I’ve argued here that the truthmaker objection to presentism is best met by appealing to God’s memories of the past as the truthmakers of true propositions about the past. (Note: Readers of the linked paper should be aware that I am still revising it. Constructive feedback is welcome.) Instead, I will briefly explain how my… Read More: Presentism, Truthmakers, and God’s Memories: Reply to an Objection »
Awhile back, I did a series of three posts (I, II, and III) in which I was trying to work out the relations between propositions (“props” for short) and states of affairs (“sofas” for short). I’ve since been rethinking things a bit. So here’s my new and (hopefully) improved theory. Earlier I had written that… Read More: Propositions and States of Affairs – IV »
As William Dembski has pointed out, there are three basic types of explanations we can give for any phenomenon, E: Law: We can posit some nomological regularity L which allows us to predict E as a (probable) consequence of antecedent conditions. Chance: We can say that E had no systematic cause but was simply a… Read More: Three Types of Explanations – Law, Chance, and Design »
I certainly don’t mind being challenged, and I can usually count on my regular commenter, Ocham, to do just that. He seems to take issue with nearly everything I say. My last post on Intelligent Design was no exception. Here’s his latest: Ocham: I don’t see how the designist argument counts as an explanation. As… Read More: Design Arguments and Probability – Reply to Ocham »
Reader C Grace (Celinda) asked me to comment on the following argument: p1 Intrinsically, the mind has no form or existence only intentionp2 Intention is a potential relationp3 Representation occurs when the mind takes on the form of the object presentedp4 Willing is the act of actuating an intention thus creating an actual relationthereforec1 the… Read More: From the Mailbag: On Mind and Intention »
In my previous post I linked to a recent essay by William Dembski, one of the leading figures in the Intelligent Design (ID) movement. In the essay, he argues that Darwinism is significantly analogous to alchemy such that, like alchemy, its scientific merits should be suspect. In should mention that Dembski doesn’t use the term… Read More: Which is More Like Alchemy – Darwinism or ID? »
An interesting comparison by leading ID expert William Dembski. (Link)
In an earlier post, I proposed the following hypothesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals: (RH) (a) If p entails q then P(If p then q)=1. (b) If p entails ~q, then P(If p then q)=0. (c) If p entails neither q nor ~q, then P(If p then q) = P(X), where X is whatever information… Read More: Further Thoughts on the Probabilities of Conditionals »
I’ve decided to make my dissertation available for download. Entitled “The Problem of Induction: An Epistemological and Methodological Response”, I examine and reject most of the extant proposals for “solving” the problem and develop a novel approach to the issue that, I think, works, at least in broad outline. If I were to rewrite it… Read More: My Dissertation »
A conditional probability is represented P(A | B), read “the probability of A given B”, and is (by definition) equivalent to P(A & B) / P(B). To see how this works, consider a simple example. Let’s take a fair die and roll it. What is the probability that we will role and even number? Clearly,… Read More: Conditional Probabilities and the Probabilities of Conditionals »