This post is a somewhat belated reply to Ian’s last comment on this post. He and I have different theories of time – he defends the ‘static block’ view, whereas I am a presentist. As part and parcel of that larger debate we have been arguing about “tensed facts”.
As a presentist, I hold that only the present is real – the past is no more; the future is not yet. If something doesn’t exist now*, then it doesn’t exist period. Moreover, I believe that reality as a whole is (omnitemporally) dynamic and nonconstant. If we could survey all that exists from an absolute or God’s-eye perspective, we would observe it evolving from one state to another. I do, of course, believe that there are truths about the past and the future, but I analyze these in terms of truths about the present – either how what now exists has been or how what now exists is going to be. In other words, I think that all truths about the past and future are grounded in presently existing tensed facts. For example, the proposition that Caesar was assassinated is true now because the past-tense state of affairs Caesar’s having been assassinated obtains now.
(*Here and throughout this paragraph, “now” is meant as a referring term, not as a mere indexical. In other words, it doesn’t mean “that moment, whatever it is, that stands in the ‘simultaneous with’ relation to this (date, utterance, etc.)”. Rather, for a presentist, it refers to the Now, to that unique state of affairs that is reality as a whole.)
As a static block theorist, Ian has a very different view of things. On his view past, present, and future events and things are (tenselessly) all equally real. Time or space-time is like a stationary block stretched out in both spatial and temporal dimensions. If we could survey all that exists from a God’s-eye perspective, it would be utterly static and constant, like an eternal, unblinking cosmic stare. Change, on this view, consists in there being relations of difference among parts of the block along a temporal dimension. The block as a whole, however, does not change in the slightest. Now, this view would seem to have no use for tensed facts, certainly not in the sense in which I defined them above. Truths about the past and future as of any given time are (tenselessly) made true by the actual existence at their respective times of the past and future events referred to.
Oddly, however, from my point of view, Ian wants to affirm the existence of “tensed facts”. He writes:
I do believe that there is an objective now. Since my writing of ‘now’ occurs at 10:29PM 7/30/07 then my ‘now’ here refers to 10:29PM (PST) 7/30/07 and since I believe that there is an objective 10:29PM (PST) 7/30/07, I can perfectly agree that there is an objective now. The reference of ‘objective now’ will simply change depending on the time its uttered. And I can perfectly well, in the same way, accept that there are tensed facts. Of course it’s a fact that my writing this is present.
When Ian says “there is an objective now”, he means to use ‘now’ is a strictly indexical sense. To affirm “there is an objective now”, for him, means roughly the same thing as “for any given time t, there is a time (namely t itself) that is simultaneous with t.” Similarly, he affirms the existence of “tensed facts”. But what he means by ‘tensed facts’ is not at all the same thing as what I mean by the term. What I mean when I affirm the existence of tensed facts is that there exist states of affairs that intrinsically refer to the Now. What he means is, roughly, that there exist states of affairs that stand in temporal relations with other states of affairs.
Here is the terminological dispute: Both Ian and I want to reserve to ourselves the right to say “There is an objective now” and “There are tensed facts”, but we disagree about what those assertions mean, or rather ought to mean. As Ian analyzes our dispute, we both agree that
(1) There are tensed facts
while disagreeing about what tensed facts are. I don’t think that’s the right way to put it. It is precisely because we don’t agree on what tensed facts would be if they existed that we don’t agree on (1). In other words, even though we might utter the same sentence, we do not express the same proposition. There is only a semblance of agreement on (1). What we really agree on is not (1) but rather
(2) It is appropriate for me to use the expression “tensed facts exist” to characterize my metaphysical position. (‘Me’ and ‘my’ are to be understood indexically.)
We agree, in other words, in the propriety of using certain modes of expression in the course of cashing out our respective metaphysical positions. But this does not constitute substantive metaphysical agreement. Ian rejects the existence of tensed facts as I understand them. And I reject the existence of most of the tensed facts that he countenances. (He would presumably want to say that there are both past tensed and future tensed facts. According to presentism, however, the only real temporal relation is that of simultaneity – the only states of affairs that stand in temporal relations with other states of affairs are ones that are mutually concurrent. Hence, I would deny the existence of past tensed and future tensed facts as he understands them.)
Our dispute at this point is a terminological one. According to my usage of “objective now” and “tensed fact”, Ian denies the existence of such things. According to his usage, however, he affirms them. We can’t resolve this impasse by agreeing to (1) and then debating the nature of these things because we don’t agree on (1).
, which brings up the question of how to resolve
agreement about the existence of tensed facts. we shouldn’t confuse that with agreement about the existence of tensed facts. It is still the case that, from my point of view, you are an eliminativist about tensed facts. From your point of view, of course, the label is inappropriate. Fine, let’s agree to disagree on that.
The moral I want to emphasize is this. Before two people can have a productive metaphysical debate, they have secure enough agreement on matters of language so that it’s clear on both sides what is being affirmed and what is being denied. What our discussion so far has made clear to me is how difficult it can be to secure agreement on the use of terms of discussion. One party or the other has to be willing to concede proprietary use of certain modes of discourse to the other side so that an unambiguous contrast of positions can be made out. I had thought that “tensed facts exists” was sufficiently unambiguous to effect a clear difference between A-theorists and B-theorists. Ian disagrees. As a B-theorist he is not willing to concede that affirmation to meclear that no B-theorists would
Or rather, we have been arguing about what sorts of facts may be properly described with that label. In short, we are having a terminological dispute.
proper to describe with that label.
I agree with you that there are two questions here, and not just one. That was a central point of my post.
Where we differ is on how to analyze the nature of the debate. Let’s say that I’m the non-reductionist and that you are the reductionsit regarding tensed facts. You want to say that we agree in affirming
(1) Tensed facts exist
but disagree about the nature of tensed facts.
I don’t think that’s the right way to put it. It is precisely because we don’t agree on what tensed facts would be if they existed that we don’t agree on (1). When I say “tensed facts exist”, I mean to endorse an A-theoretical metaphysics. In other words, I take my claim to be incompatible with your metaphysics. When you say “tensed facts exist”, however, you either mean to endorse a B-theoretical metaphysics or you think that there is some concept of “tensed facts” that is neutral between the A and B theories. What that neutral conception could be, I don’t know. My point, however, is that what we agree on is not (1) but rather
(2) It is appropriate to say “tensed facts exist”.
We agree, in other words, in the propriety of using certain modes of expression in the course of cashing our out respective metaphysical positions. But we shouldn’t confuse that with agreement about the existence of tensed facts. It is still the case that, from my point of view, you are an eliminativist about tensed facts. From your point of view, of course, the label is inappropriate. Fine, let’s agree to disagree on that.
The moral I want to emphasize is this. Before two people can have a productive metaphysical debate, they have secure enough agreement on matters of language so that it’s clear on both sides what is being affirmed and what is being denied. What our discussion so far has made clear to me is how difficult it can be to secure agreement on the use of terms of discussion. One party or the other has to be willing to concede proprietary use of certain modes of discourse to the other side so that an unambiguous contrast of positions can be made out. I had thought that “tensed facts exists” was sufficiently unambiguous to effect a clear difference between A-theorists and B-theorists. Ian disagrees. As a B-theorist he is not willing to concede that affirmation to meclear that no B-theorists would
on the language we have to secure enough common ground on the language. it can be really difficult to isolate metaphysical debates you’re not.