilia to occur. Malcolmâs doubt looks like this, then,
14) God is not wrong for allowing X, but I donât like X, therefore Iâll doubt the existence of God, even though he is not wrong, or in error, for permitting X.
And this Malcolmâs âexternal PoEâ argument as it bears on the rationality of believing in God.
Malcolm then goes on. He writes,
âAs for the problem of evil, regardless of the subjectivity of my own intuitions about what is evil and what isn’t, you are ignoring the fact that much of what goes on in the world simply seems contradictory to the claims that are made for the nature of God. It is quite transparently simple to see how a person, wondering whether or not to believe in God – and who imagines that if there is a God, that he is supposed to be a fount of mercy and justice (the common definitions of which include such concepts as sparing the innocent form suffering, etc.) – to then look around the room and see the innocent suffering right and left. You return again and again to your mushroom metaphor, but never acknowledge that conventional descriptions of God say nothing whatsoever about edible funguses, but quite a lot about love, justice and mercy.â
Above I showed how I had not misunderstood his position, but merely pointed out that he had no external PoE argument, now Iâll show how it has been Malcolm, not me, who has misunderstood his interlocutorâs argument. What Malcolm just uttered above is whatâs called an internal critique. Remember that I claimed that Malcolm could give an internal critique. I claimed this on 2/14/07. I had said that Malcolm didnât have an external PoE, but he could still give an internal PoE. And so the above is not a critique of anything Iâve said. I never said Malcolm could not launch an internal critique.
Though I could technically end here, since Malcolmâs comments only serve to underscore my point, I had previously claimed that I had seen no successful internal critiques. Does the above count as one? No, it doesnât. But first, letâs look at the above and see that it couldnât be a successful external critique.
First, on Malcolmâs view, all he could mean here, externally, is that he doesnât like what God does, but God is not morally wrong in allowing these supposed innocents to suffer, though. Moreover, apparently one holds the position that if someone is good, then they shouldnât do evil, and if they do do evil, they shouldnât promote themselves as being good. Why? Because this is hypocrisy. Apparently Malcolm thinks hypocrisy morally repugnant. But, again, is this really a problem? All Malcolm could mean here is that he disagrees with hypocrisy. But this as been critiqued above. It is not a successful PoE argument to say that someone is not really doing evil, but they are doing something I subjectively dislike. You see, the PoE must take evil seriously. If there is no evil, then a person cannot be blamed for causing evil. All God is being charged with here is for doing things Malcolm doesnât like.
But, Malcolm could say, well, given your conception of God, given what is claimed of him, then if there is real evil E, this is incompatible with some other property P that God supposedly has. Thus, E is problematic on P. Hence we can see the internal character of this critique. But, unfortunately for those who launch internal critiques, they must include the entire system I the critique. Thus, even though E may be problematic on P, if the worldview includes P1, P2, P3, and PâŠn, which render E on P unproblematic, the internal inconsistency goes away. Or, if said critique presupposes that cases of E are happening, but the worldview, if true, does not have cases of E happening, the internal critique is defeated. I claim that Malcolmâs rationality defeaters, which seek to show internal inconsistency, can only be made by denying other things true of theism. Hence the de jure objection is not independent of the de facto. His objections can, once analyzed, be stated thus: âIf Christianity is not all that it claims to be, then thereâs a problem of evil for it.â But of course now we donât have a defeater for Christianity. Malcolm is free to imagine Christianity as claiming such and such, or not claiming such and such. But then we have Malcolmanity. Iâm not here to defend Malcolmanity, or claim it is internally consistent.
So, take the claim that âinnocents suffer.â Externally, this is not morally wrong, Malcolm just disapproves of it. âDisapproving of Xâ is not a moral claim. âX is wrong.â is a moral claim. But, is this a problem internally? Given what Christianity teaches, if Christianity were the case, is Malcolm looking around and âseeing innocents suffering right and left?â Letâs analyze this claim:
a) Christianity claims that there are no innocent mere-human people. âAll have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God.â âThere is none that are good, no not one.â If Christianity is true, there are no âinnocents suffering right and left.â
b) When sinners suffer, they suffer the effects of sin. These, on the Christian worldview, are punishments for violations of a holy and perfect law. Hence, God, as a perfect and just judge, can punish criminals.
c) God allows and ordains evil for the greatest good. Malcolm cannot point to cases of âsufferingâ and show that this is evil. For example, a little child may need a doctor to stitch him up because he fell and received a cut. This causes an âinnocentâ to suffer. Is the doctor committing an evil? No. But, if the doctor did this for no reason, or it had no greater good, this would be evil. Hence, Malcolm should be aware that what he needs to show are gratuitous cases of evil.
d) I donât know of the metaphor claiming that âGod is the fount of mercy and justice,â but God is merciful and he is just. But Godâs mercy, according to Christianity, is selective. God is under no obligation to give mercy to all, or any. Godâs love is rather like marital love. I love my wife in a way I donât love my neighborâs wife. People donât deserve mercy, else itâs no longer mercy. But, people do deserve to be treated justly. And what we deserve, as sinners, is nothing short of the cosmic death penalty.
And so given these other claims the Bible makes, Malcolm didnât attack the Christian worldview, but, rather, Malcolmanity. It would be logically fallacious to claim that since Malcolmanity had internal inconsistencies, therefore, so does Christianity.
Then it appears that Malcolm wants to claim heâs been arguing this way all along. He writes,
âLet me spell it out once again:
A) It is proposed that there may be a Supreme Being who is responsible for the Creation and maintenance of this world.
B) Such a being may or may not exist, but if he does, he is all-powerful, and nothing that happens may happen without his consent.
C) This Being, should he exist, is loving, protective of the innocent, just, and merciful.
D) In the actual world, the innocent suffer horribly, and often. Justice is rare, as is mercy.
E) Therefore, it seems that either this Being is not as described (and thus, perhaps, unworthy of worship), or…
F) …perhaps the most parsimonious account of all: he simply does not exist.â
Notice that he says âonce again.â But, âonce again,â Iâve told Malcolm that heâs not forbidden to offer an internal critique. And, (A) – (F) is an internal critique.
Note again, though, that without an external and objective standard of evil, Malcolm has no criticism. He even says so: âYou seem bent on trying to press me into making several claims that I’m not making; in particular you seem to think that I am trying to hold onto the right to criticize other people’s morality on some objective basis [âŠ] while denying that morality has such a basis in the first place. But I think you are simply unable to grasp that this is exactly what I am NOT trying to do.â See, without an objective basis for morality, an external critique looks like this: âI donât like what God does, therefore I doubt his existence.â This has the form: âIf I donât like Yâs allowing X, then I have reason to doubt the objective existence of Y.â And absurd critique. Again, given Malcolmâs view, God is not morally in error for âallowing innocents to suffer.â Thus we have: âY is not wrong for allowing X, but I donât personally like the fact that Y allows X, therefore I have reason to doubt the objective existence of Y.â And so the above cannot be an external critique.
Now, as far as the internal critique goes, (A) – (F) do not present the correct story, and so it is impossible that this could be an internal critique. That is, maybe it is an internal critique of Malcolmanity, but it is not an internal critique of Christianity (at least the robust and long-standing Augustinian tradition Iâm representing). So, despite the fact that there are no mere-humans who are innocent, another problem is that this doesnât show that âallowing âinnocentsâ to sufferâ is an immoral thing on our worldview. God has a good reason for what he plans and allows. We must also note that justice is never rare. God will always punish sin. Sin will never go unpunished. The doctrine of Hell is not included in the above account. Thus Christianity has facts F1 – Fn that have been left out of the internal critique.
Malcolm seems to note this answer. He claims, âThe problem is that the alleged nature of God conflicts with what we see in the world, namely the suffering of the innocent. If you wish to modify “God” so as not to be committed to the protection of the innocent, etc., then you do manage to avoid this objection, but at a rather dear cost.â But I have not modified God in such a way. I have modified Malcolmâs understanding of what heâs critiquing. If Malcolm wishes to continue to critique Malcolmanity, he may do so if he wishes, but it comes at a rather dear cost; namely, biblical Christianity gets off Scott free. Furthermore, Malcolm needs to show that the suffering which occurs is gratuitous evil. Thereâs nothing wrong with causing suffering for a greater moral good (cf. the medical procedure on the child). God uses evil to test his servants (cf. 1 Peter 1:7; James 1:3), to discipline them (Hebrews 12:7-11), to preserve their life (Genesis 50:20), to enable them to comfort others (2 Corinthians 1:3-7), and to give them greater joy when suffering is replaced by glory (1 Peter 4:13). All of these specific second-order goods bring God more glory, and these are achieved by His allowing suffering and evil. In the Christian worldview Godâs glory, God himself, is the highest good. Furthermore, God glorifies himself cross-attributinally. He does not just receive glory in his allowing the elect to know him better, but in punishing the wicked.
So, given that view, the apostle Paul could say, âI consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in usâ (Romans 8:18). God uses suffering for many reasons. Different people and situations require different amounts of suffering. For one believer God may sanctify him by giving him a couple of flat tires in his life. Another he may sanctify by giving him some physical defect. Another he may take his life. And all of this is not as bad vis-Ă -vis Job. He needed to be rocked. Take the suffering of Joni Erickson Tada. Sheâs a Christian who was paralyzed at a very young age. She rejoices in her suffering, knowing that God did this for His glory. To paraphrase Joni Erickson Tada, God allows that which he hates in the short term in order to accomplish that which He loves in the long-term. This is a woman who says that when she gets to heaven she will run up and thank Jesus for putting her in a wheelchair! Tada uses a beautiful illustration in one of her books. Suppose you have an expensive diamond, which you wish to display. How do you optimally enhance its beauty? Would you imbed it in hundreds of diamonds? No. You place it as a solitaire on a dark cloth. Then, you direct a single spotlight on it which reflects its beauty to the fullest.
Joni believes that her paralyzed âearth suitâ creates just such a dark backdrop through which Christ may be seen. This brings great credibility to Jesus Christ’s worthiness to be praised as the lost and saved alike marvel at her behavior in her circumstances! They think, “Where does she get such strength?” So, God uses our suffering to Glorify Himself. But, God is no less glorified in His love than in His wrath. In Christianity, Godâs wrath and justice are glorified just as much as His love and wisdom. Indeed, would not a perfect human judge receive glory for rendering wise and just punishments? How much more then the exemplar of righteousness? John Piper puts it this way: âIt is Godâs supreme commitment to uphold and display the full range of His glory through the sovereign demonstrations of all His perfections, including his wrath and mercyâŠâ
Next, Malcolm again accuses me of missing his point. But, again, it is Mr. Pollack who misses the point. Says Malcolm,
âYou continue rather doggedly to miss my point with your example of the voodoo priest. He claims human sacrifice is moral; I say I think it isn’t, and then you ask âHow do we determine who is right?â But the point is, as I freely admit – as in fact follows tautologically from the falsity of moral objectivism – that neither of us is “right” in the sense you are looking for.â
But the context of the above discussion was that Malcolm used the fact of moral disagreement as an argument for ethical subjectivism (or, relativism). My point, though, was that real disagreement presupposed moral objectivism. Something is objective if you can be mistaken about it. Given subjectivism, no one is wrong. So, it makes no sense to debate and argue. I hope Malcolm doesnât debate his dinner guests when they let him know they like chocolate ice cream better than Malcolmâs favorite, orange sherbet! So, note again Malcolmâs false accusation.
Lastly, Malcolm asks what I think the standard is. My answer: Godâs holy character is the standard. I donât expect Malcolm to like this standard, but that doesnât mean it doesnât exist. He asks what arguments I have for objective moral standards. One is that an all-knowing God has revealed that there are these standards. But, Iâve also offered other arguments in this combox. Either moral objectivism is the case, or some kind of subjectivism is. Now, the refutation and arguments against subjectivism seek to support objectivism. Second, it appears that we can be wrong about our moral beliefs. Bottom line, a child molester is flat out wrong for molesting children. If he is wrong, then there must be a standard by which we can say that heâs wrong. Saying heâs wrong is not the same as saying, âI disagree with him.â The latter is not a moral claim, but a psychological description. Third, the force of a PoE is gone. For a PoE argument to work, evil must be taken seriously. At best, the skeptic can offer an internal critique, but thatâs not going to work against extended theism, especially the kind Iâve presented here. Fourth, moral subjectivism leads to moral equivalency. Child rape and love making with your wife are morally equivalent. Fifth, ethical subjectivism implies moral infallibility. As long as Malcolm reports what he truly feels about some moral position, he cannot be in error. Ethical objectivism answers all of these problems. Cultural relativism disallows moral progress. Thus Martin Luther King was actually immoral for advocating equality among the races. Objectivism allows for moral progress. Sixth, ethical obligations can only be made by persons. Non-persons cannot obligate me to do or behave any such way. I am obligated to pay my roofer, who I agreed to pay if he fixed my roof. I am obligated to pay him because he is a person that I have entered into a contract with. It would seem that universal and absolute moral obligations require a universal and absolute person, God. Godâs person is the âgroundâ of morality. Finally, objectivism can say a scene like this is really wrong and morally evil:
â”People talk sometimes of bestial cruelty, but that’s a great injustice and insult to the beasts; a beast can never be so cruel as a man, so artistically cruel….
I’ve collected a great, great deal about Russian children, Alyosha. There was a little girl of five who was hated by her father and mother…. You see, I must repeat again, it is a peculiar characteristic of many people, this love of torturing children, and children only…. It’s just their defenselessness that tempts the tormentor, just the angelic confidence of the child who has no refuge and no appeal that sets his vile blood on fire….
This poor child of five was subjected to every possible torture by those cultivated parents. They beat her, thrashed her, kicked her for no reason till her body was one bruise. Then, they went to greater refinements of cruelty — shut her up al night in the cold and frost in a privy, and because she didn’t ask to be taken up at night… they smeared her face and filled her mouth with excrement, and it was her mother, her mother did this. And that mother could sleep, hearing the poor child’s groans!â – The Brothers Karamozov
Best,
~PM
Good post Paul,
It seems to me that the heart of this is
1) The ‘what is evil?’ defense to the PoE is what leads to
2) the point raised by Malcolm, that such a god is not (subjectively) worth worshiping (to him and many others).
this leaves a subjective vs objective (with the assumption that god is the thing that should be worshiped) impasse
3) Which could then be countered by something along the lines of
a) his plan isn’t all THAT bad
b) he is the only show in town, you can’t stop him
c) you will only make things worse by standing in his way
d) best to just get on board
of course we have to take the other god assumptions for granted to do that and each of the above are possible to debate.
Also of note is that we have to accept is that God does not appear to be bound by the same rules as us. ie you can’t jsut take what he says is god or bad in the holy book and expect only the good of that to reflect in the world and that the masterplan is complex beyond our comprehension.
———
However, I think we still tend here towards the lacking omnipotence solution to the problem of evil.
The problem is that an omnipotent god would presumably not only control the moves in the chess game but also the rules of the game.
A) (11) and (13) run into the issue ‘why does god allow this contradiction.
ie why does not everyone exist in such a way that none of their subjective desires conflict (or at least a minimal amount of them conflict).
Why does not everyone LOVE mushrooms? Why don’t all mushrooms get eaten?
and B)
>”God uses evil to…”
this implies there is a limit on god’s power. For example if I want to achieve an end I could do so by committing an evil act, but it is almost never essential to do that and almost never the best strategy. Where it is the best strategy (for example if someone had to shoot a man escaping from jail) it reflects a lack of power on the shooters part (i.e. you shoot because it is the only way you can stop him).
Well, Paul, if nothing else, I must admire your stamina. I never really imagined that anything I might say would pierce such a seamlessly encapsulated worldview; I begin to think that communication across the immeasurable gulf that separates our sets of axioms is simply not feasible, and I weary of the effort. There is no way to gain a purchase on a system of thought that, for example, eliminates even the possibility of the suffering of the innocent on the basis that nobody, not even Dostoyevsky’s tormented babe, is innocent; that seeks to quiet the skeptic’s curiosity about how one knows there to be objective moral standards by saying that they must be there because God has “revealed” that they are; that suggests no scientific or objective way to access or examine such standards, but insists that they are necessary nonetheless; that permits no objection to be made against God for inflicting unjust suffering because everything that God does is by definition just; that dismisses perfectly reasonable doubts about the alleged existence of an invisible, intangible, supernatural being by fatuously likening them to doubting the existence of common foodstuffs due to gustatory preferences; and that in a truly astonishing philosophical contortion can take the fact that people often disagree about moral issues not to be consistent with the nonexistence of objective moral standards, but as evidence in their favor, and so on.
We live in utterly different worlds, you and I, and if we cannot agree on the most basic postulates, spending further hours in sterile argument is time wasted for both of us. We have got to the point of simply insisting that we misunderstand one another, and it is indeed wearying to be so willfully, intractably misunderstood.
The view you defend is a consistent one, and you present it adeptly; it resembles a polished sphere, self-supporting, without the need to moor itself to any external reality whatsoever. It is that very inability to attach such a view to the objective world in such a way as might be convincing to a skeptic that is the point I have been trying to make throughout this “debate”, but I certainly have no illusions about the penetrability of such a structure by anything remotely resembling doubt, or scientific inquiry.
The strength of such a view, however, is also its weakness, as it provides a haven for those who already believe, but offers nothing – not the slightest assistance – to the skeptic who might have been brought around by a worldview of less-perfect circularity.
You may have the last word; I have no doubt you’ll take it.
Hi again Malcolm,
Well, since theists allegedly have the burden of proof, and are allegedly in the intellectual minority, I think it wise for me to accept your allowing me to have the last word. Theists need every edge we can get! đ Seriously, though, this will be my last word and I wouldn’t mind in the least if you wanted to close out your thoughts. My closing comments should be brief…. but that’s what I thought my last two posts would be!
First, I thank you for recognizing that the theism I defend is a “consistent” one. That’s more than, say, the contributors to Martin’s and Monnier’s The Impossibility of God will allow.
Second, though I know you will disagree, from my perspective there is common ground. You see, whether you like it or not, you’re made in God’s image, Malcolm. As an image bearer, I know that you really do think that torturing and raping a 5 year old little girl, just for the pure fun of it, is morally wrong. I know that when you hear of reports like that, it’s not like hearing reports that some people like to lick a bowl of chocolate ice cream bare, while you like to do that just to vanilla. Chocolate lovers are not in error, child-rape lovers are.
We do not live in different worlds, we live in God’s world. There is not one square inch of his creation that does not have his stamp of ownership on it. Not one square inch where the king does not say, “This is mine!”
You do well to recognize that we have different presuppositions. Though I agree with you that mine are “consistent,” I’m sorry that I cannot share that sentiment of your worldview. And you see my argument would be, that given your worldview, your presuppositions undermine rationality, morality (as we saw), human dignity, etc.
Third, I do allow for internal objections to God’s goodness. My problem is, I’ve not seen the argument as of yet. When people try it they always attack some cookie cutter version of theism. Some form of Appalachian mountain snake dancing theism. Or, some flat out unbiblical notions of God and his attributes. So it is false to say that I just assert that no internal critique can be given. I don’t think one can, but you’re free to offer one.
Fourth, that I took the disagreement of moral values (and facts) to be evidence of objective morality is true. We’ve seen no rebuttal to the contrary. but let’s not just say that this is some disease of the theist. Non-Christian and non-theists moral realists make the same points.
Fifth, to say that I need “scientific standards” to determine what is “necessary” strikes me as sorely mistaken.
Lastly, though my position does offer a haven for those who believe, it is false to say that it offers unbelievers answers. But you see, you need the regenerating work of the Spirit of God to enable you to see. I could point to the fact that Christian theism allows for the basic dignity of man, he will not, for example, be sucked into the cosmic consciousness, or become a cog in the grand evolutionary scheme of things. Without the assumption of being created in God’s image, then we have Russell’s worldview. As Bertrand Russell says in A Free Manâs Worship,
âThe life of Man is a long march through the night, surrounded by invisible foes, tortured by weariness and pain, towards a goal that few can hope to reach, and where none may tarry long. One by one, as they march, our comrades vanish from our sight, seized by the silent orders of omnipotent Death. âŠBrief and powerless is Man’s life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darknessâŠâ
I could point out that God has made us to know the truth. He has made our minds to have faculties aimed at true beliefs. I could say this is better than, say, Rorty:
“The idea that one species of organism is, unlike all the others, oriented not just toward its own increated prosperity but toward Truth, is as un-Darwinian as the idea that every human being has a built-in moral compass–a conscience that swings free of both social history and individual luck.” (Richard Rorty, “Untruth and Consequences,” The New Republic, July 31, 1995, pp. 32-36.)
I could point out that you could have real significance – as an adopted child of our heavenly Father. Instead of finding significance in our blog entries, our homes, businesses, cars, friends opinions, etc. Quite frequently we see those Christmas newsletters from friends. And each year their picture gets smaller. They want to show them on the balcony of the Waldorf Astoria, but you can barely see them. We are shrinking. I could point out that we become what we worship, what we idolize. Unfortunately, we tend here in the West to idolize impersonal things. Thus we are increasingly becoming less personal. I could point you to Christ, he should be our true idol. As we seek to become more like him, we embrace and exhibit the personal. As Augustine said, “Our hearts are restless until we find our rest in Thee.” I can point you to a Savior. I can tell you how to get rid of your guilt. Unfortunately, you reject all these things. It’s not that I have nothing of “assistance” for you, it’s that you don’t want the assistance. You want to be your own God, make up your own moral rules, and seek to know everything through a microscope, where you’re all powerful, and virtually omnipresent to what is on the slide. Malcolm, maybe you could tell me how I could talk about God and your need for him, to someone who hates God and wants to be his own god? How do you offer assistance to those who think they are well off? Perhaps the fault is not in my arguments, my worldview, or my religion? Perhaps the fault is within your own heart?
For His Kingship,
~PM
Hi Paul,
Well, after such a gracious coda, perhaps I will accept your offer to “close my thoughts”. It was late, and I was weary, when I wrote, in some haste, last night, and I regret any incivility of tone.
The fundamental axiom about which our intuitions pull us in entirely opposite directions, of course, is the existence of God, and the psychic need for such absolutes. I cannot demonstrate the nonexistence of God, though my own sense of intellectual parsimony suggests strongly to me that the notion of such an invisible being is an utterly unjustifiable hypothesis at best, and most likely – almost certainly – nothing more than a persistent cultural hallucination. But there is no question that a consistent philosophy can be built upon such a set of axioms, as long as care is taken that none of it is to be exposed to any sort of empirical verification, and as long as the postulates and definitions are shaped so as to allow large internal cavities to which the believer may retreat whenever pressure is applied from one side or the other.
Perhaps an even greater difference between our minds, though, than the need for God, is the hunger for absolutes. You are quite right that for me torturing children is a more important matter than preferences in ice cream; that I see one as morally wrong, and the other not to be a normative matter at all. The difference is that for me, it is enough simply to acknowledge these moral intuitions as part of our human makeup – as part of what makes human society work, a finely tuned adaptive mechanism that is the product of the complex interactions of our natural, cultural, and personal history – while for you, that isn’t enough; you must insist that these moral intuitions must also be grounded in “objective” metaphysical bedrock, even if such objective roots are entirely inaccessible in any empirical way. Doubt and uncertainty are not acceptable. It is not enough to have moral preferences; you must also believe that they are objectively “right” as well, even if there is no way to access the alleged underlying facts in any way whatsoever, and no objective way to resolve any moral disagreement by appealing to them. Such insistence upon unprovable and inaccessible abstracta seems to me utterly unnecessary, and wholly unjustifiable.
You are right that my worldview “undermines” rationality, morality, human dignity, if by that you mean that it removes from them the supernatural basis upon which the theist wishes them to stand. But that certainly does not mean that we cannot reason, make moral choices, or respect ourselves; indeed, to the secular mind there is more dignity in an adult, naturalistic worldview, in which we are responsible for our own moral framework, and in which we take the world simply as we observe it to be, than there is in living as the fearful and obedient children of an invisible, intangible hyperbeing that countenances the most wretched suffering for motives that are by definition shrouded in impenetrable mystery, a view whose only empirical support rests upon the claims of a book of Bronze Age folklore.
It may well be, as Russell writes, that the life of Man is indeed naught but a brief spark in a long darkness, and it is certainly easy to understand the temptation of a mythos that offers victory over death. But comfort is not counsel, and those of us who want not reassurance, but Truth, see no reason to drop, in favor of wishful imaginings, our patient inquiry into the world we can actually observe. And to imagine that my life can only have significance if I am the “adopted child of our heavenly Father” seems utterly backward to me; wouldn’t it be better to find such dignity in my own life, my own actions, my own choices, than in having a powerful father? Whom do you respect more: the self-made man, or his privileged children? Frank Sinatra, or Nancy?
But you are wrong when you say I hate God, and that I want to be my own God. Implicit in those remarks is another axiom about which we differ: that there need be a God at all. I don’t hate God, any more than I hate Santa or Sherlock Holmes. As Laplace said, I simply “have no need of that hypothesis”. And I certainly don’t want to be God, not at all. I’m perfectly happy just to be me.
Once again, last word to you, if you like (this time for sure).
Malcolm,
My “last word” will consist of two small points – more of a recap, really:
1) I did not detect “incivility of tone,” so no worries.
2) Thanks for you time. Perhaps we will run into each other again and debate God’s existence, the supperiority of the Christian worldview, etc., for now I only saught to prove that giving up objective morality leaves you without an external PoE (a main weapon in the atheist arsenal), and I have no reason to think that an atheists only other option – an internal argument – can be successful. At least there was none offered here. I also attempted to show that you’re free to “doubt God’s existence” given your understanding of morality, but this boils down to an irrational reason to doubt; certainly not how a properly functioning cognizer would attempt to rationally doubt the objective existence of something. I think both points were argued successfuly, IMHO. I no doubt you think you have no need for the God hypothesis (actually, I never presented God as an hypothesis), but from what we’ve seen here, your “basis for doubt” isn
t a rational one, and rejecting the “hypothesis” leaves you unable to say that child-rape is *wrong.* So, if you want to continue to hold to a worldview that says the difference between child-rape and child-protection is like the difference between liking chocolate ice cream over vanilla, then all I can say is: Speak into the microphone. Let the world know the true options they face.
blessings,
~PM