I’d like to offer some thoughts comparing three different models of divine providence in relation to the problem of evil. The models I want to discuss are (1) theological determinism (hereafter ‘Calvinism’), (2) Molinism, and (3) open theism. [Full disclosure: My sympathies are with (3).]
By ‘Calvinism’ I mean the view that God has meticulously decreed “whatsoever comes to pass”. In other words, God knowingly and specifically “plans, orders, and provides” for every event, past, present, and future. There are no non-logical limits apart from God’s own nature constraining what kinds of worlds God can bring to pass.
By ‘Molinism’ I mean the view that God has meticulously decreed whatsoever comes to pass, but that there are non-logical limits apart from God’s own nature, that constrain what God can bring to pass. Specifically, according to Molinism, God’s creative decision is based on his pre-volitional knowledge of so-called “counterfactuals of creaturely freedom” (CCF’s), over which he has no control. According to Molinism, God knew, for any possible free creature S and any possible circumstance C and any possible action A (such that S could be free in C with respect to doing A) either (a) If placed in C, S would freely do A or (b) If placed in C, S would freely refrain from doing A. Because God has no control over which of those counterfactuals is true, his creative options are narrowed from the class of all possible world to the class of all feasible worlds (i.e., those possible worlds that are compatible with the true CCF’s).
By ‘open theism’ I mean the view that God has not meticulously decreed whatsoever comes to pass but has rather has left some aspects of history ‘open’, i.e., to be determined by the free decisions of his creatures.
Now, the problem of evil challenges theists to reconcile the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God with the existence of extensive, and often apparently gratuitous, suffering in the world. Theists generally try to meet the problem, at least in part, by developing ‘theodicies’ that try to show that God is justified in allowing various kinds of evils for the sake of promoting various kinds of goods. Many theodicies have been proposed, but it is generally agreed that the most plausible theodicies are variations on the “free will defense” (FWD). The basic idea is that giving creatures free will, so that they can choose between good and evil, is a good thing because it makes possible goods like genuine loving relationships that would not be possible otherwise. Moreover, God could not have given creatures free will and also guaranteed in advance that they never misused it. When creatures misuse their freedom to do evil, it is they, not God, who are to blame.
Now, let’s look at our three theories of divine providence in relation to the problem of evil.
Calvinism is clearly limited in its options because it has to eschew the FWD. Why did God decree the Fall, the Holocaust, and all the thousands of atrocities and natural disasters throughout history? There is not much the Calvinist can say beyond “God only knows”. That’s the “skeptical theist” response – it’s useful in moderation, but promotes moral skepticism and indifference in excess. In the end, Calvinism implies that God has created either the best of all possible worlds, or, if there is more than one such world, then one of the class of best possible worlds, or if there is no precise standard for determining a class of “best” possible worlds, then one of the class of “pretty darn good” possible worlds. It is far from clear, however, that this is such a world.
Molinism fares better. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCF’s) that it posits possess their truth values independently of God. Thus, if God creates Adam and puts him in a certain situation, then God can be certain ahead of time that Adam will freely choose to sin, but God can do nothing about it short of either not creating Adam or creating him but not allowing him into any situation in which he would freely choose to sin. In addition, the Molinist can make use of the FWD, for if Adam freely sins, then God is exonerated because Adam is the one who sinned, and because God couldn’t have created Adam and put him in those circumstances and prevented him from sinning. But, one wonders, why didn’t God do something different if he was sure that Adam would freely sin? The standard reply is that Adam, as well as every other free creature God could have created, possessed “trans-world depravity”. In other words, no matter which free creature God could have created, that being would have freely chosen to sin in similar circumstances. Frankly, I find the idea of trans-world depravity rather implausible. Given the trillions upon trillions of possible free creatures that God could have created and the unknown multitudes of circumstances he could have situated them in, surely God could have found enough possible free creatures to populate a world in which moral evil was much rarer than it is in ours. And if so, then why didn’t God create that kind of world instead? In summary, Molinism implies that God has created either the best of all feasible worlds, or, if there is more than one such world, then one of the class of best feasible worlds, or if there is no precise standard for determining a class of “best” feasible worlds, then one of the class of “pretty darn good” feasible worlds. Again, it is far from clear that this is such a world.
Open theism, I think, fares better still. Open theists reject the meticulous providence of both Calvinism and Molinism. So they don’t have to deal with God’s eternally decreeing evils or of God’s willing to create a world when he knew ahead of time that it would contain all the evils that ours does. According to open theism, because God has sovereignly decided to create a world with free creatures, the outcome of the world depends to a large extent on what choices those creatures make. And, since future free choices haven’t yet been made and cannot be predicted with certainty on the basis of past and present events, God cannot know for certain how the world will turn out in all its particulars. This helps because God would seem to be less blameworthy for not preventing evils that he couldn’t know in advance would happen. On the open theist view, an all-good God would be expected to create not the best of all possible worlds or the best of all feasible worlds, but the best of all possible means to the best of all possible worlds. Or if there is no unique best means, then one of the class of best possible means. Or, if there is no precise standard for determining a class of “best” possible means, then one of the class of “pretty darn good” possible means. Or, qualifying the goal as well, a “pretty darn good” means to a “pretty darn good” possible world. And now, I think, it is not so clear that our world is not such a world.