I’m slowly working my way through Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). I say “slowly” because I’m juggling a few other projects at the moment and want to make sure that I give his book its proper due given the centrality of the topic to my… Read More »
I tackled this topic several years ago, but I think it’s time to revisit it again. I’m going to argue that truthmaker maximalism (TM)—the view that every truth is grounded in some reality that makes it true—should not be regarded as a particularly controversial thesis. It’s virtually a corollary of the correspondence theory of truth (CTT).… Read More »
What is the relation of truthmaker theory to the correspondence theory of truth? In a paper by William Lane Craig and David Hunt that I’ve just finished responding to in a series of posts (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), they assert that It is … no part of the correspondence theory of truth that… Read More »
This is the fifth installment in a series of posts responding to a 2013 paper by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H) entitled “Perils of the Open Road”. In the paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006 paper (hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled “Open Theism, Omniscience, and… Read More »
Trenton Merricks claims that truthmakers must be what truths are “about” in some unarticulated sense of “about”. He then argues against truthmaker-type principles by claiming that there are truths of various sorts for which his undefined aboutness criterion cannot be met. In two of my last three posts I have criticized Merricks for leaving this… Read More »