Category Archives: openness of the future

A Roll-Back Argument for Open Theism

Suppose we assume that God exists, God is omniscient (i.e., God infallibly knows all of reality as it is), The future is causally open (i.e., there are multiple causally possible futures because some future event possibilities are causally undetermined). Now, suppose a sequence S of events (E1, E2, … , En) plays out a certain… Read More: A Roll-Back Argument for Open Theism »

Todd (ch.1) – Open Futurism and Grounding

I’m slowly working my way through Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). I say “slowly” because I’m juggling a few other projects at the moment and want to make sure that I give his book its proper due given the centrality of the topic to my… Read More: Todd (ch.1) – Open Futurism and Grounding »

Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 5 – the metaphysical argument)

This is the fifth installment in a series of posts responding to a 2013 paper by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H) entitled “Perils of the Open Road”. In the paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006 paper (hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled “Open Theism, Omniscience, and… Read More: Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 5 – the metaphysical… »

Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 4 – the semantic argument)

This is the fourth installment in a series of posts in which I respond to a recent 2013 paper entitled “Perils of the Open Road” authored by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H). In their paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006 paper (hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled “Open… Read More: Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 4 – the semantic… »

On Propositions that Can Never Become True

Alex Pruss recently posted an interesting new objection to alethic openness at his blog. His argument is not that long, so for convenience I’ll reproduce it here. According to open future views, the proposition that in 2015 a fair and indeterministic coin lands heads has some probability but is not true. However, that proposition is… Read More: On Propositions that Can Never Become True »

Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 3 – the SFV/OFV distinction)

This is the third installment in a series of posts in which I respond to a 2013 paper entitled “Perils of the Open Road” authored by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H). In the paper C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006 paper (hereafter, RBB) that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd… Read More: Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 3 – the SFV/OFV… »

Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 1 – Preliminary Considerations)

With this post I begin a series in which I respond to a 2013 paper by William Lane Craig and David Hunt. Entitled “Perils of the Open Road,” the paper critiques two papers defending open theism. More specifically, they critique a 2006 paper that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled “Open Theism,… Read More: Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 1 – Preliminary Considerations) »

Alethic Openness and Bivalence (Part 2 of 2)

In my previous post I briefly presented a reason, one having to do with the need to avoid fatalism and accommodate future contingency, for thinking that the future is alethically open, or such that there is no complete, true, linear story of the future.  I then noted that we can make sense of alethic openness by supposing that… Read More: Alethic Openness and Bivalence (Part 2 of 2) »