I’ve recently been rereading Trenton Merrick’s book Truth and Ontology (Oxford, 2007) in which he argues against the substantive dependence of truth on being. Thus, he rejects theses like TM – Every truth has a truthmaker, a parcel of reality the existence of which necessitates, and thereby grounds, that truth. TSB – Truth supervenes on… Read More »
of 200+ living philosophers of religion.
In my two previous posts, I have explained the notion of ‘truth at a time’ and argued that for a (contingent) proposition to be true at T it must supervene upon what exists at T. In short, truth at T requires a truthmaker at T. A question that remains concerns accessibility relations among times. If… Read More »
As a follow-up to my previous post, I’d like to say a bit about how truth at a time and truth at a world relate to truth simpliciter. Unlike ‘truth at a world’ and ‘truth at a time’, truth simpliciter is not evaluated from the perspective of any given time or world, but absolutely. In… Read More »
In my previous post I made the following claim without argument: “for a proposition to be true now, what it represents as being the case must correspond to … what is the case now.” I’m now going to give that argument. Every argument for any categorical conclusion requires some categorical assumptions which are not defended… Read More »
The future is ‘alethically’ open at time T with respect to possible state of affairs X and future time T* > T if and only if neither “X will obtain at T*” nor “X will not obtain at T*” is true at T. I believe that the future is alethically open with respect to future… Read More »
I’ve been reflecting a bit about the following analogy proposed by Enigman: Given someone who knows that she can move freely anywhere within an infinitely dimensional space, does she know that she has complete freedom of motion? The problem is that such a space is isomorphic to a hyperspace containing such a space as a… Read More »
Vlastimil Vohánka send me an email recently asking for my thoughts on the following reconstruction of an argument recently proposed by Quentin Smith. 1. Necessarily, global moral realism is true (everything, or rather, every physical entity, has a positive amount of value). Premise2. Necessarily, aggregative value theory is true (each physical location has a finite… Read More »
As I note in a comment on my previous post, I have a strong intuition that there should be some sort of systematic connection between assertibility-conditions and truth-conditions. The source of that intuition, I think, stems from the Principle of Charity, which states that, so long as it is contextually plausible to do so, one… Read More »
Thesis: Whatever anyone must believe in order rationally to assert a proposition p is part of the meaning of p. Obvious case: One cannot rationally assert p unless one believes that p. If the thesis is right, then it provides a test for whether a given proposition q is part of the meaning of p.… Read More »