A frequent reply to foreknowledge / future contingency incompatibility arguments is that something must be wrong with all such arguments simply because “foreknowledge isn’t causal” and so cannot constrain our freedom. Thus, William Lane Craig writes: “No matter how ingenious the argument, fatalism [i.e., the incompatibilist’s argument] must be wrong. For it posits a constraint… Read More »
This is part six of eleven in a series responding to the essays in Ben Arbour’s edited volume, Philosophical Essays against Open Theism (Routledge, 2019). In this post I tackle chapter 6 by Katherin Rogers, “Foreknowledge, Freedom, and Vicious Circles: Anselm vs. Open Theism” (pp. 93–109). Rogers is a well-respected philosopher of religion and a… Read More »
This is the second installment in a series of posts in which I respond to a recent 2013 paper by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H). Entitled “Perils of the Open Road,” C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006 paper that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled “Open… Read More »