Since I’m doing a series on incompatible property arguments against God’s existence, I thought it’d be appropo to link to a short discussion between two philosophers – one a theist, the other an atheist – on this issue.
The next several arguments that Drange presents (see here) turn on the idea of divine immutability, that God is incapable of change in any sense, and attempt to draw out a contradiction with other divine attributes. Here’s the first: The Immutability-vs.-Creation Argument If God exists, then he is immutable. If God exists, then he is… Read More: Incompatible Properties Arguments against Theism (Part 2) »
Haven’t posted much in awhile, but I thought I would do a short series of posts on a group of “incompatible properties” arguments against theism delineated by Theodore Drange. He presents the arguments here. Basically, incompatible properties arguments against theism try to show that theism is false because the concept of God is in some… Read More: Incompatible Properties Arguments against Theism (Part 1) »
In previous blog posts I’ve discussed two opposing tense logics: (a) Ockhamist and (b) Peircean. Ockhamist tense logic takes as its characteristic axiom the claim that (O) □(∀p)(∀t)(∀u: u
In an earlier post, I explained the difference between the ‘Peircean’ and ‘Ockhamist’ systems of tense logic. Simply put, the Ockhamist construes the future tense-operator “will” to mean merely “happens subsequently to the time of the utterance”. Thus, if someone says of a completely indeterministic coin before it is tossed “it will land heads” and… Read More: Peircean vs. Ockhamist Tense Logic – Part 2 »
One form of the infamous Liar Paradox asks us to consider a person uttering the phrase “I am lying right now” and to determine if they are or are not lying. The paradox is supposed to emerge once one notices that if the person is lying then it follows that they are not lying, and… Read More: How to Respond to the Liar Paradox »
Sorry, folks, about being absent from my blog for so long. I’m currently under a crunch-time of sorts regarding several different projects. Blogging for me is a spare-time thing, not an obsession, so when things get too hectic I have to take a break. And with this year’s philosophy job search fast approaching, posting will… Read More: Concepts and Propositions – I »
Blogging’s been light because I’ve been tied up for most of this month with several projects that are at crunch time. One of those projects is a substantial revision of my paper “A Defense of Prior’s ‘Peircean’ Tense Logic” that I presented at a conference in April 2006. As with most issues, I’ve found that… Read More: A Short Note on Tense Logic »
An indexical is a pointing word, one used to refer directly to something. (To remember this, think of your index finger, the one you use to point with.) Examples include ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’, ‘we’, ‘they’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. Clearly, indexicals are an important part of our speech. In fact, nearly every… Read More: Propositions and Indexicals »
Just a few quick, not fully thought-out ideas on this topic. Consider the present-tensed statement “It is now 3 o’clock”. How should we articulate truth conditions for this statement? The dominant view is that the truth conditions must take into account the de facto time of utterance. Thus, (1) “It is now 3 o’clock” uttered… Read More: Truth-Conditions for Tensed Statements »