In yesterday’s post I gave some background on the Intelligent Design (ID) debate and noted that an increasingly popular move by the mainstream scientific establishment has been to stipulate that “science” requires methodological naturalism. In other words, the claim is that properly “scientific” explanations can only make reference to ‘natural’ laws and entities, the kinds… Read More: Science and Methodological Naturalism »
In the wake of a recent Pennsylvania court case there has been a lot of discussion about the scientific status (or lack thereof) of “Intelligent Design” (ID), an intellectual movement initially spearheaded by the works of Phillip Johnson and then picked up by Michael Behe, William Dembski, and a growing chorus of scientists, philosophers, and… Read More: Intelligent-Design and the Nature of Science »
On a tip from hammsbear, I took a look at Peter Ludlow’s article, “Do T-Theories Display Senses”. Here are some of my thoughts on that article. Tarksi’s T-schema (“p” is true iff p) is often used to spell out the truth conditions for sentences. Thus, “snow is white” is true iff snow is white. (‘iff’… Read More: Tarksi’s T-Schema, Truth-Conditions, and Senses »
I’m still reading Smith’s book (Language and Time), and I’ve noticed that Smith, along with everyone he’s critiqued thus far, makes an assumption about the truth conditions of sentence tokens that, frankly, seems false to me. First, let me explain what a sentence token is. Consider the sentence “It is raining” uttered on two separate… Read More: Sentence Tokens and Truth Conditions »
Some of these are fairly lame, I admit. And some are clever but opaque to the philosophically uninitiated. See if you can figure them out before I explain any of them. (I wouldn’t want to spoil a good joke with premature commentary.) Don’t put Descartes before the horse. One day Descartes walked into a pub… Read More: Some Philosophy Jokes »
I’m currently reading Quentin Smith’s book Language and Time, in chapter 1 of which he has a nice argument against a certain kind of skepticism (pp. 14-18). His argument runs as follows. Is it ever reasonable for you to believe something just because it seems true to you and, so far as you are aware,… Read More: Quentin Smith Contra Skepticism »
So far as I am aware, all philosophers agree that if it rains on a particular Tuesday then it will be the case every day thereafter that it rained on that particular Tuesday. If we let P stand for “it was the case that …”, F stand for “it will be the case that …”,… Read More: Peircean vs. Ockhamist Tense Logic »
Whenever someone says that something is relative–whether it be morality, truth, velocity, the color of emeralds, or what have you–you should always ask the question, “relative to what?” There are as many ways for something to be relative as there as ways to answer that question. For example, some people think that morality (by which… Read More: All Moral Relativisms Are Self-Refuting »
Self-proclaimed “Maverick Philosopher” William Vallicella brought to my attention the following paradox: ‘Neologism’ is not a new word, but an old word. Hence, ‘neologism’ is not a neologism. ‘Paleologism’ is not a word at all; or at least it is not listed in the Oxford English Dictionary. But it ought to be, so I hereby… Read More: Neologism, Paleologisms, and Grelling’s Paradox »