Author Archives: Alan Rhoda

I’ve just finished revising my paper “Presentism, Truthmakers, and God” and have sent it off to a journal. I made quite a few changes from the earlier version. For those who might be interested, here’s the abstract: Abstract: The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that what exists simpliciter is coextensive with what exists now)… Read More »

Faithful readers, My wife and I are leaving tomorrow morning for a week in Maui to celebrate our third anniversary. So no more blogging until I get back. Alan PS: I’ve decided to try turning off comment moderation. So your comments will now appear immediately after you post them.

In my previous post I raised some questions about the “Law of Excluded Middle” (LEM), which states that (LEM) For any proposition p, either p is true or p is not-true. The gist of my concern was that if LEM applies across the board then this implies that reality is discrete all the way down,… Read More »

The so-called “Law of Excluded Middle” (LEM) is often taken to be one of the most fundamental laws of logic. It may be expressed as follows: (LEM) For any proposition p, either p is true or p is not-true. LEM is to be distinguished from the Principle of Bivalence (BV), which states: (BV) For any… Read More »

I’ve argued here that the truthmaker objection to presentism is best met by appealing to God’s memories of the past as the truthmakers of true propositions about the past. (Note: Readers of the linked paper should be aware that I am still revising it. Constructive feedback is welcome.) Instead, I will briefly explain how my… Read More »

Awhile back, I did a series of three posts (I, II, and III) in which I was trying to work out the relations between propositions (“props” for short) and states of affairs (“sofas” for short). I’ve since been rethinking things a bit. So here’s my new and (hopefully) improved theory. Earlier I had written that… Read More »

As William Dembski has pointed out, there are three basic types of explanations we can give for any phenomenon, E: Law: We can posit some nomological regularity L which allows us to predict E as a (probable) consequence of antecedent conditions. Chance: We can say that E had no systematic cause but was simply a… Read More »

I certainly don’t mind being challenged, and I can usually count on my regular commenter, Ocham, to do just that. He seems to take issue with nearly everything I say. My last post on Intelligent Design was no exception. Here’s his latest: Ocham: I don’t see how the designist argument counts as an explanation. As… Read More »

Reader C Grace (Celinda) asked me to comment on the following argument: p1 Intrinsically, the mind has no form or existence only intentionp2 Intention is a potential relationp3 Representation occurs when the mind takes on the form of the object presentedp4 Willing is the act of actuating an intention thus creating an actual relationthereforec1 the… Read More »