Category Archives: disquotation principle

The Metaphysical Muddles of Molinism – Some Thoughts on MacGregor (Part 1)

As part of my ongoing research for my book project on Open Theism (under contract with Cambridge Univ. Press), I’ve recently begun reading Kirk MacGregor’s latest book, Molinist Philosophical and Theological Ventures (2022). I’m looking at the book because he addresses some aspects of an anti-Molinist argument that I’ve been developing over the past few… Read More »

Todd (ch.5) – Omniscience and the Open Future

This is part 5 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). (Previous installments: part 1, part 2, part 3, and part 4.) Chapter 5 is a relatively short chapter that initially focuses on how to understand divine omniscience in relation to… Read More »

Molinist Strategies for Meeting the Grounding Objection

In a previous post I presented the infamous grounding objection to Molinism. The problem stems from the fact that for Molinism God’s middle knowledge (MK) is supposed to be non-natural, i.e., not part of, entailed by, or grounded in God’s nature contingent, i.e., neither necessary nor impossible in the abstract metaphysical sense that I describe… Read More »

Correspondence vs. Disquotation

In my previous two posts I have discussed the correspondence theory of truth and disquotation principles. In this post I’m going to use the former to argue against the latter. More specifically, I’m going to argue that the “if and only if” of the disquotation principles should be merely an “only if”. In other words, instead… Read More »