What philosophers call ‘propositions’ are useful theoretical entities. They are useful because they help to unify a range of otherwise disparate mental and linguistic phenomena. Thus, propositions are often thought to be (a) the contents of our mental representations, (b) the objects of intentional attitudes, (c) the meanings of sentences, and (d) the primary bearers… Read More »
It is commonly held among philosophers that events are the kinds of things that can most properly be said to serve as causes and effects. On this view, the event of the rock’s hitting the window causes the event of the window’s breaking. Some, however, prefer to analyze causation in terms of states (or states-of-affairs).… Read More »
Just got a paper accepted for publication in Religious Studies. Entitled “Generic Open Theism and Some Varieties Thereof,” it will probably come out in early 2008. Here’s the almost final version. I’ll be reading a somewhat shortened version of this paper at the upcoming Pacific APA in early April.
My recent post on the problem of evil stirred up quite a bit of discussion. One issue that I brushed over in my post, but which came up repeatedly in the comments, was that theism is no better than atheistic materialism at explaining how there can be objective moral standards due to the infamous “Euthyphro… Read More »
Brilliant satire. Enjoy. (HT: Uncommon Descent)
The most oft-discussed objection against theism is the problem of evil, and it runs basically as follows: If an all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful God exists, then he obviously wouldn’t allow an evil unless he had a sufficiently good reason for doing so. Cite numerous examples of apparently gratuitous evils (i.e., evils for which there does not… Read More »
There’s an interesting post over at Bill Vallicella’s blog on whether belief in God is in the same rational boat as belief that there is a tiny china teapot orbiting the sun, an angry unicorn on the dark side of the moon, or the flying spaghetti monster. Bill says no, and I agree. He notes… Read More »
I received the following reply to an earlier blog post concerning whether it was possible for someone to rationally believe in the miraculous. Dear Alan, I am a Czech grad student in philosophy who wants to write a dissertation concerning contemporary analytical philosophy of religion, mainly the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ. I… Read More »
Here’s another recent review of Dawkins’ The God Delusion. This one from The New York Review of Books, January 11, 2007 edition. It’s written by H. Allen Orr, a biologist, religious agnostic, and noted critic of the Intelligent Design movement. All in all, Orr’s review strikes me as a balanced one. He’s got no particular… Read More »
Roughly stated, presentism is the view that the only time at which anything exists is now. Past events are no more; future events are not yet. If it doesn’t exist now then it doesn’t exist, period. One common objection to presentism is known as the triviality objection. According to this objection, presentism is either (a)… Read More »