Category Archives: fatalism

Todd (ch.5) – Omniscience and the Open Future

This is part 5 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). (Previous installments: part 1, part 2, part 3, and part 4.) Chapter 5 is a relatively short chapter that initially focuses on how to understand divine omniscience in relation to… Read More »

Fatalism and the “Modal Fallacy” Fallacy

A common trope in the academic literature on fatalism is that arguments for fatalism are invariably guilty of a “modal fallacy”, specifically the fallacy of conflating “necessarily, if p then q” with “if p, then necessarily q“. In fancy academic jargon this is known as conflating the necessity of the consequence (i.e., of the whole conditional, if p… Read More »

Todd (ch.4) – Against Conditional Excluded Middle

This is part 4 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). You can find part 1 here, part 2 here, and part 3 here. Ch. 3 dealt with will excluded middle (WEM), the thesis that Fp ∨ F~p (i.e., that for… Read More »

Todd (ch.3) – Against “Will Excluded Middle”

This is part 3 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). You can find part 1 here and part 2 here. Todd’s main focus in chapter 3  is a thesis that he calls “will excluded middle” (WEM). Simply put, WEM says… Read More »

Open Futurism, Supervaluationism, and Indeterminacy – A Critique of Barnes and Cameron

In my previous post on Ch. 2 of Patrick Todd’s book The Open Future (Oxford 2021), I criticized Todd for confusing supervaluationism with the view defended by Elizabeth Barnes and Ross Cameron in two influential papers. In this post I want to look more closely at the view of Barnes and Cameron (hereafter B&C). For ease of… Read More »

Todd (ch.2) – Models of the Undetermined Future

This is part 2 of my ongoing series on Patrick Todd’s recently published book The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False (Oxford, 2021). You can find part 1 here. In chapter 2, Todd compares and contrasts “three models of the undetermined future” and proposes a unified semantics for the future tense. I argue… Read More »

A Refutation of Simple Foreknowledge Revisited

In my previous post, I develop what I take to be a refutation of the simple foreknowledge (SF) view. In this post I want to look at little more carefully at that refutation, consider how a proponent of SF might try to get around it, and show that this response does nothing to resolve the… Read More »

The Impossibility of Simple Foreknowledge

In philosophical theology, simple foreknowledge (SF) is the view that Minimal monotheism is true, i.e., there is one, necessarily existing, personal, omniscient, etc. God who freely creates ex nihilo. God is temporally everlasting and therefore has a past, present, and future. The future is causally open, i.e., there are multiple causally possible futures, and therefore… Read More »

Responding to Craig and Hunt (Part 2 – “The Argument”)

This is the second installment in a series of posts in which I respond to a recent 2013 paper by William Lane Craig and David Hunt (hereafter, C&H). Entitled “Perils of the Open Road,” C&H critique two papers defending open theism: a 2006 paper that I co-wrote with Greg Boyd and Tom Belt entitled “Open… Read More »